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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2016–2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners 
reviews Florida appellate court decisions involving state tax and other 
business law matters.
1
  While the cases that have been included are mostly 
from 2016 through June of 2017, several important 2015 cases have been 
included.
2
 
Part II provides analysis of appellate cases where the courts were 
presented with disputes by and among the business, its owners and their 
transferees, and its key employees, whether sounding in tort, contract, 
statutory law, or a combination thereof.
3
 
Part III considers litigation with third parties starting with several 
important state tax cases involving constitutional and procedural issues of 
note.
4
  Cases arising in and out of the ordinary course of business, again, 
                                                          
 * Associate Professor of Taxation and Business Law, Master of Taxation 
and Master of Accounting Programs, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business and 
Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern University; B.A., New York University; J.D., New York 
Law School; LL.M. (Tax), New York University School of Law. 
1. See infra Parts I–II. 
2. See infra Parts II–III. 
3. See infra Part II. 
4. See infra Part III. 
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whether sounding in tort, contract, or statutory law—other than tax—or a 
combination follow.
5
 
II. CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND 
PARTNERSHIPS:  DIVORCES OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER 
A. Officers and Directors Liability 
1. Director and Officer Liability Policy:  Insured Versus Insured 
Exclusion 
Mr. Durant, a shareholder of Bonifay Holding Company, Inc. 
(“Corporation”), was formerly a director of Corporation.6  Mr. James, at all 
times relevant to this case, was Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and 
President of Corporation.
7
  Mr. Durant previously sold his stock back to 
Corporation
8
 but later repurchased the stock.
9
  After the repurchase, Mr. 
Durant brought and prevailed in an action against Mr. James, which alleged 
overvaluation of the repurchased stock.
10
  Mr. Durant attempted to collect the 
money judgment awarded in that action—of more than $1 million—by 
seeking a writ of garnishment against the directors and officers under a 
policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Insurance 
Company”), which insured the Corporation’s directors and officers.11  
Insurance Company counterclaimed and sought a declaration that the claim 
was not covered by the policy.
12
  The policy contained an insured versus 
insured coverage exclusion (“Exclusion”), whereby Insurance Company was 
not required to pay claims by one [i]nsured [p]erson against another 
[i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct,
13
 subject to two exceptions set forth 
in the policy.
14
  The Exclusion did not apply to claims based upon an 
insured’s employment or for contribution or indemnification of otherwise 
covered claims.
15
  Mr. Durant argued that his suit against Mr. James was not 
undertaken “as a director or [as a] former . . . director, . . . but [rather] in his 
                                                          
5. See id. 
6. Durant v. James, 189 So. 3d 993, 995 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
7. Id. 
8. Id.  Mr. Durant was required by the judgment of dissolution entered in his 
divorce to sell his stock in Corporation.  Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 995 & n.1. 
15. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995 n.1. 
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[individual] capacity,” and the writ sought was based on damages awarded to 
him under a “judgment unrelated to his former director position.”16  Both 
Insurance Company and Mr. Durant filed motions seeking summary 
declaratory judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment to Insurance 
Company and Mr. Durant appealed.
17
  The Exclusion provided that “[t]he 
insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for [l]oss in connection with 
any [c]laim by or at the behest of the Company, or any affiliate of the 
Company or any [i]nsured [p]erson”—the balance of the provision being the 
two exceptions mentioned above.
18
  Insured persons were defined in the 
policy as “any past, present or future director, trustee, officer . . . of the 
Company,” and the definition of claim contained in the policy was “any 
demand ‘against an [i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct;’” there was no 
disagreement as to these definitions.
19
  The district court, noting that the fact 
that Mr. Durant and Mr. James were both insured persons was not contested, 
concluded that Mr. Durant failed to bring himself within the policy’s express 
exceptions to the Exclusion, nor was he acting in furtherance of some 
statutory duty.
20
  The First District Court of Appeal in Durant v. James
21
 
considered the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby v. 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s22 and concluded that Rigby was distinguishable from 
the case before the First District Court of Appeal.
23
  Rigby involved a trustee 
in bankruptcy added to a previously issued director and officer liability 
policy as an insured person, and specifically named in the amended 
definition of the term director in the policy.
24
  The Third District Court of 
Appeal in Rigby held that the Exclusion did not apply to the trustee in 
bankruptcy acting in furtherance of statutory duties of the trustee under 
federal bankruptcy statutes and suing other directors—on behalf of 
creditors.
25
  The Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby held that the 
bankruptcy trustee “did not bring the adversary action acting as an officer or 
                                                          
16. Id. at 995. 
17. Id. at 994–95. 
18. Id. at 995 n.1. 
19. Id. at 995. 
20. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96.  The First District Court of Appeal 
distinguished the facts before it from the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s—involving a trustee in bankruptcy acting in furtherance of 
the duties of the trustee under federal bankruptcy statutes.  Id.; see also Rigby v. Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s, 907 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
21. 189 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
22. 907 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
23. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995. 
24. Id.; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1188–89.  As discussed in Durant, there was an 
amendment to the definition of director in the policy involved in Rigby to include, by name, 
the bankruptcy trustee.  Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189. 
25. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189. 
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director.  As a result, the insured versus insured [provision] did not apply.”26  
After distinguishing Rigby, the First District Court of Appeal in Durant 
noted that it was “further persuaded by the opinions of other jurisdictions, 
holding that the capacity in which the claimant sued the other officer or 
director in the first instance had no bearing on the bar on coverage under a 
[directors and officers] policy’s insured versus insured exclusion.”27  The 
First District Court of Appeal concluded that the policy did not contain any 
ambiguity and there was no “lack of clarity in the terms” requiring 
interpretation.
28
 
2. Who Is on the Board and Where Did the Corporation Go? 
The dispute in Wilson v. Wilson
29
 stemmed from the death of 
Reverend John Wilson (“Reverend”).30  The Reverend had incorporated a 
number of entities.
31
  The initial issue in the trial court was regarding the 
identities of the members of the boards of directors of those corporations 
(“Corporations”).32  Before trial, the judge allowed the former personal 
representative of the Reverend’s estate (“Intervenor”) to intervene.33  The 
Intervenor’s position was that the various Corporations formed by the 
Reverend had not operated as not-for-profit corporations, and therefore, the 
Corporations’ assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to 
administration.
34
  As to the initial issue—the identity of the board 
members—the trial judge’s order stated that neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendants had proven that they were board members.
35
  The trial judge also 
ruled, in essence, that the Corporations were to be disregarded and that the 
assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to administration, 
which supported the Intervenor’s position.36  On appeal, the Third District 
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendants were not 
directors, but reversed the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs were not 
directors.
37
  The appellate court noted that the Corporations’ regularly filed 
required annual reports identified the plaintiffs as members of the Board of 
                                                          
26. Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189. 
27. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 996. 
28. Id. 
29. 211 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
30. Id. at 314. 
31. Id. at 317. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 315. 
34. Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 315. 
35. Id. at 316. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 319–20. 
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Directors.
38
  The district court also reversed the trial court’s ruling that 
effectively dissolved the Corporations—and went even further by deciding to 
whom the dissolved Corporations’ assets belonged.39  Also, under the test set 
out by the Supreme Court of Florida in Morgareidge v. Howey,
40
 the 
Intervenor should not have been allowed to intervene as he had no interest of 
the direct and immediate character required.
41
  Nor should the Intervenor 
have been permitted to introduce new issues of validity of the Corporations 
and of the ownership of the assets of the Corporations, as intervenors are not 
allowed to introduce new issues.
42
 
3. Fiduciary Duties 
The next case, Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.,
43
 is a consolidated 
appeal of two Miami-Dade County Circuit Court cases.
44
  In Taverna 
Imports, Inc. v. Maricela Fonseca (“Case One”), the allegations included the 
following:  Taverna Imports, Inc. (“Corporation”) issued 4500 of its 5000 
authorized shares equally to three shareholders—Mario Taverna (“Mario”), 
Maricela Fonseca (“Maricela”), and Jule Laudisio (“Jule”)—when 
Corporation was formed in 2002.
45
  Corporation, in 2005, redeemed 1000 
shares from Jule,
46
 and at the end of January 2007, Jule agreed, in writing, to 
have her remaining 500 shares redeemed for cash—with checks for the 
correct amounts transmitted to her at the end of January of 2007.
47
  This left 
Mario and Maricela as the remaining shareholders.
48
  Within three days after 
receipt of the checks, Jule attempted to disavow the sale of her remaining 
shares and she returned the checks to Corporation.
49
  In late February 2007, 
at a formal shareholders’ meeting, Mario, the elected president of 
Corporation, was purportedly ousted from that role by a vote of the 
shareholders, including Jule, which ouster occurred even though the 
                                                          
38. Id. at 319. 
39. Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 317–18, 320. 
40. 78 So. 14 (Fla. 1918). 
41. Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 316–17 (quoting Morgareidge, 78 So. at 15). 
42. Id. 
43. 212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
44. Id. at 434. 
45. Id. at 434–35. 
46. Id. at 435.  After the 2005 redemption, 45% of the shares were owned by 
Mario, 45% of the shares were owned by Maricela, and 10% of the shares were owned by 
Jule.  Id. 
47. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 435. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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corporate by-laws required that officers be removed by the Board of 
Directors.
50
 
Mario and Corporation sued:  (1) Maricela; (2) Richard Fonseca 
(“Richard”), Maricela’s husband; (3) Jule; and (4) Hans Eichmann (“Hans”), 
a former member of the Board of Directors of Corporation, and an employee 
and a former employee of Corporation.
51
  In the lawsuit, Corporation 
requested a declaratory judgment declaring that the redemption of Jule’s 
stock was valid and that the corporate actions taken after Jule’s stock had 
been repurchased were invalid.
52
  Mario also sought damages for Maricela’s 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty and for Richard’s alleged aiding and 
abetting of Maricela’s alleged breach.53  On Corporation’s motion for partial 
summary judgment, the trial court found that the redemption of Jule’s shares 
was valid, that the election of a new president at the formal shareholders’ 
meeting was not valid, and that Mario was still president of Corporation.
54
  
After trial, on the remaining issues, the jury awarded damages of $1,063,234 
in favor of Corporation against all of the defendants for “wrongfully [taking] 
corporate authority of [the Corporation], which caused [it] damages.”55  The 
jury also awarded damages of $833,000 to Mario, individually, for 
Maricela’s breach of fiduciary duty and Richard’s role in aiding and 
abetting.
56
  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court 
proceedings except as to the calculation of damages.
57
  The redemption of 
Jule’s shares to Corporation was valid even though only Jule signed the 
agreement, and not Corporation, since the parties had performed under the 
contract.
58
  The fact that Jule did not cash the checks was of no legal 
consequence.
59
  Mario’s removal as president was ineffective as it was not 
done “by a majority vote of the Board of Directors.”60  The district court also 
held that there was competent substantial evidence to support the jury’s 
verdict that Maricela breached her fiduciary duty to Mario under section 
                                                          
50. Id. at 435–36.  About a month later, after a special meeting, Mario found 
himself locked out of the Corporation’s warehouse, although he was subsequently let in, at 
which time he discovered that Hans, the former employee and former board member, was 
back and managing the business.  Id.  Mario was eventually terminated.  Fonseca, 212 So. 3d 
at 436. 
51. Id. at 434 & n.3, 437. 
52. Id. at 437. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 435, 437. 
55. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 438. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 443. 
58. Id. at 440–41. 
59. See id. at 441. 
60. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 441–42. 
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607.0831 of the Florida Statutes.
61
  In addition, the court found competent 
substantial evidence in support of the jury’s verdict that Maricela’s husband, 
Richard, aided and abetted Maricela in breaching her fiduciary duty owed to 
Mario, with the Third District Court of Appeal holding that “Florida law 
recognizes a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary 
duty.”62 
Richard Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.
63 (“Case Two”) involved 
Richard’s purchase of Bank of America’s judgments, one against 
Corporation and one against Mario, but only the judgment for $110,309.36 
against Corporation was before the appellate court.
64
  The trial judge, in Case 
Two, granted Richard’s motion and allowed him to proceed as to the 
purchased judgment against the Corporation—by levying and executing 
against the 1000 shares redeemed by the Corporation from Jule in 2005.
65
  
By allowing seizure of Jule’s formerly owned shares, Maricela, by way of 
Richard, would own a majority interest in Corporation giving Maricela the 
power to cancel Corporation’s judgments, the only remaining significant 
assets of Corporation, against Maricela and Richard.
66
  The Third District 
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under the unique circumstances of 
this case “[t]he trial court . . . should have applied Richard[’s monetary] 
judgment” against Corporation as an offset to Corporation’s judgments 
against Maricela and Richard in Case One.
67
  Otherwise, control of 
Corporation would be obtained for an improper purpose.
68
 
4. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference:  Default/The 
Ultimate Sanction 
In 2010, Mr. Coghlan and Ms. Del Grosso (“Individual 
Plaintiffs”)—while employees, officers, directors, and shareholders of The 
Bare Board Group, Inc. (“Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation”)—
allegedly lent money to Mr. Doyle, a person who, like Individual Plaintiffs 
and Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, was “in the printed computer 
                                                          
61. Id. at 442; see also FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2016). 
62. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 442. 
63. 212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
64. Id. at 434, 439 n.8, 445. 
65. Id. at 439 n.6.  The district court noted that levy and execution was sought 
only on the shares redeemed from Jule “given [Richard’s] position throughout the litigation 
(and here on appeal) that Jule” still owned shares.  Id. 
66. Id. at 445–46. 
67. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 434, 445–46. 
68. Id. at 447 (citing Rowland v. Times Publ’g Co., 35 So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla. 
1948)). 
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circuit board industry.”69  Individual Plaintiffs allegedly knew Mr. Doyle 
planned to establish a printed circuit board company, which he did in 2010, 
incorporating as ICMfg & Associates, Inc. (“Plaintiff Corporation”).70  
Individual Plaintiffs resigned from their officer and director positions with 
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation on January 13, 2012.
71
  Individual 
Plaintiffs had also been highly compensated employees of Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation, but they resigned from their employment on 
the same day that they resigned as officers and directors.
72
  They remained 
shareholders of Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, but Individual 
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation
73
 brought a declaratory judgment action 
against Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation to determine the proper 
value of Individual Plaintiffs’ shares held in Defendant Counterclaimant 
Corporation.
74
  They also sought a determination by the court because “they 
were in doubt about their rights under the shareholder agreement.”75  
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation answered the complaint, alleged 
various affirmative defenses and, in an amended counterclaim, alleged the 
following as to Individual Plaintiffs:  (1) [B]reach of fiduciary duty, (2) civil 
conspiracy to defraud, (3) fraud, (4) “violation of the Florida Deceptive and 
Unfair Trade Practices Act” (“FDUTPA”),76 and (5) “tortious interference 
with business relationships;” and as to Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle, 
alleged the following:  (1) “[A]iding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,” 
(2) civil conspiracy to defraud, (3) violation of FDUTPA, and (4) “tortious 
interference with [Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s] business 
relationships.”77  The counterclaim was answered and contained affirmative 
defenses.
78
  The trial court found that in the course of the litigation, 
Individual Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation (collectively “the Plaintiffs”) 
had committed what amounted to fraud upon the court, and on Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s motion to impose sanctions, the trial court 
                                                          
69. ICMfg & Assocs. v. Bare Bd. Grp., No. 2D15-3557, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2017). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 3. 
72. Id. at 2–3. 
73. See id. at 3.  Why Plaintiff Corporation was a plaintiff in the original 
declaratory judgment action is not apparent from the appellate court decision.*  However, 
Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle were counter-defendants as to Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaims.  ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 3. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.  The appellate court noted that the shareholder agreement gave 
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation “the first right of redemption” of Individual 
Plaintiffs’ shares in the event their employment ended.  Id. 
76. Id. at 3–5; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2011). 
77. ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 5. 
78. Id. 
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struck the Plaintiffs’ pleadings.79  This left the Plaintiffs in the position of 
having defaulted on Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaim 
so that Defendant Counterclaimant did not need to establish liability on the 
part of the Plaintiffs.
80
  The Plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding the 
default, Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation was still required to prove a 
causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ conduct and Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.81  The trial judge disagreed, 
ruling that the default had established the element of causation as to all of the 
Plaintiffs.
82
  The jury awarded substantial damages—totaling almost $10 
million—to Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation based on expert 
testimony, although the expert did not consider the issue of causation.
83
  The 
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the 
sanction striking Plaintiffs’ pleadings.84  The conduct of the Plaintiffs 
justified the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this fashion and the 
imposition of the sanction.
85
  However, when it came to the issue of 
damages, the district court did not approve of the pre-trial ruling that the 
default on the question of liability was enough to establish the nexus and 
causation between the Plaintiffs’ tortious acts and Defendant 
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.86  The damages were 
unliquidated and the Plaintiffs had the right to contest “the causal 
relationship between the damages claimed and the liability established by the 
default.”87  The district court reversed on the award of damages for lost 
profits and prejudgment interest and remanded for trial on only the issue of 
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.88 
B. Claims of Shareholders, Members, and Partners 
1. Statutory Appraisal Right:  Valuation of Corporate Stock 
The issue on appeal in this case was the proper fair market valuation 
of shares of a corporation (“Corporation”) that was to be merged with 
                                                          
79. Id. at 6–7. 
80. Id. at 7. 
81. Id. at 7–8. 
82. See ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 8. 
83. Id. at 9–10, 12. 
84. Id. at 22. 
85. See id. at 13. 
86. Id. at 18. 
87. ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 16 (quoting Talucci v. Matthews, 960 So. 2d 
9, 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam)). 
88. Id. at 22. 
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another corporation.
89
  Corporation estimated the value of the dissenting 
shareholder’s (“Dissenting Shareholder”) 25% interest at $420 per share, 
while Dissenting Shareholder’s proposed estimate was $5,066.67 per share, 
which would translate into a value for her interest in the corporation of $1.9 
million.
90
  At trial, two expert witnesses testified as to the value of 
Dissenting Shareholder’s stock, one on behalf of Corporation and one on 
behalf of Dissenting Shareholder, but the judge adopted the opinion of 
neither.
91
  Instead, the trial judge found that the fair market value of the 
shares was $1.9 million, the same amount claimed by the Dissenting 
Shareholder—which was more than her trial expert witness’s valuation.92  
Dissenting Shareholder based her fair market value estimate “on an 
independent accountant’s valuation,” but no documentation of this valuation 
was produced at trial.
93
  The judge entered an order using the $1.9 million 
amount and Corporation appealed.
94
  On appeal, the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal stated that the trial court has discretion to:  (1) appoint independent 
appraisers to make a recommendation as to the fair market value,
95
 which the 
trial judge did not do; (2) has discretion to accept one party’s expert’s 
opinions, or even portions of more than one expert opinion,
96
 which the 
judge did not do; or (3) the trial judge may “formulate an independent 
valuation based on the evidence presented,” but the judge’s valuation must 
be supported by substantial competent evidence.
97
  The appellate court said 
the judge did not adopt the opinion of either appraiser, did not appoint an 
independent appraiser, and did not provide an explanation as to how the 
judge arrived at the $1.9 million fair market value.
98
  The Fifth District Court 
reversed and remanded with instructions.
99
 
                                                          
89. Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Sandhu, 207 So. 3d 981, 983 
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam). 
90. Id.  Dissenting Shareholder was the former spouse of one of the individual 
defendants sued by Dissenting Shareholder.  Id.  The judgment dissolving their marriage 
granted each spouse a one-half interest in the individual defendant’s one-half interest, with the 
merger plan and appraisal proceeding being the outgrowth of the equitable distribution.  Id. 
91. Id. at 983–84. 
92. Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 984. 
93. Id. at 985. 
94. Id. at 984. 
95. Id. at 985 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1330(4) (2013)). 
96. Id. at 986 n.7. 
97. Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 986. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
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2. No Personal Liability for Repayment of Contribution to Limited 
Liability Corporation 
Georg Schollmeier (“Schollmeier”) agreed to a capital contribution 
of $400,000 in Avrupa, LLC (“LLC”) in exchange for a 20% interest in 
LLC.
100
  The members of LLC—Tulga Demir (“Demir”), Tugend Demir 
(“Tugend”), and Schollmeier—entered into an agreement entitled Avrupa, 
LLC Contribution Agreement (“Agreement”) that provided that, if 
Schollmeier decided to withdraw from LLC, he would be repaid his 
contribution.
101
  When Schollmeier requested repayment of his contribution, 
and it was not forthcoming, he sued Demir and Tugend and alleged that they 
breached their Agreement.
102
  On December 12, 2014, after hearing a motion 
for summary judgment,
103
 the trial court held Demir personally liable on 
Schollmeier’s breach of contract claim, and Demir appealed.104  The Third 
District Court said that “[t]he final judgment against Demir individually as it 
relates to Schollmeier’s financial contribution to Avrupa is based on the trial 
court’s determination that the Agreement . . . was not a limited liability 
company operating agreement, . . . but instead a personal contract solely 
governing the terms of Schollmeier’s contribution.”105  The Third District 
Court of Appeal disagreed and found that the agreement was tantamount to a 
limited liability company operating agreement.
106
  The Third District 
reversed and remanded,
107
 and cited to its decision in Dinuro Investments, 
LLC v. Camacho,
108
 stated that a principal reason for forming a limited 
                                                          
100. Demir v. Schollmeier, 199 So. 3d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).  
LLC was formed by Tulga Demir to run a Miami Beach night club.  Id.  The club was open 
from early February of 2007 until March 29, 2007.  Id. at 444. 
101. Id. at 443–44. 
102. Id. at 444.  Schollmeier’s complaint contained counts that sought damages 
for alleged “breach of fiduciary duty, . . . breach of statutory duty of loyalty and care” and a 
count seeking an accounting, but there were proposals for settlement of these counts, and the 
proposals were later accepted by Schollmeier.  Demir, 199 So. 3d at 444. 
103. Id.  Schollmeier stated that he asked for only $375,000 of the amount on 
his motion for summary judgment because there was a dispute as to whether the other $25,000 
was actually contributed.  Id. at 444 n.2. 
104. Id. at 444. 
105. Id. at 445. 
106. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445.  Section 1 of the Agreement recited that it was 
“a limited liability company agreement under and as provided in the Act.”  Id.  The definition 
of Act in the Agreement was “the Limited Liability Company Act of the State of Florida.”  Id. 
at 444 n.1. 
107. Id. at 447. 
108. 141 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
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liability company is to obtain protection from personal liability.
109
  The 
court, quoting from Dinuro Investments, LLC stated that: 
Conspicuously missing from the operating agreement is any 
provision stating that the members shall be directly liable to each 
other for breaches of the terms of the operating agreement . . . .  
Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that 
members are typically shielded from individual liability for their 
involvement with an LLC unless the terms of the articles of 
organization or the operating agreement provide otherwise.
110
 
The court then quoted section 608.4227(1) of the 2011 Florida Statutes as 
additional support.
111
  That subsection provided that: 
 
Except as provided in this chapter, the members, managers, and 
managing members of a limited liability company are not liable, 
solely by reason of being a member or serving as a manager or 
managing member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, 
or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the 
limited liability company.
112
 
 
The Avrupa agreement “[did] not contain any provision or language 
indicating that any Member of Avrupa would be personally liable to any 
                                                          
109. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742). 
110. Id. at 446 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742). 
111. Id.  Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes was repealed effective June 
11, 2015.  Act Effective July 1, 2015, Ch. 2015-148, § 11, 2015 Fla. Laws 1, 9 (amending § 
608.4227, FLA. STAT. 2011).  Section 605.0304(1) of the Florida Revised Limited Liability 
Company Act provides as follows: 
A debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited liability 
company is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of 
the company.  A member or manager is not personally liable, 
directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, 
for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the company solely 
by reason of being or acting as a member or manager.  This 
subsection applies regardless of the dissolution of the 
company. 
Florida Revised Limited Liability Company Act, Ch. 2013-180, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 2105, 
2142 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 605.0101–1108 (2013)).  The Savings Clause provisions are 
found in section 605.1106 of the Florida Statutes and its effective dates are under section 
605.1108 of the Florida Statutes.  Id. § 605.1106, 605.1108(4).  A limited liability company 
with the name Avrupa, LLC was “Admin Dissolution for Annual Report” on September 14, 
2007.  Detail by Entity Name:  Avrupa, LLC, SUNBIZ, 
http://search.sunbiz.org/inquiry/corporationsearch/Byname (search in search bar for “Avrupa, 
LLC”; then follow “Avrupa, LLC” hyperlink under “Entity Name List”) (last visited Dec. 31, 
2017). 
112. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 446. 
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other Member for the company’s obligations.”113  The court concluded that if 
it was the parties’ intent that there would be personal liability for the parties’ 
capital contributions, “the terms needed to be explicit.”114  Mr. Schollmeier 
could only look to the company for reimbursement.
115
 
3. Limited Partnerships and Corporations:  Derivative Actions 
Required 
In this dispute among siblings, one brother (“Plaintiff”) sued three 
brothers (“the Brothers”), over the siblings’ ownership interests in each of 
the siblings’ several business entities including two closely held corporations 
and two limited partnerships (“the Entities”).116  However, there was one 
entity, Biloxi 3, LLC, involved in the litigation that was owned by the 
Brothers, not Plaintiff.
117
  Plaintiff sought relief against the Brothers alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty owed to him with respect to actions taken by the 
Entities.
118
  The improper actions alleged were “unearned excessive bonuses 
and management fees paid by” one of the Entities to the Brothers, and the 
alleged improper diversion by the Brothers of the proceeds of a settlement 
agreement away from one of the limited partnerships and to Biloxi 3, LLC.
119
  
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, citing its decision in Dinuro 
Investments, LLC.
120
  Plaintiff “failed to show a direct harm and a special 
injury separate and distinct from that sustained by the other partners [and 
shareholders]” so a derivative action would have been the proper 
proceeding.
121
  The Third District Court of Appeal also affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s demand for arbitration under the partnership 
and shareholder agreements.
122
 
4. Tortious Interference Claims:  Statute of Limitation 
On March 6, 2012, Mr. Eff (“Plaintiff”) brought an action against 
Sony Pictures (“Defendant”) and alleged that Defendant tortuously interfered 
in a business relationship that Plaintiff had with Mr. Silvera and another 
                                                          
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. 
116. Fritz v. Fritz, 219 So. 3d 234, 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
117. Id. at 236. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 236–39; see also Dinuro Invs., LLC v. Camacho, 141 So. 3d 731, 
740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
121. Fritz, 219 So. 3d at 238. 
122. Id. 
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person.
123
  Plaintiff alleged that he had a 25% interest in the movie Shottas 
(“the Movie”) “pursuant to an oral agreement” made with Mr. Silvera and 
another individual—who was not a party to the action—and that Plaintiff and 
Mr. Silvera formed Access Pictures, LLC, to produce the Movie.
124
  He 
further alleged that Defendant later made a licensing agreement with others 
whereby Defendant acquired “exclusive distribution rights to Shottas” after 
Mr. Silvera met with Defendant without Plaintiff.
125
  The trial court granted 
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the applicable four-year 
statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(o) of the Florida Statutes.
126
  
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.
127
  Under the licensing 
agreement with other parties, the Defendant was to make the initial payment 
on October 30, 2005 and other payments were alleged to have been made 
later.
128
  In May of 2007, Plaintiff’s lawyer emailed Defendant to advise him 
of Plaintiff’s interest in the Movie.129  The trial court ruled that October 30, 
2005 was the date on which the Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference 
accrued, and under the delayed discovery doctrine, May 2007 was therefore 
the latest that Plaintiff found out about any alleged tortious interference.
130
  
Thus, the lawsuit filed on March 6, 2012 was time barred under the four-year 
statute of limitation unless the continuing tort doctrine applied to Plaintiff’s 
claim.
131
  The Third District Court of Appeal described the continuing tort 
doctrine as being “established by continual tortious acts, not by continual 
harmful effects from an original, completed act.”132  The district court found 
“no Florida cases addressing the continuing tort doctrine as it pertains to a 
cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship.”133  The 
district court refused to apply the doctrine to Plaintiff’s claim because “the 
tort was not continual in nature merely because [Defendant] made 
subsequent distribution payments.  These additional distribution payments 
were merely ‘harmful effects from an original, completed act.’”134 
                                                          
123. Effs v. Sony Pictures Home Entm’t, Inc., 197 So. 3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (2016). 
127. Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245. 
128. Id. at 1244. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. See id. at 1243–44. 
132. Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245 (quoting Suarez v. City of Tampa, 987 So. 2d 
681, 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. (quoting Suarez, 987 So. 2d at 686). 
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C. Sale of Business 
1. Discovery:  Financial Information Provided to Accountant Not 
Protected by Accountant-Client Privilege 
In PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC v. Progressive Dental 
Reconstruction, Inc.,
135
 PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC (“Purchaser”) sought 
discovery of Progressive Dental Reconstruction’s (“Seller”) business and 
financial records given by Seller to Seller’s accountant for income tax 
purposes.
136
  Purchaser alleged that Seller acted fraudulently to accomplish 
the sale and that the records were necessary to establish its claim.
137
  The trial 
court denied the discovery request, and Purchaser sought immediate review 
of the trial court’s ruling.138  The First District Court of Appeal granted the 
petition for certiorari holding that the records were not shielded from the 
discovery request by the accountant-client privilege.
139
  Seller did not 
present any evidence that the records possessed by the accountant consisted 
of privileged communications or work product.
140
  The First District Court of 
Appeal held that otherwise discoverable records did not become privileged 
just because they were sent to Seller’s accountant.141  The trial court order 
was quashed and the case was remanded.
142
 
2. Valid Contract for Sale of Assets of Business Existed:  No Unjust 
Enrichment Remedy 
“The parties were at one point good friends and business associates,” 
said the Fourth District Court of Appeal before it explained the events 
leading up to the litigation.
143
  Mr. Brancato and Mrs. Brancato (“Surviving 
Spouse Seller”) sold the assets of a business144 to Valerie Fulton’s insurance 
agency, Fulton Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Insurance Agency Purchaser”), and 
Dean Fulton.
145
  Payment was to be based on commissions for the twelve-
                                                          
135. 203 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
136. Id. at 214. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC, 203 So. 3d at 214. 
141. Id. at 215. 
142. Id. 
143. Fulton v. Brancato, 189 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
144. Id.  The appellate court did not indicate the capacity in which Surviving 
Spouse Seller signed the sales agreement or if the agency was a separate entity.  Id. 
145. Id.  Surviving Spouse Seller sold the business when Mr. Brancato became 
ill, but the date of his death is not stated in the appellate opinion.  See id. 
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month period following the date of [the] [a]greement.
146
  When payments 
were not made as expected, Surviving Spouse Seller sued Valerie Fulton and 
Insurance Agency Purchaser alleging breach of contract.
147
  The jury found 
that Insurance Agency Purchaser had breached the contract which was the 
legal cause of the damage.
148
  However, the jury also found that Valerie 
Fulton and Insurance Agency Purchaser were unjustly enriched by getting 
the assets and not paying “the reasonable value of those assets,” and that they 
had converted the assets.
149
  The jury awarded total damages of $98,000 to 
Surviving Spouse Seller.
150
  On appeal, Valerie Fulton and Insurance Agency 
Purchaser contested the unjust enrichment and conversion verdicts, as well as 
Surviving Spouse Seller’s efforts to have the court pierce the corporate veil 
in order to hold Valerie Fulton personally liable.
151
  The appellate court said 
that a directed verdict should have been entered against Surviving Spouse 
Seller on the unjust enrichment count.
152
  If an express contract exists, as 
here, “an equitable theory, such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit” 
cannot be entertained.
153
  As to the conversion claim and damages, the 
appellate court held that the damages were to be confined to the $98,000 jury 
award for breach of contract, as “[t]here was no evidence that the seller 
sustained any additional damages by the buyer and the buyers’ agency’s 
conversion of other assets.”154 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
146. Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 968. 
147. Id. at 969. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 969–70. 
152. Id. at 970. 
153. Id. at 969 (quoting Ocean Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d 1222, 
1225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). 
154. Id. at 970.  Does the such as limit the term equitable theory?  Id. at 969.  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Ocean Communications, Inc. v. Bubeck held that 
restitution—which requires the existence of a contract—is available in cases where there has 
been a breach of an express contract.  Ocean Commc’ns, Inc., 956 So. 2d at 1225; see also 
Barbara Landau, 2006–2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32 NOVA L. 
REV. 21, 58 (2007).  “A court of equity has the power to reform” a contract in the case of 
mutual mistake, scrivener’s error or inadvertence, and in cases of unilateral mistake of one 
party combined with inequitable conduct by the other party.  Goodall v. Whispering Woods 
Ctr., 990 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Barbara Landau, 2008–2009 Survey 
of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L. REV. 71, 97 (2009). 
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D. Non-Compete Agreements 
1. Injunction:  Where’s the Bond? 
In the next case, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction on 
March 29, 2012 in favor of Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Vital”) and against 
two of Vital’s former employees (“Employees”)—in an action against 
Employees and their new employer—Vital alleged breaches of non-compete 
clauses and tortious interference.
155
  In May 2012, the circuit court dissolved 
the injunction for reasons that are not stated in the court’s order.156  
Employees then sought damages and attorneys’ fees in the same action.157  
Damages were granted, Vital appealed the trial court’s order and was 
successful on appeal.
158
  This case stands for the proposition that if a 
temporary injunction is wrongfully issued, the persons wrongfully enjoined 
may sue for damages in the amount of the bond under Rule 1.610(b) of the 
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; but if a bond is not posted, damages cannot 
be collected, at least not pursuant to section 60.07 of the Florida Statutes.
159
  
It seems that no bond was required when the preliminary injunction was 
granted.
160
  Thus, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court’s award of damages to Vital.161  Of course, in the absence of the bond, 
the injunction was not enforceable in the first place.
162
 
2. Breach During Term of Employment 
Telemundo Media, LLC v. Mintz
163
 was an interesting non-compete 
temporary injunction case.
164
  Joshua Mintz (“Mintz”) was employed by 
Telemundo (“Telemundo”).165  The term of employment was from January 1, 
                                                          
155. Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l Supplements, LLC, 210 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Order on Temporary Injunction at 1, Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l 
Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012). 
156. Order on Motion to Dissolve Temporary Injunction, Vital Pharm., Inc. v. 
Prof’l Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012). 
157. Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 767–69 (citing Hathcock v. Hathcock, 533 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); see also FLA. STAT. § 60.07 (2016); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b). 
160. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b); Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767. 
161. Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 768–69. 
162. See id. at 767–68. 
163. 194 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
164. Id. at 435. 
165. Id. 
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2015 through December 27, 2017.
166
  Mintz signed a non-compete agreement 
with Telemundo barring certain employment for six months after Mintz’s 
termination of employment with Telemundo.
167
  That part of the agreement 
provided that Mintz agreed he would “not, either directly or indirectly, 
provide services—as an employee or in any other status or capacity—to any 
Spanish-language media competitor of Telemundo in the news, 
entertainment, new media—e.g. the Internet, etc.—and telecommunications 
industries, within the United States.”168  The employment agreement 
contained an alternative dispute resolution provision in which Mintz agreed 
to follow Telemundo’s dispute resolution process.169  Mintz advised 
Telemundo that he was leaving to take a job in Mexico with a competitor of 
Telemundo.
170
  Mintz planned to start work at his new job within two months 
after he informed Telemundo that he was leaving.
171
  Telemundo sought 
injunctive relief to prevent Mintz from starting his new employment before 
the arbitration proceedings were complete.
172
  The trial court denied the 
motion, concluding that Mintz could work in Mexico because the covenant 
not to compete provision “only applied within the United States.”173  The 
Third District Court of Appeal reversed, directing the trial court to enter an 
order granting the temporary injunction.
174
  The appellate court reviewed the 
elements necessary for a temporary injunction
175
 and concluded that all 
elements necessary were present.
176
  The parties’ agreement provided that 
services to be provided by Mintz “were ‘of a special, unique, unusual, 
extraordinary, and intellectual character, giving them a peculiar value, the 
loss of which the Company cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated 
for in damages.’”177  It is apparent from the decision that the district court 
                                                          
166. Id.  Employer had an “irrevocable option to extend the term” for an 
additional year.  Id. 
167. Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435.  The allegations in this case 
were as follows:  In November 2015, Mintz told Telemundo that Mintz planned to accept a 
job with one of Telemundo’s major competitors, at which point, Telemundo set the 
contractual alternative dispute resolution process in motion in late December.  Id.  Then, on 
January 7, 2016, Mintz told Telemundo that he was planning to leave to start working for the 
competitor on June 13, 2016.  Id.  This action was filed by Telemundo on January 11, 2016.  
Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435. 
170. Id. 
171. See id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436. 
175. Id. at 435–36. 
176. Id. at 436. 
177. Id. at 435. 
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concluded that the within the United States limitation did not apply to a 
breach of Mintz’s obligation “to provide his unique personal services 
exclusively to Telemundo for the contractually specified period,” as opposed 
to after the termination of the employment contract.
178
 
3. Failure to Establish the Absence of Irreparable Harm 
In 2015, Mr. Given (“Employee”), a regional sales manager in 
Georgia, while working for Allied Universal Corporation, a Florida 
corporation (“Former Employer”), signed a non-compete agreement “as a 
condition of continued employment.”179  Employee, who had been 
responsible for all of Former Employer’s sales territory north of Florida, 
resigned from his position with Former Employer in March 2016, and 
accepted a new position as a strategic account manager at a Georgia 
company that directly competed with Former Employer.
180
  Former 
Employer sought a temporary injunction to enforce the non-compete 
agreement.
181
  The motion was denied and Former Employer appealed.
182
  
The Third Circuit reversed, directing the trial court to grant the temporary 
injunction requested.
183
  Former Employer presented evidence that 
Employee’s new employment would cause Former Employer irreparable 
harm in the absence of a temporary injunction.
184
  This “create[d] a 
rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury” supporting the relief requested 
under section 542.335(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes.
185
  Employee provided no 
evidence that would establish the absence to the Former Employer of the 
injury—contemplated by section 542.335(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.186  In 
                                                          
178. Id. at 435–36.  The district court stated that “[t]his is notwithstanding the 
language in the exclusivity provision that the trial court construed to mean that [Employee] 
could provide his services to [Employer’s] competitor outside of the United States.”  
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436 n.1. 
179. Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, No. 3D16-1128, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2017).  Employee was hired in 2010.  Id. 
180. Id.  The parties did not dispute the existence of a valid agreement not to 
compete, Employee had become an employee of Univar, that the new employment happened 
within one month after Employee resigned from his job with Former Employer, or that Univar 
competed with Former Employer.  See id. at 5 n.2.  The agreement called for an eighteen-
month non-compete period within 150 miles of any operational facility of Former Employer.  
Id. at 2. 
181. Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 3. 
182. Id. at 1. 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. Id. at 7. 
185. Id. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(j) (2016)). 
186. Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 
542.335(1)(b)). 
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fact, Employee admitted that absent an injunction “he would begin managing 
a sales territory” for his new employer.187  The Third District Court of 
Appeal reminded us that it is not necessary that Former Employer actually 
prove irreparable harm before injunctive relief may properly be granted; 
quoting the Supreme Court of Florida in Capraro v. Lanier Business 
Products, Inc.,
188
 that “[i]t truly can be said in this type of litigation that 
relief delayed is relief denied.”189 
III. ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST THIRD PARTIES 
A. Tax Cases 
The constitutional challenge presented in Florida Department of 
Revenue v. DIRECTV, Inc.
190
 arose out of the imposition of a sales tax by the 
State of Florida on satellite TV services at 10.8% while cable TV services 
were taxed at 6.8%.
191
  DIRECTV, Inc. and Echostar, LLC (“Satellite 
Companies”) sued the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”), the Florida 
Cable Telecommunications Association (“FCTA”), and others alleging that 
the Communications Services Tax (“CST”)192 is unconstitutional under the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.
193
  The relief sought, in addition to a 
declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality of the tax, was a 
permanent injunction and a refund of the tax.
194
  The trial court agreed with 
the DOR, thus denying the tax refund and injunctive relief, but the First 
District Court of Appeal reversed, finding an as applied violation of the 
Commerce Clause; that is, the tax was found to be discriminatory in effect, 
although not in purpose.
195
  In so doing, the district court found that cable 
companies and Satellite Companies “were similarly situated because they 
both ‘operate in the same market and are direct competitors within that 
                                                          
187. Id. 
188. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985). 
189. Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 7–8 (quoting Capraro, 466 So. 2 at 
213). 
190. 215 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 2017).  As of the date of submission of this Article,  
a petition for certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court of the United States.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2012). 
191. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2006).  
This discrepancy began with the enactment of the Communications Services Tax.  DIRECTV, 
Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49.  That statute currently imposes a tax of 9.07% on satellite service, while 
cable service is taxed under that statute at a rate of 4.92%.  FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2015). 
192. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12. 
193. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 49–50. 
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market.’”196  The district court also concluded that cable companies are in-
state interests because of the extent of “their local infrastructure and local 
employment.”197  The First District Court of Appeal then held that “because 
the CST favors communications that use local infrastructure, it has a 
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.”198  The DOR and the FCTA 
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause had not been violated.
199
 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants to the 
United States Congress the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several [s]tates.”200  In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
long recognized that even on matters with respect to which the United States 
Congress has not legislated, certain state taxation may be barred by the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.
201
  Under the test set forth in Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady
202
 (“Complete Auto test”), a state tax will not offend 
the Commerce Clause provided the tax “[(1)] is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [(2)] is fairly apportioned, [(3)] does 
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the 
services provided by the State.”203  Satellite Companies relied on the third 
requirement and claimed that the tax had a discriminatory effect benefiting 
in-state commerce versus out-of-state interests.
204
 
The Supreme Court of Florida said that “[s]tatutes that openly 
discriminate against out-of-state economic interests in order to protect in-
state interests are subject to a per se rule of invalidity.”205  However, before 
discrimination against interstate commerce may be found, entities subject to 
disparate tax treatment must be determined to be similarly situated.
206
  The 
DOR took the position that satellite and cable companies are not similarly 
situated, but the Supreme Court of Florida did not agree.
207
  The Court, after 
noting that “[w]hat is required for entities to be considered substantially 
similar has not been extensively considered by the courts,” stated that “[i]t 
                                                          
196. Id. at 49. 
197. Id. 
198. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49. 
199. Id. at 50, 55. 
200. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
201. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d. at 50 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson 
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)). 
202. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
203. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 50 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 
430 U.S. at 279). 
204. Id. at 51. 
205. Id. (quoting Simmons v. State, 944 So. 2d 317, 330 (Fla. 2006)). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 51–52. 
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appears that, at the very least, the entities must be in competition with one 
another.”208  The Court concluded that cable TV and satellite TV were 
substantially similar businesses competing for the same customers.
209
  The 
Court then discussed whether cable companies were in-state entities, as 
argued by Satellite Companies.
210
  The Court found that both were out-of-
state businesses, holding that “[c]able is not a local, in-state interest any 
more than satellite.”211  Because both are out-of-state for Dormant 
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court said that Satellite Companies’ 
argument of discriminatory effect could not succeed.
212
  As to the 
discriminatory purpose argument made by Satellite Companies, the Court 
concluded that, notwithstanding the difference in tax rates, the applicable 
statute was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose and there was no intent 
to favor cable TV.
213
 
In the context of its discussion on whether cable companies are in-
state, the Court noted that “every state and federal court considering [satellite 
companies’ Dormant] Commerce Clause challenges brought by the satellite 
industry . . . has held that these [tax measures that favor cable] do not violate 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.”214  The Court noted that some cases have 
done so on the grounds that satellite and cable are not similarly situated,
215
 
while others have found that “cable is not an in-state interest.”216  The Court 
said it agreed with the latter group of decisions.
217
 
Florida Department of Revenue v. American Business USA Corp.
218
 
also involved a challenge based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, but in 
this case, the taxpayer, American Business USA Corp. (“Internet 
Corporation”), operated its business from Wellington, Florida.219  Internet 
Corporation was engaged in the online internet business of selling “flowers, 
gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property.”220  Internet 
Corporation did not keep an inventory of goods for sale, but would instead 
use florists that were located near the place to which the order was to be 
                                                          
208. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 51 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 
Tax Comm’r of Ohio, 519 U.S. 278, 298–99 (1997)). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 52–53. 
211. Id. at 53. 
212. Id. 
213. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 54–55. 
214. Id. at 53. 
215. Id. at 53 n.1. 
216. Id. at 53–54, 54 n.2. 
217. Id. at 54. 
218. 191 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017). 
219. Id. at 909 & n.1. 
220. Id. at 909 n.1. 
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delivered.
221
  Internet Corporation charged sales tax when flowers and other 
items were to be delivered to Florida customers.
222
  Internet Corporation did 
not charge sales tax on items delivered to customers in other states.
223
 
The statute that was challenged by Internet Corporation, section 
212.05(1)(l) of the Florida Statutes provides, in part, that “[f]lorists located 
in this state are liable for sales tax on sales to retail customers regardless of 
where or by whom the items are to be delivered.”224  Internet Corporation 
contested the DOR’s ruling that Internet Corporation was liable under this 
statute for tax on sales to non-Florida customers.
225
  The DOR’s ruling 
provided that “the tax required by [the statute was] a tax on the privilege of 
engaging in business in Florida and is not a tax on the property sold.”226  On 
appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Internet Corporation alleged 
that the imposition of the tax with respect to Internet Corporation’s sales to 
out-of-state customers was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and in violation of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.
227
  The Fourth District Court of Appeal 
ruled that taxing internet “sales to out-of-state customers . . . violate[d] the 
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.”228  The DOR appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Florida, and the Court quashed the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
decision.
229
  The Supreme Court of Florida applied the Complete Auto test to 
determine if the imposition of the tax violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.
230
  After a lengthy examination of the facts of the case, the Court 
determined that the tax passed muster—satisfying the four prongs of the 
Complete Auto test—and thus, the tax did not violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.
231
 
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that if Internet 
Corporation did not have any physical presence in Florida, the imposition of 
the tax on sales to out-of-state customers would have clearly violated the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.
232
  But, based on Internet Corporation’s 
presence in Florida, with its headquarters being located in Wellington, 
Florida, and Internet Corporation “doing business in Florida since 2001 . . . 
                                                          
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 909 & n.1. 
223. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909 n.1. 
224. Id. at 908; see also FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(l) (2012). 
225. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 909. 
229. Id. at 908. 
230. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 912. 
231. Id. at 917. 
232. Id. at 914. 
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accept[ing] internet orders” from that location, the Court found that the 
substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test was satisfied.
233
  Those 
facts also served to defeat Internet Corporation’s due process argument of 
lack of minimum contacts.
234
 
In the next case, the First District Court of Appeal certified the 
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter “of great 
public importance:  Does the ‘Local Option Tourist Development Act,’ 
Codified at Section 125.0104, [of the] Florida Statutes, impose a tax on the 
total amount . . . received by an . . . on-line travel company’s website, or only 
on the amount the property owner re[covers] for the rental of the 
accommodations?”235 
The Supreme Court of Florida rephrased the question as follows:  
“Are the total monetary amounts that [online travel companies] charge their 
customers to secure reservations for transient accommodation rentals in 
Florida . . . subject to taxation under section 125.0104 [of the] Florida 
Statutes?”236 
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative, 
holding that the tax can only be imposed on the amount paid to the transient 
lessor—the hotel, motel, or other provider of accommodations—and not on 
the total amount paid to the online travel company, that difference being 
referred to as the mark-up.
237
  Justices Labarga and Quince concurred with 
                                                          
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 914, 917.  The Court, discussing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, stated 
that “[d]ue process requires only that there be some minimal connection between the state and 
the transaction it seeks to tax.”  Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1992).  The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Quill Corp. 
and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue stated the following with respect to 
the alleged due process violation:  “We have concluded that American Business’[] activities 
have a substantial nexus to Florida.  Thus, the minimum connection required to satisfy due 
process is also met.”  Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp, 504 U.S. at 307; 
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967), abrogated by Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota 504 U.S. 298 (1992).  Of course, the converse is not necessarily the 
case, as the district court pointed out, again, citing Quill Corp. for the proposition that a 
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause may exist even where there is no due process 
violation.  Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 910. 
235. Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d 730, 731 (Fla. 2015) (quoting 
Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 110 So. 3d 941, 951–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g 
denied, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015)). 
236. Id. at 733; see also Broward Cty. v. Orbitz, LLC, 135 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table 
decision); Leon Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 128 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (mem.) 
(per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table decision). 
237. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 732, 737.  The mark-up was said to be 
“between [25%] and [45%].”  Id. at 738–39.  The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, 
Third Division, in City of Chicago v. Expedia, had before it a controversy regarding the 
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the opinion of Justice Perry, Justice Pariente concurred in the result and 
wrote a separate opinion, and Justice Canady concurred in the result; while 
Justice Lewis dissented with the opinion with Justice Polston concurring in 
the dissent.
238
 
The next two cases are district court decisions involving sales 
taxes.
239
  In the first, an agreement was reached during the DOR’s sales tax 
audit of Verizon Business Purchasing, LLC (“LLC”), by which the parties 
agreed to extend the statute of limitations on the tax assessment until March 
31, 2011.
240
  On February 8, 2011, the DOR sent LLC a Notice of Proposed 
Assessment (“NOPA”) for more than $3 million plus interest.241  The DOR 
advised LLC that an informal protest could be filed by April 11, 2011, 
administrative review could be sought, or judicial proceedings could be 
instituted by LLC, but if LLC did not file a protest, the assessment would 
become final on April 11, 2011.
242
  LLC was also informed that in the 
absence of an informal protest, “‘an administrative hearing or judicial 
proceeding, . . . [had to be brought] no later than [June 8, 2011] or [sixty] 
days from the date the assessment’” became final.243  LLC was also advised 
that if a protest was not filed, “the proposed assessment [would] become a 
                                                                                                                                         
Chicago Hotel Accommodations Tax (“CHAT”), under Chicago Municipal Code § 3-24-010 
(1990).  City of Chi. v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1-15-3402, 2017 WL 1511961, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Apr. 26), withdrawn, May 16, 2017.  The court in Illinois stated that “[w]ell after the CHAT 
ordinance was enacted, the Internet was invented and, eventually, profitable [online travel 
companies] began operating.  The [City of Chicago] has joined numerous taxing authorities 
who have attempted to apply established tax provisions to [online travel companies’] online 
business model.”  Id. at *2.  The court went to explain that the results from cases in other 
jurisdictions may be of limited assistance because of differences in statutory language.  Id.  
For example, in Orbitz, LLC v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, the Tax Court of 
Indiana declined to “rely on [out of state decisions] or find them persuasive” because of state-
specific statutory language upon which the case’s resolution was dependent.  Orbitz, LLC v. 
Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 66 N.E. 3d 1012, 1015–16 n.4 (Ind. T.C. 2016).  Just a word of 
caution—as true today in the age of immediate and magic cite checking as it was in the days 
of only paper books and supplements:  Orbitz, LLC did not expressly cite Alachua County, 
although the parties’ briefs may have, but a cite check of Alachua County disclosed that 
Orbitz, LLC declined to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s Alachua County decision.  Id. at 
1015 n.4; see also Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737.  But did it?  Compare Orbitz, LLC, 66 
N.E. 3d at 1018 with Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737. 
238. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737. 
239. See Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 191 So. 
3d 516, 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16-967 2016 WL 5407681 
(Fla. 2016); Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. State, 164 So. 3d 806, 807–08 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
240. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 807–08. 
241. Id. at 808. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
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FINAL ASSESSMENT on [April 11, 2011].”244  LLC filed suit against the 
DOR challenging the NOPA on statute of limitations grounds, asserting that 
the DOR had been required to make an assessment before March 31, 2011.
245
  
The DOR successfully moved for summary judgment and LLC appealed.
246
  
The district court concluded that the DOR’s assessment of the tax was barred 
by the statute of limitations on assessment.
247
  The statute of limitations 
contained in section 95.091(3)(a)1.b. of the Florida Statutes requires that any 
tax due under section 72.011 of the Florida Statutes must be “determine[d] 
and assess[ed] . . . within [three] years after the date the tax is due, any return 
with respect to tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.”248  
Thus, the question presented was whether the DOR’s assessment was 
timely.
249
  As noted above, the DOR had, by agreement, until March 31, 
2011, to assess the tax.
250
  The NOPA was issued on February 8, 2011.
251
  
The DOR argued that the date the NOPA was issued, February 8, 2011, was 
the date it assessed the tax against LLC.
252
  Thus, according to the DOR, the 
assessment was timely.
253
  It was conceded by “the parties [that] section 
95.091 does not define the [term] assess.”254  LLC pointed out that under 
section 213.21(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations on 
assessments is tolled when informal protests are filed.
255
  LLC argued, in 
effect, and the district court agreed, that there would be no purpose for that 
tolling provision if the NOPA was the assessment, as the assessment would 
have been made.
256
  The First District Court of Appeal agreed “that the 
assessment contemplated in [section 95.091(3)(a)] is a final assessment.”257  
As the district court pointed out, since there is a sixty-day period between the 
NOPA and the date the NOPA becomes final, if the taxpayer does not file a 
protest, all the DOR would have had to do in this case was to issue the 
NOPA at least “sixty days prior to . . . March 31, 2011.”258  In answering the 
                                                          
244. Id. (alteration in original). 
245. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808. 
246. Id. at 808–09. 
247. Id. at 812–13. 
248. Id. at 809; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a)1.b (2010). 
249. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809. 
250. Id. at 808. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 809–10. 
254. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809; see also FLA. STAT. § 
95.091 (2010). 
255. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808; see also FLA. STAT. § 
213.21(1)(b) (2010). 
256. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 811–12. 
257. Id. at 811; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a). 
258. Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 812. 
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question presented, that is, whether NOPA was the assessment contemplated 
by section 95.091(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, or whether the date the 
NOPA became final was the assessment, the district court, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, concluded that the pertinent statute of limitations 
referred to a final assessment and the NOPA was not a final assessment.
259
 
American Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Department of 
Revenue
260
 involved an assessment of sales tax and interest against American 
Heritage Window Fashions, LLC (“LLC”) for more than $220,000.261  On 
March 29, 2010, the DOR served a NOPA on LLC, and pursuant to section 
72.011(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, informed LLC of its options 
to contest the assessment.
262
  LLC did not avail itself of any of the options.
263
  
Collection efforts by the DOR began at the end of 2010, and on April 1, 
2013, almost three years after the relevant periods stated in the NOPA 
expired, the DOR obtained $7,507.58 from an account that the DOR had 
ordered frozen back on May 10, 2011, “of which $6,525.95 was applied to 
the . . . deficiency, roughly [3%] of the assessed sum.”264  On July 10, 2013, 
LLC requested a refund of the amount applied to the deficiency, alleging 
“that it was an audit overpayment.”265  The DOR declined “the request on 
August 26, 2013, and [LLC] filed a written protest on September 25, 2013 . . 
. [seeking] ‘to appeal the Notice of Proposed Assessment’” based on its 
argument regarding the underlying liability.
266
  The DOR denied the protest 
on the merits which “made final the [DOR’s] denial of [the LLC’s] refund 
application.”267  LLC sought further administrative review, and eventually 
the matter found its way to the Second District Court of Appeal.
268
  The 
district court affirmed the DOR’s determination that LLC’s challenge was 
untimely.
269
  To bring what amounted to an untimely action to contest a tax 
assessment through a petition to review a refund denial under circumstances, 
like those presented in this case, would, said the court, “render the statute’s 
sixty-day limitation on actions brought to contest tax assessments 
                                                          
259. Id. at 811–12; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a). 
260. 191 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16-
967 2016 WL 5407681 (Fla. 2016). 
261. Id. at 517. 
262. Id. at 517–18; see also FLA STAT. § 72.011(1)(a), (2)(a) (2010). 
263. Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. 
268. Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518. 
269. Id. at 524. 
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meaningless.”270  Section 72.011(5) of the Florida Statutes “is the language 
of a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.”271 
ValleyCrest Landscape Maintenance, Inc. (“ValleyCrest”) sued the 
DOR for a refund of motor fuel tax paid.
272
  ValleyCrest, which is in the 
business of residential and commercial landscaping, uses lawn equipment 
that runs on diesel fuel and gas, both purchased by ValleyCrest at retail fuel 
stations.
273
  ValleyCrest argued that the second gas tax authorized under the 
Article XII, section 9(c) of the Florida Constitution applies only to motor 
vehicles, and the tax under section 206.41(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes 
applies only to vehicles operated on public roads and not “to off-road uses of 
gasoline.”274  ValleyCrest also argued that not giving it an exemption, and 
hence a refund of the taxes, amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.
275
  The trial court 
ruled in favor of the DOR, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.
276
  
Section 206.41(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes exempts from the motor fuel tax 
on gasoline anyone “‘who uses any motor fuel for agricultural, aquacultural, 
commercial fishing, or commercial aviation purposes,’” provided that the 
fuel is not “‘used in any vehicle or equipment driven or operated on public 
highways of [Florida],’” and provided that a refund is requested.277  
ValleyCrest was being taxed on fuel it used operating its off-road 
equipment.
278
  The district court of appeal first noted that “there is no use-
based exemption for landscaping equipment” as there is for the other 
enumerated uses.
279
  The legislature has broad power to create distinctions 
and classifications in tax statutes.
280
  These distinctions can be upheld 
without violating the Equal Protection Clause so long as there are non-
arbitrary reasons for so doing.
281
  As an example, in this case, the district 
court also noted that the landscaping business did not have the same 
                                                          
270. Id. at 521. 
271. Id. at 522 (citing Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So. 
2d 814, 815 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam)); see also FLA. STAT. § 72.011(5) (2010). 
272. See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc. v. State, 213 So. 3d 992, 994 (Fla. 
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12079 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 
2016), and review denied, 2017 WL 192041 (Fla. 2017). 
273. Id. 
274. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 206.41(1)(a) (2016). 
275. ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994. 
276. Id. 
277. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 206.41(4)(c)1. 
278. See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994. 
279. Id. at 994–95. 
280. Id. at 995. 
281. See id. 
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economic impact on the state as did the agricultural, commercial fishing, and 
aviation industries.
282
 
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC (“LLC”) challenged its 2008 ad 
valorem tax assessment by filing suit in the circuit court in 2009 against 
Hillsborough County.
283
  LLC paid the “2008 taxes in an amount . . . 
admitted in good faith was due and owing” pursuant to section 194.171(3) of 
the Florida Statutes.
284
  LLC did not timely pay the 2009 real estate tax, but it 
did timely pay real estate taxes assessed after 2009.
285
  The property 
appraiser successfully moved to have LLC’s 2009 complaint dismissed based 
on section 194.171(5) of the Florida Statutes because the 2009 tax was not 
timely paid.
286
  LLC appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal 
reversed the trial court’s decision.287  The statute requires only that all taxes 
assessed for years after the year the taxpayer’s action is brought be timely 
paid, not that taxes for the year in which the taxpayer’s action is brought be 
timely paid.
288
 
B. Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate, Deeds, and Landlord-Tenant 
Cases 
1. Real Estate Contract:  Specific Performance Denied 
Real estate developer (“Seller”) entered into an agreement with 
Appellees (“Purchaser”) for the sale and purchase of property “adjacent to 
the Mardi Gras, a Daytona Beach business”289 having “a minimum of [fifty] 
frontage feet on the Boardwalk and [also having] ‘sufficient land to build a 
                                                          
282. Id. at 995–96. 
283. Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC v. Henriquez, 194 So. 3d 1091, 1091–
92 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
284. Id. at 1092; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(3) (2009). 
285. Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092. 
286. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(5). 
287. Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092. 
288. Id. at 1093. 
289. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v. Paspalakis, 220 So. 3d 457, 459 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 212 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017), review 
denied, No. SC17-568, 2017 WL 2438408 (Fla. 2017).  This was a “public-private economic 
development project,” but the events here apparently predated the amendment of Article X § 
6(a) of Florida’s Constitution in 2007.  FLA. CONST. art X § 6; Boardwalk at Daytona Dev. 
LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459 n.1; see also Eileen Zaffiro-Kean, Daytona Boardwalk Property Fight 
Continues, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Nov. 26, 2016, 2:57 PM), http://www.news-
journalonline.com/news/20161126/daytona-boardwalk-property-fight-continues.  There are no 
dates set forth in the district court’s opinion with respect to the transactions or the proceedings 
in the trial court.  Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459; Zaffiro-Kean, supra. 
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7500 square foot, one story building.’”290  As it turned out, three parcels of 
real estate potentially fit this description.
291
  Seller requested declaratory 
relief that a parcel of real estate that it tendered to the Purchaser was in 
conformance with the parties’ agreement, while Purchaser filed a 
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the transfer to Purchaser by Seller of 
a different parcel.
292
  The trial court ordered specific performance as to one 
of these parcels and Seller appealed.
293
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that it was error to order specific performance in this case 
because “[s]pecific performance is only available to compel the transfer of 
land that is specifically described in the parties’ agreement alone or where its 
identity is clear from an agreement that is appropriately supplemented by 
parol evidence,”294 which was not something that could be satisfied on this 
record.
295
  The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order of specific 
performance and Purchaser filed a motion for rehearing.
296
  On motion for 
rehearing, which was denied, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded 
that Purchaser had chosen to pursue one remedy in its litigation, that is, 
specific performance.
297
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal said that 
Purchasers “freely made their choice . . . to not pursue different causes of 
action or other remedies, such as money damages, reformation, or 
rescission.”298 
2. Arbitration Requirement Contained in Real Estate Contract Not 
Waived 
The contract for sale to Appellees (“Purchasers”) of an outparcel of 
Timber Pine’s (“Seller”) shopping mall contained a binding arbitration 
clause, and the amended deed restrictions contained restrictions that gave 
Seller certain approval rights over construction on the property it sold to 
                                                          
290. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459. 
291. Id. at 459. 
292. Id. at 460.  There was a claim for damages exceeding $15,000 contained 
in Purchaser’s amended counterclaim, but the appellate court noted that such damages were 
not mentioned again in the counterclaim.  Id. at 460 n.2.  Purchaser’s claim for money 
damages becomes the subject of the appellate court’s comments on denial by the court of 
Purchaser’s motion for rehearing on the appeal.  Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v. 
Paspalakis, 212 So. 3d 1063, 1063–64 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
293. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 460. 
294. Id. at 459. 
295. Id. 
296. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063; Boardwalk at 
Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459. 
297. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063–64. 
298. Id. at 1064. 
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Purchasers.
299
  Purchasers consented in writing to these amendments.
300
  
After the closing, Seller sued Purchasers seeking injunctive relief and 
damages based on Purchasers’ alleged violation of Seller’s construction 
approval rights.
301
  The injunction was denied, and the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial.302  Purchasers meanwhile answered 
the complaint and counterclaimed alleging Seller breached the contract by 
failing to provide input on the plans for Purchasers’ building and failure to 
provide a cross-parking easement.
303
  Seller moved to compel arbitration of 
Purchasers’ counterclaim.304  The trial judge denied the motion without 
explanation; the Seller appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
reversed and remanded with instructions.
305
  The right to arbitration can be 
waived, and such waiver may be deemed to have occurred if the party 
demanding arbitration has resorted to the courts to enforce its claims 
otherwise subject to arbitration.
306
  However, here, there was no significant 
relationship between Seller’s rights under the amended deed restrictions and 
the arbitration clause in the antecedent contract.
307
  Therefore, Seller’s suit 
against Purchasers did not constitute a waiver of arbitration under the 
contract with respect to Purchasers’ counterclaim alleging breach of 
contract.
308
  “[T]he mere coincidence that the parties in dispute have a 
contractual relationship will ordinarily not be enough to mandate arbitration 
of the dispute.”309 
3. No Merger in Deed 
The next case provides a discussion of an exception to the general 
rule that “preliminary agreements concerning the sale of [real] property 
merge into the deed executed pursuant to the sale.”310  Mr. Harkless, in 2008, 
                                                          
299. Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, 211 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. (citing Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, No. 5D16-95, 2016 WL 
7405671, at *1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished table 
decision)). 
303. Id. 
304. Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d at 1149. 
305. Id. at 1150–51. 
306. See id. 
307. Id. at 1151. 
308. Id. 
309. Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d. at 1150 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999)). 
310. Harkless v. Laubhan, 219 So. 3d 900, 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), 
reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2017). 
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leased part of his real estate to Verizon Wireless and granted it an easement 
for the construction of a cell tower, but the construction did not begin until 
May 2012.
311
  In the interim, the property on which the tower was to be 
located, and with respect to which the easement was granted, was transferred 
twice.
312
  The first transfer occurred in April 2011 when Mr. Harkless sold to 
Mr. and Mrs. Lolly ten acres of his property—including the land leased to 
Verizon Wireless and subject to the easement.
313
  There was an addendum 
(“the Addendum”) to the Harkless-Lolly contract that stated, in part, that Mr. 
Harkless would continue to own the “easement and Verizon cell tower 
lease.”314  No mention was made in the warranty deed to the Lollys from Mr. 
Harkless of any right on the part of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments 
from Verizon.
315
  The Lollys, just three months after the transfer to them, 
sold the real estate to Mr. and Mrs. Laubhan.
316
  The language in the 
contract, between the Lollys and the Laubhans, differed from the language in 
the Addendum to the Harkless-Lolly contract.
317
  The Lolly-Laubhan 
contract stated, in part, that “[b]uyer is aware of Verizon tower lease and has 
received a copy of the survey and lease.”318  By warranty deed in July 2011, 
the Lollys transferred the property to the Laubhans—the deed making no 
mention of any right of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments from 
Verizon.
319
  But that was not all that happened in the interim, as Mr. 
Harkless, sometime prior to May 2012, gave a third party, Communications 
Capital Group, LLC, an “option to purchase his interest in the Lease for 
$175,000.”320  Communications Capital Group, LLC then sought signed and 
notarized confirmation from the Laubhans that they acknowledged Mr. 
Harkless’ rights to continue to receive rent from Verizon Wireless pursuant 
to the lease.
321
  Because the requested response was not forthcoming and the 
response instead was that “they owned the Parcel free and clear of Mr. 
Harkless’ right to receive rent,” the option was not exercised.322  At this 
point, Mr. Harkless sought declaratory relief regarding his right to the rent, 
                                                          
311. Id. at 902. 
312. Id. at 902–03. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 903. 
315. Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 903. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id.  Both deeds did, however, make mention of an easement.  Harkless, 
219 So. 3d at 903–04. 
320. Id. at 903. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
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plus reformation of both deeds reflecting his rights under the Verizon 
Wireless lease.
323
 
The Laubhans filed a motion for summary judgment, relying on the 
deeds and another agreement mentioned in both deeds, and argued that there 
was no ambiguity that would permit the consideration of parol evidence.
324
  
They also claimed that they were not aware, prior to the litigation, that there 
was a Harkless-Lolly agreement that Mr. Harkless retained his right to the 
rent.
325
  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Laubhans, 
and Mr. Harkless appealed.
326
  The appellate court decided that because the 
Lollys and Mr. Harkless, being all the parties to the agreement that reserved 
the rent to Mr. Harkless, agreed that the Addendum language “was intended 
to reserve Mr. Harkless’s right to” the lease payments, that the right did not 
merge into the deed to the Lollys “as a matter of law.”327  Mr. Harkless 
effectively reserved his right to receive rent, that is, his contract with the 
Lollys and the reservation of the right to the rent did not merge into the 
deed.
328
  The district court concluded that summary judgment should not 
have been granted because the question remaining on remand as to whether 
the Laubhans were bona fide purchasers for value, created a “genuine issue 
of material fact.”329  At this point, the Second District Court of Appeal 
addressed the issue of whether the Laubhans could be bona fide purchasers 
under Florida’s recording statute, section 695.01(1) of the Florida Statutes.330  
The court, after noting that the parties had not identified any cases addressing 
whether the recording statute applies to the right to receive rent and the court 
had found none, held that the plain language of the statute provides that “[n]o 
conveyance . . . of real property, or of any interest therein” shall be valid 
against bona fide purchasers unless properly recorded.
331
  The Second 
District Court of Appeal concluded that the right to receive rent is covered 
                                                          
323. Id. 
324. Harkless, 219 So. 3d. at 903–04.  The other agreement that was referred to 
in both deeds was “the Amended Memorandum of Lease Agreement” which the district court 
described as “essentially an abridged version of the Lease” that did not mention any right 
retained by Mr. Harkless to receive payments under the Verizon Wireless lease.  Id. at 903.  
The district court declined to accept any line of decision out of other district courts, citing 
cases from the Third District and the Fourth District, that the words subject to in a deed could 
result in the deed being rendered generally ambiguous.  Id. at 906. 
325. Id. at 903. 
326. Id. at 902, 904. 
327. Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 905. 
328. Id. at 909. 
329. Id. at 902, 909. 
330. Id. at 908–09; see also FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2011). 
331. FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1); Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908. 
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by the statute
 
and remanded for a determination of the Laubhans status as 
bona fide purchasers.
332
 
4. Denial of Temporary Injunction in Suit Based on Deed Restrictions 
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. (“Planned Parenthood”) 
bought real property subject to deed restrictions.
333
  MMB Properties 
(“MMB”), a general partnership that runs a cardiology practice in the same 
medical complex, is subject to the same deed restrictions.
334
  Planned 
Parenthood intended to offer abortion services at the facility, and MMB—
claiming that performance of such services violated the deed restriction—
sought and obtained from the circuit court a temporary injunction that 
enjoined Planned Parenthood from performing abortions at the facility.
335
  
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the temporary 
injunction, finding that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial 
and competent evidence.
336
  The district court also found that in order to have 
the temporary injunction dissolved, as had been sought by Planned 
Parenthood, it “needed to establish changed circumstances which it did not 
do.”337  The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Fifth District Court of 
Appeal’s affirmance of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to 
the trial court for a hearing on a permanent injunction.
338
  The Court claimed 
conflict jurisdiction involving the standard for modifying or dissolving a 
temporary injunction; the Court noting that the First, Second, Third, and 
Fifth Districts all require changed circumstances, while the Fourth District 
does not.
339
  The Court adopted the position of the Fourth District, noting 
that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo 
pending final injunctive proceedings.
340
  The principle has developed that a 
party seeking to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction must show 
changed conditions or changed circumstances to justify modification or 
dissolution of the injunction.
341
  However, there is no such requirement in 
Rule 1.610(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
342
  The Court 
                                                          
332. Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908–09. 
333. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 
918, 920 (Fla. 2017). 
334. See id. 
335. Id. at 920–22. 
336. Id. at 923–24. 
337. Id. at 923. 
338. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 929. 
339. Id. at 924–25. 
340. Id. at 924–26. 
341. Id. at 924. 
342. Id.; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610(d). 
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concluded that it was within the trial court’s discretion “to reconsider, on a 
motion to dissolve, a temporary injunction entered after notice and a hearing, 
. . . regardless of whether the arguments or evidence could have been brought 
to the attention of the court at the hearing on the injunction.”343  In other 
words, the changed circumstances rule in this context is no more.
344
  The 
Court went beyond the conflict jurisdiction issue and found that the trial 
court’s decision, granting the temporary injunction and declining to dissolve 
it, was not supported by competent substantial evidence—particularly with 
respect to the likelihood of MMB succeeding on the merits.
345
 
5. Self-Help Provision in Lease Invalid 
The lease between (“Landlord”) and (“Tenant”) gave Landlord 
certain self-help authority if an Event of Default occurred, including the 
authority “after the continued Tenant default after the expiration of the time 
to cure” and “without further written notice to Tenant . . . enter upon and 
take possession of the Leased Premises and expel or remove Tenant and any 
other occupant therefrom with or without having terminated the lease.”346  
The agreement further provided that [l]andlord shall not be deemed to have 
violated any right of Tenant and shall not be deemed to be guilty of trespass, 
conversion or any other criminal or civil action as a result of such action.”347  
The day came when Landlord found it necessary to lock Tenant out of much 
of the leased premises and obtain police help in escorting Tenant’s 
employees off the premises.
348
 
                                                          
343. Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 925. 
344. Id. at 926. 
345. See id. at 928.  Justice Canady, joined by Justice Polston, dissented.  Id. at 
929 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
346. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship v. Nantucket Enters., 
211 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC17-491, 2017 WL 
2774368 (Fla. 2017). 
347. Id.  The appellate court did not discuss the introductory provision of the 
language quoted in the text above.  See id.  The provision began as follows:  “[I]f and 
whenever any Event of Default by Tenant shall occur, Landlord may after the continued 
Tenant default after the expiration of the time to cure . . . at its option and without further 
written notice to Tenant.”  Id.  Presumably, the language was deemed not crucial to the court’s 
conclusion.  See id. 
348. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44.  The 
leased premises included a restaurant and office space.  Id.  The restaurant was closed by the 
City of Palm Beach Gardens based on Tenant not obtaining the right permits.  Id.  The city 
posted “red tags on the doors, which indicated the restaurant was unsafe for occupancy.”  Id.  
“The same day, Landlord [installed] chains and locks on the . . . kitchen [doors], the 
restaurant,” and the office doors.  Id.  Several days later, the lease was terminated by 
Landlord, and the Landlord “had the police escort Tenant’s employees from the restaurant.”  
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44.  It is not clear from the 
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Each party filed claims against the other.
349
  Landlord alleged that 
Tenant breached the terms of the lease, and Tenant alleged conversion in 
addition to wrongful eviction.
350
  A directed verdict on the claim of wrongful 
eviction was entered by the court against Landlord on Tenant’s motion, and 
the jury awarded $8.8 million in damages against Landlord plus found 
liability as to the conversion claim and awarded $2 million to Tenant.
351
  The 
jury also ruled against Landlord on its breach of contract claim.
352
  On 
appeal, Landlord challenged the propriety of the directed verdict against it.
353
  
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the directed verdict under the 
authority of section 83.05(2) of the Florida Statutes, which sets out the only 
methods by which a landlord may repossess, leased premises from a 
defaulting tenant.
354
  The methods are by an action based on section 83.20 or 
other civil action that determines the right to possession, or where the tenant 
has surrendered or abandoned the rented space.
355
  Landlord did not employ 
any of the approved eviction methods, and the self-help provisions in the 
lease agreement availed the Landlord nothing.
356
  Tenant also challenged the 
trial judge’s decision not to award pre-judgment interest on the eviction 
damages award.
357
  The Fourth District held that since Tenant received an 
award purely of a fixed amount of money damages, the trial court had no 
discretion in the matter and should have awarded pre-judgment interest 
“from the date of the loss or the accrual of [the] cause of action.”358  Tenant, 
however, did not fare as well on the issue of the $2 million in damages 
awarded on its conversion claim.
359
  Conversion requires the exercise of 
control over and acts that are not consistent with “another’s possessory rights 
in personal property.”360  There was lack of proof to support the award.361  
                                                                                                                                         
opinion how Tenant’s employees were still in the restaurant, which was padlocked several 
days earlier, but there were other leased areas including an atrium, a ballroom, and two 
meeting rooms, which may be where the employees were.  See id. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44. 
353. See id. 
354. Id. at 44–45; see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2) (2006). 
355. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44–45; 
see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2), 83.20 (2006). 
356. See Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45. 
357. Id. at 46. 
358. See id. (quoting Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 46 (Fla. 
2010) (per curiam)). 
359. See id. at 45–47. 
360. Id. at 45 (quoting Joseph v. Chanin, 940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006)). 
361. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 46. 
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Furthermore, the court held that “‘an action in tort is inappropriate where the 
basis of the suit is a contract, either express or implied.’”362  The directed 
verdict, as to the eviction damages, was affirmed, the conversion damages 
award was reversed, and the denial of pre-judgment interest on eviction 
award was reversed and remanded.
363
 
Landlord raised an interesting argument in support of its position 
that the directed verdict on the wrongful eviction claim was improper.
364
  
The argument was that this was not a total eviction, but rather just a partial[] 
evict[ion], since Tenant was not locked out of all of the leased premises.
365
  
The court responded that “[a]lthough the issue of whether a tenant can be 
partially evicted appears to be an issue of first impression in Florida, we 
need not address it here.”366  The court then stated that it found “no evidence 
to support Landlord’s contention that it intended to allow Tenant to use that 
part of the leasehold . . . or that Tenant could still maintain its other business 
operations without the restaurant.”367 
C. Torts 
1. Construction Defects:  Applicable Statute of Limitation 
Almost ten years after the closing on property upon which Lennar 
Homes (“Builder”) constructed a home for the homeowner (“Purchaser”), 
Builder was served by Purchaser with the required notice pursuant to Section 
558 of the Florida Statutes.
368
  Purchaser subsequently filed suit against 
Builder alleging home construction defects.
369
  When the suit was filed, more 
than ten years had elapsed since the date of the closing, and Builder defended 
citing section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes, the ten-year statute of 
repose applicable to construction defect claims.
370
  Section 95.11(3)(c) 
provides, in part, that 
                                                          
362. Id. (quoting Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 1970)). 
363. Id. at 47. 
364. Id. at 45. 
365. Id. 
366. Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45. 
367. Id. 
368. Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So. 3d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 
2017); see also FLA. STAT. § 558.004 (2016).  Section 558.004(1) of the Florida Statutes 
requires that in cases of construction defect claims not involving personal injury, a claimant, 
“at least [sixty] days before filing” suit, is required to serve a “written notice of claim on the 
contractor.”  FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1). 
369. Busch, 219 So. 3d at 94–95. 
370. Id. at 94; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016). 
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“[i]n any event, the action must be commenced within [ten] years 
after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the 
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, . . . the date of completion 
or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, 
registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, 
whichever date is latest.”
371
 
Builder claimed that the contract was complete as of the closing so 
the ten-year period started to run at closing of the sale which would mean 
that the period had expired.
372
  The complaint was dismissed, and Purchaser 
appealed.
373
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the contract 
attached to the complaint that contained language indicating that it was 
possible for the contract not to be completed until after closing, and the court 
ruled that “[b]ecause the contract expressly contemplated that closing could 
occur even if work required by the contract remained incomplete, and the 
complaint did not allege that no work was completed after closing, the 
allegations of the complaint do not conclusively establish that the contract 
was completed upon closing.”374  In other words, the District Court 
concluded that the complaint failed to conclusively establish that the ten-year 
period started to run at closing.
375
  Therefore, the complaint should not have 
been dismissed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded.
376
 
On a related note, in Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster 
Specialty Insurance Co.,
377
 the United States Court of Appeal for the 
Eleventh Circuit certified the following question of first impression to the 
Supreme Court of Florida:  “Is the notice and repair process set forth in 
Chapter 558 of the Florida Statutes a suit within the meaning of the 
[commercial general liability] policies issued by [insurance company] to 
[contractor]?”378 
While it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court of Florida 
will decide Altman Contractors, Inc., or whether that decision dealing with 
insurer’s duty to defend will have an impact on construction defect claims 
subject to section 95.11(3)(c), or the tolling statute under section 558.004(10) 
of the Florida Statutes, remains to be seen.
379
  The latter section provides that 
                                                          
371. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c). 
372. Busch, 219 So. 3d at 95. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. at 95–96 (emphasis added). 
375. See id. at 94. 
376. Id. at 94, 96. 
377. 832 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2016). 
378. Id. at 1326. 
379. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 558.004(10) 
(2016). 
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service by a claimant of written notice of claim under section 558.004(1) 
“tolls the applicable statute of limitations.”380  It should be noted that there is 
no express reference in section 558.004(10) to the statute of repose contained 
in section 558.004(1).
381
 
2. Slip and Fall:  Invitee, Uninvited Licensee, or Trespasser 
While walking home at about 11:00 P.M., after an evening out, Mrs. 
Arp (“Mrs. Arp”) took a cut through shortcut “over a pathway of paver 
stones located in the area of a utility easement on property owned by W.E. 
Association and operated as a shopping center.”382  Plaintiff stepped on a 
cracked stone, turned her ankle, and fell.
383
  “The [shortcut] did not have a 
No Trespassing sign,” and Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that she 
witnessed other people taking the shortcut regularly.
384
  She did not go into 
any of the shopping center stores that evening, and was using the shortcut 
“because she ‘just wanted to get home.’”385  She sued Waterway East 
Association, Inc. (“Waterway”), among others, alleging negligence.386  The 
trial court granted Waterway’s motion for summary judgment, and the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.
387
  The appellate court first noted 
that under common law, there are three categories of persons who enter onto 
private property, specifically, “an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.”388  
After defining the invitee as “a visitor on the premises by invitation, either 
express or reasonably implied, of the owner,” the district court defined “[a]n 
uninvited licensee [as] a person who chooses ‘to come upon the premises 
solely for [his or her] own convenience without invitation either expressed or 
reasonably implied under the circumstances.’”389  The district court defined a 
trespasser as one “who enters the premises of another without license, 
invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own, 
or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other 
                                                          
380. FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1), (10). 
381. See id. 
382. Arp v. Waterway E. Ass’n, 217 So. 3d 117, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2017). 
383. Id. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. Arp, 217 So. 3d at 119, 122. 
388. Id. at 120. 
389. Id. at 120–21 (alteration in original); see also Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 
691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (explaining the difference between licensees by invitation and uninvited 
licensee). 
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than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity.”390  To the trespasser and uninvited 
licensee, the court concluded, “[t]he only duty a [property owner] owes . . . is 
‘to avoid willful or wanton harm to him and, upon discovery of his presence, 
to warn him of any known dangers which would not be open to his ordinary 
observation.’”391  The facts did not show that Waterway breached its duty to 
Mrs. Arp, who “was, at best, an uninvited licensee.”392 
3. Slip and Fall:  No Notice 
Ms. Wilson-Greene (“Plaintiff”) brought a negligence action related 
to a fall that occurred in a City of Miami owned building.
393
  The 
maintenance contract for the building was between the City of Miami and 
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc.
394
  Plaintiff testified that she had business 
on the second floor, which Plaintiff said took more than fifteen minutes, and 
that she used the elevator from the second floor to return to the lobby.
395
  Her 
testimony was to the effect that when she stepped off the elevator, she 
slipped on a green substance, fell, hit her head, lost consciousness, and when 
she became conscious again, she had a green substance on her body that was 
not hot.
396
  Plaintiff testified that “[s]he did not see any substance on the 
floor before she entered the elevator” in the same group of elevators to go up 
to the second floor.
397
  Plaintiff lost on a motion for summary judgment and 
she appealed.
398
  The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that 
the language of the contract between the defendants, the City of Miami and 
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc., “did not create a contractual duty on Vista 
[Maintenance Services, Inc. to] constantly . . . patrol the building” for 
dangerous conditions.
399
  Neither the City of Miami nor Vista Maintenance 
Services, Inc. had actual notice of the dangerous condition, and a permissible 
inference of constructive notice was not supported by the facts.
400
  The 
                                                          
390. Arp, 217 So. 3d at 121 (quoting Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 
1972)). 
391. Id. at 120 (quoting Nolan v. Roberts, 383 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 1980)). 
392. Id. at 121–22. 
393. Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
394. Id. 
395. Id. 
396. Id. 
397. Id. 
398. Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1273. 
399. Id. at 1274. 
400. Id. at 1275. 
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district court distinguished melting substances from hot substances, which 
“requires a jury to impermissibly stack inferences,”401 stating: 
We conclude that where melting substances are involved, 
there is no need to infer the substance was previously frozen.  
Logic tells us that is a given.  In the instant case, the jury first 
would need to infer that the substance was hot prior to spilling on 
the floor and infer from this that it was on the floor for a sufficient 
amount of time for it to have cooled.
402
 
The district court held that “[t]he mere presence of soup which is 
‘not hot’ on the floor is not enough to establish constructive notice.”403  Nor 
was there actual notice.
404
  The court noted that the contract did not have the 
type of language that would have required a heightened duty of care on the 
part of Vista Management Services, Inc.
405
 
D. UCC and Other Debtor-Creditor Disputes 
1. Perfected Security Interest 
In Beach Community Bank v. Disposal Services, LLC,
406
 Beach 
Community Bank (“Creditor”) held a perfected security interest under the 
Uniform Commercial Code in certain containers that secured a debt owed to 
Creditor by Solid Waste Haulers (“Debtor”).407  Debtor sold the containers to 
Disposal Services, LLC (“Transferee”), but Debtor did not apply the sales 
proceeds to its debt to Creditor.
408
  Debtor eventually defaulted on payments 
to Creditor, and Creditor then made written demand of Transferee that it pay 
Debtor’s debt in full or turn over the containers to Creditor.409  Transferee 
did neither, and Creditor sued Transferee alleging conversion of the 
containers.
410
  On motion by Transferee, the trial court entered an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Transferee, opining that Creditor 
could not sue for conversion because the remedy of replevin was still 
available to it.
411
  Creditor appealed and the First District Court of Appeal 
                                                          
401. Id. at 1276. 
402. Id. 
403. Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1275. 
404. Id. 
405. Id. at 1274. 
406. 199 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
407. Id. at 1133. 
408. Id. 
409. Id. 
410. Id. at 1133–34. 
411. Beach Cmty. Bank, 199 So. 3d at 1134. 
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reversed.
412
  Creditor had alleged in its complaint all of the elements 
necessary to sustain a cause of action for conversion.
413
  “When an 
unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured party has numerous 
cumulative remedies at its disposal; it is not forced to elect a single 
remedy.”414 
2. Assignment of Accounts Receivable 
The Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) contracted with 
Arbor One, Inc. (“Assignor”) for certain work to be done.415  Assignor sold 
to United Capital Funding Corp. (“Assignee”) Assignor’s accounts 
receivable from the DOT.
416
  Assignee, pursuant to section 679.4061 of the 
Florida Statutes, notified the DOT in writing, of the assignment and the 
amount of the receivables and advised the DOT to make contract payments 
due to Assignee—not to Assignor.417  The DOT continued to pay 
Assignor.
418
  Assignee sued the DOT and obtained a summary judgment 
declaring the DOT to be legally obligated to Assignee for payment of the 
Arbor One accounts receivable.
419
  The Second District Court of Appeal 
affirmed, concluding that the DOT was an account debtor like any other 
subject to the above cited statute.
420
  The court also determined that the DOT 
did not come within the so-called transfer exception of sections 679.1091 to 
679.4061(1).
421
  Finally, the Second District ruled that the DOT’s claim of 
sovereign immunity was barred by section 337.19(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.
422
 
3. Homestead Sales Proceeds 
JBK Associates, Inc. v. Sill Bros., Inc.
423
 involved a judgment 
creditor’s claim to the proceeds of the sale of the judgment debtor’s 
                                                          
412. Id. at 1135. 
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
415. Dep’t of Transp. v. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d 126, 128 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
416. Id. 
417. Id. at 128–29; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.4061 (2012). 
418. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 129. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. at 130, 136. 
421. Id. at 133, 136; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.1091, .4061(1). 
422. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 136; see also FLA. STAT. § 
337.19(1) (2012). 
423. 191 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 2016). 
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homestead.
424
  Creditor obtained a judgment against debtor in 2010.
425
  In 
2013, due to Debtor’s divorce, the marital homestead was sold and Debtor’s 
portion of the proceeds was deposited in a [Florida] Homestead Account 
(“Account”) at Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC (“Garnishee”).426  The account 
was subdivided into a cash portion and two securities portions.
427
  The 
account was kept separate from Debtor’s other assets.428  In 2014, Creditor 
served writs of garnishment on Garnishee in an effort to apply the assets of 
the account toward satisfaction of its judgment.
429
  In the trial court, Debtor 
successfully moved to have the writs dissolved.
430
  The trial court’s order 
was affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the strength of the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s decision431 in Orange Brevard Plumbing & 
Heating Co. v. La Croix.
432
  The Fourth District’s decision was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Florida.
433
  The Supreme Court reiterated the basic 
principle that proceeds from the sale of one’s Florida homestead continues to 
enjoy protection from the claims of most creditors and provided: 
(1) [T]here must be a good faith intention, prior to and at the time 
of the sale, to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a 
reasonable time; (2) [t]he funds must not be commingled with 
other monies; (3) [t]he proceeds must be kept separate and apart 
and held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home.
434
 
The Court found that Debtor had kept faith with the requirements of 
Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating.
435
 
                                                          
424. Id. at 880. 
425. Id. 
426. Id. 
427. Id. 
428. JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 880. 
429. Id. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. 
432. 137 So. 2d 201 (Fla 1962). 
433. JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 882. 
434. Id. at 881. 
435. Id. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Florida House Bill 221 was signed into law on May 9, 2017.
1
  With 
the enactment of the Bill, Florida joins forty-six other states, and the District 
                                                     
* Carlos Ibarcena, J.D. candidate, 2019, Nova Southeastern University, 
Shepard Broad College of Law; B.S. Finance, Bentley University. Carlos dedicates this 
Comment in loving memory of his mother Karina Klee.  He would like to give a special thank 
you to his family and loving fiancée, Lillian, for always blessing him with support and 
motivation.  He would also like to thank his colleagues of the Nova Law Review for the hard 
work and effort they dedicated to this Comment and Volume 42.  Lastly, he would like to 
thank Professor Joseph Hnylka for his guidance and critique in refining this Comment. 
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of Columbia, in enacting statewide legislation to legalize and regulate 
transportation network companies (“TNC”), such as Uber and Lyft.2  The 
law will provide these companies with a uniform set of operating standards 
throughout the state.
3
  The new law contains provisions addressing key 
policy arguments, which include the classification of TNC drivers, insurance 
requirements, background check requirements, administrative and reporting 
requirements, and the regulatory authority under the new regulatory scheme.
4
  
The law, which preempts all local regulations enacted before the law’s 
effective date and puts TNCs exclusively under state regulation going 
forward, carves out a small, but significant, exception allowing the operating 
authorities of airports and seaports to retain control over setting pickup fees 
and logistics within such locations.
5
 
This Comment will provide an overview of Florida’s TNC law and 
the current landscape of TNC regulations in Florida’s airports.6  Part II will 
provide background on the local regulatory landscape before the arrival of 
the state’s law and will give a brief background on statewide laws in the 
United States.
7
  Part III will provide a brief overview on key policy issues in 
Florida law.
8
  Part IV will analyze the operation and the impact of TNCs at 
airports.
9
  Part V will discuss potential gaps in Florida’s law.10  Lastly, Part 
VI will present a conclusion.
11
 
                                                                                                                             
1. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified 
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748). 
2. GINGER GOODIN & MAARIT MORAN, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK 
COMPANIES 1 (2016), http://policy.tti.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TTI-PRC-TNCs-
SBC-031417.pdf; Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, TEXAS A&M 
TRANSP. INST., http://www.tti.tamu.edu/policy/technology/tnc-legislation/ (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017). 
3. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws. 
4. See id. § 1(7)–(11). 
5. See id. § 1(15)(a)–(b). 
6. See infra Parts II–VI. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. See infra Part IV. 
10. See infra Part V. 
11. See infra Part VI. 
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II. THE ARRIVAL OF FLORIDA’S TNC LAW 
A. Background:  The Road to State Law 
The regulation of TNCs has been a hotly contested subject, not only 
in Florida, but also throughout the United States and the world.
12
  The arrival 
of TNCs in Florida created a political storm for local politicians and 
regulators.
13
  Uber, the largest of the TNCs, and its close rival, Lyft, arrived 
first in Miami, Florida around 2014.
14
  When they arrived, there were no 
transportation or for-hire regulations that fit the operating model of TNCs.
15
  
For-hire regulations, those applicable to taxicabs, appeared to be the closest 
fit, and thus were applied.
16
  However, TNCs did not conform to these 
regulations and continued to operate illegally.
17
  In willfully choosing to not 
abide by for-hire regulations, the TNCs gained a competitive advantage over 
                                                     
12. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Brian O’Keefe & Marty Jones, 
Uber’s Tax Shell Game, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 2015, at 115, 117. 
13. See Editorial, What Tallahassee Should Do on Uber, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), 
Jan. 29, 2016, at 18A; Douglas Hanks, In Email Blitz, Uber Threatens to Pull Out of Miami-
Dade, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 14, 2016, 2:26 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54698295.html. 
14. Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Chairman Backs Off in Uber Fight, But 
Sticking Points Remain, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 15, 2016, 5:46 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54953260.html; Brian 
Solomon, Lyft Rides Tripled Last Year, but Remains Far Behind Uber, FORBES: TECH (Jan. 5, 
2017, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2017/01/05/lyft-rides-tripled-last-
year-but-remains-far-behind-uber/.  Because both Lyft and Uber are privately held companies, 
there is limited information on their financials and operations: 
Lyft remains a distant second place to Uber.  In the month of December, Uber 
completed 78 million rides in the U.S. compared with Lyft’s 18.7 million.  That 
means Uber is more than four times bigger than Lyft in each company’s home 
market.  Abroad, Uber has tens of millions of more rides.  FORBES estimates Uber 
completed more rides globally in the first two months of 2016 than Lyft did all 
year. 
Solomon, supra; see also Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft Are Getting Pushback from 
Municipalities All over the US, CNBC: TECH (Sept. 2, 2016, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-municipalities-all-
over-the-us.html. 
15. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade 
Looks to Other Cities in Struggle to Deal with Lyft, Uber, MIAMI HERALD (June 21, 2014, 6:16 
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1967467.html.  
Lyft’s director of government relations stated that local regulations did not address the 
business model of TNCs.  Mazzei, supra. 
16. See Mazzei, supra note 15.  “Miami-Dade has treated the companies as 
unlicensed taxi services — and [it is] hardly the only government to do so.”  Id. 
17. See Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed-It’s Time for Regulators to 
Shut It Down, HARV. BUS. REV.: BUS. L. (June 21, 2017), http://www.hbr.org/2017/06/uber-
cant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regulators-to-shut-it-down; Mazzei, supra note 15. 
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the local for-hire transportation industry, in part, through the cost-savings 
derived from their non-compliance with regulatory costs.
18
  The 
management-led rebellion against the application of local regulations to TNC 
drivers, promoted by the payment of fines for drivers, appeared to be the pre-
determined and highly criticized strategy behind the entry to all new 
markets.
19
  Pushing local regulations aside, TNCs aimed to hook their users 
with low fares and better service.
20
  Once hooked, TNCs would supplement 
their regulatory crusade by mobilizing their loyal user to demand regulatory 
change from lawmakers.
21
  Grassroots lobbying was effective and led to the 
creation of local TNC regulations; these regulations allowed TNCs to operate 
legally, if they met the requirements.
22
 
The enactment of local ordinances was not widespread and some 
Florida counties refused to provide TNCs a pathway to operate legally.
23
  
Even within the municipalities that enacted local TNC regulations, the 
regulations varied significantly; in 2016, state legislators sought to put an 
end to the chaos by suggesting the first proposals for the statewide regulation 
of TNCs
24
.  However, the Senate struck it down after the bill passed the 
House.
25
  Undeterred, and with a new pro-TNC Senate President, the Florida 
Legislature was able to pass House Bill 221 and bring the TNC regulatory 
landscape to its current form.
26
  The Bill was signed into law on May 9, 
2017.
27
 
                                                     
18. See Edelman, supra note 17. 
19. See id. (speaking on Uber’s fight against regulators); Patricia Mazzei, 
Miami-Dade Escalates Penalties Against Renegade Lyft Drivers, MIAMI HERALD (June 6, 
2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article1965588.html; Alyson Shontell, Cops in Miami Are Running a Sting to Catch Lyft 
Drivers, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/miami-
cops-are-running-a-sting-to-catch-lyft-drivers-2014-6. 
20. See Hanks, supra note 14. 
21. See id. 
22. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Miadeco Corp. v. 
Miami-Dade Cty., No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017).  “In response to lobbying and 
changes in the for-hire transportation market, the County exercised its legislative prerogative 
to create a separate system of regulations for TNEs.”  Id. 
23. See Michael Auslen et al., It’s Up to Rick Scott Now:  Should Local 
Governments Be Allowed to Regulate Uber?, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article145556644.html. 
24. See Michael Auslen, Uber Bill Easily Clears First Hurdle, BRADENTON 
HERALD: ST. POL. (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:26 PM), http://www.bradenton.com/news/politics-
government/state-politics/article131538319.html. 
 
25. Id. 
 
26. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified 
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); see also Daniel Ducassi, Brandes:  ‘This Is the Year for Ride-
Sharing in Florida’, POLITICO: FLA. (Jan. 11, 2017, 4:38 PM), 
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B. Florida Joins the Ninety Percent 
In 2013, the California Public Utilities Commission used its 
authority to legalize TNCs statewide “and define[d] the term transportation 
network company,” now commonly used to define ride-sharing companies 
such as Uber and Lyft.
28
  Soon after, in 2014, Colorado became the first state 
to enact state-level legislation authorizing and regulating TNCs.
29
  Statewide 
TNC legislation grew from thirty-three in May 2016 to forty-three in March 
2017.
30
  As of October 2017, forty-eight states, and the District of Columbia, 
have enacted some level of TNC legislation.
31
  The lonely hold-out states are 
Oregon and Vermont.
32
  No two TNC state laws are the same; some laws 
have similar or equivalent provisions while others differ, but the key policies 
in all legislative efforts involve the level of regulation, power of local 
authorities, the taxicab industry, and public safety.
33
  State lawmakers faced a 
challenging task in writing a comprehensive law that did not overly interfere 
with a free-market economy.
34
 
Florida’s TNC law established a uniform set of regulations for TNCs 
across the state.
35
  The key policies addressed in the law include the 
classification of TNC drivers as independent contractors and minimum 
insurance requirements.
36
  Notably, the law does not require TNCs or TNC 
drivers to obtain an initial or annual permit fee before beginning to operate; 
lawmakers only mandated a bi-annual submission of a compliance report 
prepared by an independent auditor.
37
  In addition, the law expressly 
preempts all existing and future local law, with the exception of airports and 
seaports, which have the authority to set reasonable pickup fees.
38
 
                                                                                                                             
http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/01/brandes-this-is-the-year-for-ride-sharing-
in-florida-108663. 
27. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
28. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
29. Id. at 9. 
30. See id. at 1, 5. 
31. Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, supra note 2. 
32. See id. 
33. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 6–8. 
34. See Editorial, supra note 13. 
35. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
36. Id. § 1(9)(c)–(d); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9. 
37. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 9. 
38. Id. § 1(15)(a)–(b). 
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III. FLORIDA’S TNC LAW 
A. TNC Drivers as Independent Contractors 
Uber has vehemently stressed that it is a technology company, not a 
transportation provider, and Florida lawmakers agree.
39
  The ramifications, 
both legal and financial, between the classification of independent contractor 
and employee for the TNCs are tremendous.
40
  Under Florida’s TNC law, 
TNC drivers are classified as independent contractors, if the following four 
conditions are satisfied: 
 
(a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during 
which the TNC driver must be logged on to the TNC’s digital 
network. 
(b) The TNC does not prohibit the TNC driver from using digital 
networks from other TNCs. 
(c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from engaging in 
any other occupation or business. 
(d) The TNC and TNC driver agree in writing that the TNC driver 
is an independent contractor with respect to the TNC.
41
 
 
Two parts of the test, sub-subsections (a) and (c), share TNC’s 
marketing efforts towards drivers:  the liberty to decide when to drive and to 
do so as a supplemental income.
42
  Furthermore, providing a source of 
supplemental income for constituents was one of the purposes behind 
enacting the law, enabling TNCs to operate under a set of uniform 
regulations.
43
  Moreover, the liberty of TNC drivers to schedule their driving 
                                                     
39. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(1)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 2; 
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 3:2; Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring 
Controversy, NEWS-PRESS (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.news-
press.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bringcontroversy/15421511/. 
40. See ZACH SCHILLER & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y, 
TAXES AND THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 1, 7 (2017), http://www.itep.org/wp-
content/uploads/ondemandeconomytaxes0317.pdf; GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9. 
41. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 7–
8. 
42. Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 39; Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare 
Legislation with Overwhelming Support, FLA. TREND (Apr. 19, 2017), 
http://www.floridatrend.com/article/21980/florida-house-senate-pass-rideshare-legislation-
with-overwhelming-support. 
43. See Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare Legislation with 
Overwhelming Support, supra note 42; Hogan, supra note 39. 
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times, as required by the statute, is in line with Florida case law previous to 
the passing of law.
44
 
Sub-subsection (b) of the test touches the highly competitive nature 
of TNCs.
45
  TNC rivals, Uber and Lyft, have always looked to gain a 
competitive advantage over the other, though the rivalry reached new heights 
when it was alleged that the TNCs participated in potentially illicit 
recruitment practices.
46
  It is unknown whether these practices, or similar 
ones, remain in effect or, if they are, whether courts would find them to be in 
violation of the statute.
47
 
The last sub-subsection, (d), was expressly addressed in McGillis v. 
Department of Economic Opportunity,
48
 where the court affirmed the 
decision of Florida’s Department of Economic Opportunity that a former 
Uber driver was not an employee for purposes of reemployment assistance 
“[b]ecause the parties’ contract explicitly provides that an Uber driver is not 
an employee and the nature of the parties’ relationship was consistent with 
this classification.”49  Similar agreements between Uber and its drivers have 
been upheld by courts to compel arbitration.
50
  As of now, no court has ruled 
TNC drivers as employees, though the issue is being litigated in federal 
courts.
51
  It appears TNC drivers will be categorized as independent-
contractors under Florida’s TNC law, although any change in case law or 
                                                     
44. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 7; 
McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017); 
Hogan, supra note 39. 
45. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 
7–8; Maya Kosoff, Uber Used a Secret Program Called “Hell” to Track Rival Drivers, 
VANITY FAIR (Apr. 13, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/uber-used-
a-secret-program-called-hell-to-track-rival-drivers. 
46. See Kosoff, supra note 45. 
47. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 
7–8; McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222.  It is unknown whether a Florida court, which held that an 
Uber driver was not an employee, before the enactment of Florida’s TNC statute, considered 
the sabotage allegations against Uber and Lyft.  McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222.  “Drivers are free 
to switch between using Uber’s driver application and the application of a competitor, such as 
Lyft.”  Id.; Kossoff, supra note 45; Casey Newton, This Is Uber’s Playbook for Sabotaging 
Lyft, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/26/6067663/this-is-
ubers-playbook-for-sabotaging-lyft (detailing Uber’s Operation SLOG). 
48. 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
49. Id.; see also Fla. CS for HB 221, § 1(9)(d). 
50. See Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-13263, 2017 WL 2197812, at *1 
(11th Cir. Ct. App. May 18, 2017) (per curiam); Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-
23267, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017). 
51. Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397, 
1418 (2016). 
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federal law could retroactively entitle a TNC driver to rights under state and 
federal employment statutes.
52
 
B. Minimum Insurance Requirements 
When it came to regulating TNCs, TNCs and insurance were 
inseparable.
53
  The new law clearly details insurance requirements and both 
operational and legal clarifications for insurers.
54
  The clarification provides 
relief to TNC drivers and insurers.
55
  In the past, insurance issues included 
coverage gaps and amounts, and the absence of a regulatory framework led 
drivers to commit fraud by omitting information from insurers.
56
  The law 
aims to combat omissions to insurers by mandating that a TNC driver, or the 
TNC on behalf of the driver, carry insurance which “[r]ecognizes that the 
TNC driver is a TNC driver or otherwise uses a vehicle to transport riders for 
compensation.”57  Moreover, the insurance requirement provision of the law 
adopts a similar classification of TNC activity to that of the one provided as 
guidance by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) 
and mirrors that of other states’ TNC laws.58  The classification of each 
activity period corresponds to distinct insurance requirements.
59
  Florida’s 
law establishes the minimum insurance amounts to be maintained during two 
distinct TNC activity periods:  (1) when “a participating TNC driver is 
logged on to the digital network but is not engaged in a prearranged ride” 
and (2) when a “TNC driver is engaged in a prearranged ride.”60  The 
insurance maintained by either the TNC, the TNC driver, or a combination of 
both can satisfy the requirements.
61
 
                                                     
52. McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 221, 225–26; see also SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra 
note 40, at 4, 7. 
53. See Editorial, supra note 13. 
54. See Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(8)(b)(f), 2017 
Fla. Laws 4–6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); Ellen Huet, Rideshare Drivers Still 
Cornered into Insurance Secrecy, FORBES: TECH (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/18/uber-lyft-driver-insurance/. 
55. See Ducassi, supra note 26. 
56. See Huet, supra note 54. 
57. Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(a)(1), 2017 Fla. Laws 4; 
see also Huet, supra note 54. 
58. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
59. Id. 
60. Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(2), 2017 Fla. Laws 
4. 
61. Id. § 1(7)(c)(2)(a)–(c). 
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C. Reporting Requirements 
Florida’s TNC law does not require TNCs to receive approval of 
new law.
62
  The only administrative regulatory compliance required of TNCs 
is the submission of “an examination report prepared by an independent 
certified public accountant for the sole purpose of verifying that the TNC has 
maintained compliance with” two provisions of the law for the preceding two 
years of operation, to the Department of Financial Services.
63
  The first 
provision covers insurance disclosures, and the second, exclusions and TNC 
driver requirements.
64
  If the report discloses that the TNC is found to have 
been non-compliant during the examination period, the TNC will be fined 
$10,000.
65
  In the case of non-compliance, another report due the following 
January, is required.
66
  A $20,000 fine is imposed for non-compliance 
discovered in the additional report.
67
 
D. Pay to Operate:  Fees and Tailor-Made Taxes 
1. The Regulatory Cost to Operate for TNCs 
The costs and administrative requirements necessary to begin 
operating legally under enacted state TNC laws vary, as does the regulatory 
authority assigned to oversee permitting.
68
  Typically, before a permit to 
operate is granted, the TNC must submit to the relevant authority “proof of 
compliance with requirements outlined in the legislation, such as insurance 
or driver information requirements.”69  In addition, some states require TNCs 
to pay a fee as part of the initial application process.
70
  The fee is referred to, 
                                                     
62. See id. § 1(2).  TNCs do not have to submit the examination report 
required by law until January 1, 2019.  Id. § 1(11)(e). 
63. Id. 
64. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(8), (11), 2017 Fla. Laws 
6, 8. 
65. Id. § 1(11)(f). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280.3 (2017) ($5000 application fee plus 
an annual permit fee of $5000), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-606 (2016) (annual permit 
fee of $111,250).  Examples of regulatory authorities under TNC state laws include:  Virginia 
and West Virginia use the Department of Motor Vehicles; Arizona, Delaware, and South 
Carolina use the Department of Transportation; California and Ohio use the Public Utilities 
Commission; Nevada used the Transportation Authority.  GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 
8. 
69. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2 at 8. 
70. See id. 
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generally, as a license or permit fee.
71
  Annual fees range from $500 in 
Montana to $111,250 in Colorado.
72
  Though Colorado’s flat annual fee is 
currently the highest, and may be adjusted to cover the direct and indirect 
costs associated with implementing the TNC law, the formulation of annual 
permit fees prescribed by some states may surpass that figure.
73
  That is 
because “[i]n some states the permit fees are proportional to the size or 
extent of a TNC operation.”74  For example, Georgia, Michigan, and 
Kentucky base their annual fee on a tier-system categorized by the number of 
cars operating under the TNC.
75
  Of these, Georgia’s master license fee is the 
most expensive of the three states, costing $300,000 to register 1001 cars or 
more, which is ten times more expensive than the cost to register the same 
amount of cars in Michigan, and over thirteen times more expensive than 
Kentucky.
76
 
2. Custom Made TNC Taxes 
With only eight states currently applying sales or a gross receipt tax 
on taxi fares, TNCs do not have an overwhelming exposure to such tax.
77
  As 
such, some states have taken the initiative to design TNC specific taxes to go 
along with TNC laws.
78
  Nevada and South Carolina levy, on TNCs, an 
assessment fee based on their gross revenue.
79
  South Carolina has set the fee 
at 1% of gross trips, while Nevada has set the amount at 3%.
80
  Some states 
and cities have imposed a per-ride fee or a variation thereof on TNCs.
81
  
                                                     
71. Id. (license in Georgia and permit in Colorado). 
72. Id. 
73. See id.  If a TNC had over 1000 cars in Georgia, the annual license fee 
would cost $300,000, surpassing Colorado’s flat annual fee of $111,250.  GOODIN & MORAN, 
supra note 2, at 8. 
74. Id. 
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) (2016); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 § 
2(4)(c) (2017); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) ($30,000 for more than 1000 
vehicles); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 § 2(4)(c) ($22,500 for 501 or more vehicles); GOODIN 
& MORAN, supra note 2, at 8. 
77. See SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 3. 
78. Id. at 4. 
79. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 
40, at 4. 
80. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER& DAVIS, supra note 
40, at 4–5. 
81. SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 4–5.  Massachusetts imposes a 
twenty-cent per-ride fee, while Pennsylvania imposes a 1.4% gross receipt tax only on rides 
that originate in Philadelphia; Seattle, which has not been preempted by state law, imposes a 
similar fee at twenty-four cents per-ride.  See id.; Transportation Network Companies, 
70
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These variable annual fee structures tie fee amounts to the growth and 
success of TNCs, thus if the exponential growth of TNCs continues, so will 
the fee revenue of these states.
82
  The regulatory enforcement of TNCs 
comes at a cost, hence, states use the fees collected to help cover those 
costs.
83
  In states where annual fees could become significant and surpass 
enforcement costs, fee funds are distributed back to municipalities in 
proportion to population or TNC trip origination.
84
  Aside from 
administrative and operational enforcement, TNC fees can be applied in 
ways that promote the public welfare.
85
  Seattle has mandated, in addition to 
a fourteen-cent share on all TNC rides originating in the city, that TNCs pay 
ten cents per-ride for the Wheelchair Accessible Services Fund.
86
 
IV. AIRPORTS & TNCS:  A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP 
A. Background:  Airports and Revenue 
Local governments, generally, are concerned only with activities that 
are in the best interest of the people they represent.
87
  One such interest is the 
establishment, operation, and management of a public airport.
88
  The 
government units, which own and operate public airports across the United 
States, vary, but they are essentially cities or counties.
89
  A popular form of 
airport governance has been the creation of subunits of local governments, 
commonly known as airport authorities.
90
  The authority may also possess 
the power to raise funds by taxation or the issuance of bonds, if expressly 
provided by the statute creating the airport authority.
91
  Airport authorities 
are given wide latitude on their management of day-to-day operations, 
                                                                                                                             
SEATTLE.GOV: BUS. REG., http://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-and-
tncs/transportation-network-companies/tnc-companies (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
82. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SOLOMON, supra note 14. 
83. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
257.2104(3)–(4) (2017). 
84. See e.g., GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8 (South Carolina distributes 
surplus TNC funds to municipalities in proportion to trip origination). 
85. See e.g., SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 5 (local government 
imposed per-ride fee to be used on local transportation projects and transportation for the 
disabled). 
86. Transportation Network Companies, supra note 81. 
87. See e.g., Hunter Bacot & Jack Christine, What’s So “Special” About 
Airport Authorities?  Assessing the Administrative Structure of U.S. Airports, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 241, 241 (2006). 
88. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, Westlaw (database updated May 2017). 
89. Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241. 
90. Id. at 242. 
91. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, supra note 88. 
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though “the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has significant 
input into airport operations through regulatory direction.”92  To receive 
federal funding, airports must comply with assurances tied to the grants.
93
  In 
the case of FAA grants, the airport must “maintain a schedule of charges for 
use of facilities and services at the airport[] that will make the airport as 
self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at the airport, 
including volume of traffic and economy of collection.”94  In light of all the 
applicable restrictions, airport operators have become cost-effective and have 
looked to increase non-aeronautical revenue.
95
 
Almost all airports in the United States receive federal funding, but 
the majority of “their operational revenue come[s] . . . from rents and fees 
paid by . . . aeronautical and non-aeronautical” entities.96  As operators, 
airport authorities have the power to impose fees and other operational 
directives on commercial businesses operating within the airport facilities.
97
  
Airports receive revenue from two general groups of users:  aeronautical 
users, which are commercial airlines, and non-aeronautical users.
98
  Non-
aeronautical businesses include car rental companies, parking lots, 
restaurants, gift shops, and ground transportation services.
99
 
Non-aeronautical revenue is not regulated as aeronautical revenue, 
coming from commercial airlines, is regulated.
100
  “[F]ees charged to non-
aeronautical users are not subject to the [FAA] reasonableness requirement 
or the Department of Transportation Policy on airport rates and charges . . . 
.”101  The FAA has limited its input regarding non-aeronautical revenues to 
interpreting the self-sustaining requirement to mandate that airports charge 
non-aeronautical users fair market value for the use of the airport’s 
facilities.
102
  The flexibility and ability of airlines to challenge fees can serve 
as a deterrent to airports overcharging since an airport’s non-compliance 
with the reasonable fee assurance can result in a breach of the contractual 
                                                     
92. Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241. 
93. Id. 
94. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13)–(A) (2012). 
95. Maria Z. Nucci, Allocation of Economic Risk in Nonaeronautical Airport 
Revenue Contracts, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2002, at 6. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. at 7. 
98. Id. at 6. 
99. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 
367, 369 (11th Cir. 1987); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241. 
100. See Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 
Fed. Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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grant.
103
  Unlike airlines, non-aeronautical businesses do not have the same 
recourses available to challenge airport fees, which has resulted in 
litigation.
104
  Courts have given airport regulations great deference, holding 
them to be constitutional so long as the authority promulgating them can 
point the regulation to being rationally related to a legitimate objective.
105
 
B. The Arrival of TNCs at Airports 
The growth of TNCs, such as Uber and Lyft, has been exponential, 
reportedly gathering up “as much as one-fourth of the U.S. ride-hailing 
market.”106  One customer segment TNCs have been aggressively pursuing 
has been business travelers, successfully beating out taxis in the competition 
for the profitable customer segment.
107
  A component behind the success of 
TNCs in capturing the business traveler segment has been their slow, but 
persistent, entry into airports.
108
  Airports represent lucrative opportunities 
for TNCs, but airports have been reluctant in opening their doors to TNCs.
109
  
Though it is not a one-way street, airports also look at TNC fees as a 
potential significant revenue stream.
110
  TNC fees provide a new revenue 
stream for airports, but it is not always at a net increase to the airport’s 
overall revenue.
111
  More passengers taking TNCs to the airport translates 
into fewer parking, taxicab, and car rental fees for airports.
112
  These fees are 
major components of an airport’s non-aeronautical revenue; “[l]ast year, the 
                                                     
103. See id. at 7720, 7723. 
104. See Alamo, 825 F.2d at 370. 
105. See id. at 373–74; Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan 
Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1984). 
106. SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 10. 
107. Kerry Close, Why You Can’t Take an Uber Home from the Airport, TIME: 
MONEY (July 7, 2016), http://www.time.com/money/4396248/uber-lyft-ban-airport/. 
108. See Jenni Bergal, Airport Parking Takes Hit from Uber, Lyft, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (July 18, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/07/18/airport-parking-takes-hit-from-uber-lyft.  In the United 
States, “Lyft has agreements with nearly 240 airports and Uber has agreements with more than 
a hundred.”  Id. 
109. Close, supra note 107.  Airports represent a key portion of the travel 
market that TNCs are aggressively pursuing, in part, by focusing on business travelers because 
11% of them use TNCs.  Id. 
110. See Andrea Ahles, DFW Won’t Raise Parking Rates Again, and You Can 
Thank Uber and Lyft, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (June 29, 2017, 10:57 AM), 
http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/sky-talk-blog/article158814344.html 
(explaining that revenue from TNC fees will have nearly doubled in three years). 
111. Bergal, supra note 108. 
112. Id. 
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$3.5 billion in fees represented 41[%] of the $8.5 billion in U.S. airport 
revenue not related to airlines.”113 
Parking related fees have been a large revenue stream for airports for 
many years, and now make up nearly 20% of non-aeronautical revenue for 
airports in the United States.
114
  In some cases, car rental fees provide an 
even larger revenue stream for airports.
115
  For example, at Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport (“FLL”), revenue from car rental fees is 
“the largest source of revenue[],” making up about 30% of the airport’s total 
operating revenue.
116
  Likewise, parking fees also provide a significant 
revenue stream for airports, “typically represent[ing] between one-fifth and 
one-quarter of that revenue category.”117  The impact of TNCs on airport 
revenues has not been fully determined because TNCs have only been 
operating under formal agreements with airports for a short period of time.
118
  
Nonetheless, the current reduction in fees, whether short or long term, have 
airport operators looking to offset the losses with TNC fees.
119
  In addition, 
as airport operators, authorities must ensure that TNCs are abiding by the 
regulations of the airport, not only for economic reasons, but also for safety, 
security, and general operational matters.
120
  The enforcement of TNCs 
requires “increased staffing costs to oversee ride-hailing operations and 
increased curbside congestion, mean[ing] less money for the airport and 
other public transportation services that airport revenue subsidizes.”121 
Maintaining certain revenue levels for airports is also of critical 
importance to maintaining operations, covering debt-servicing, and fulfilling 
certain federal grant assurances.
122
  The reductions in revenue seen from 
increases in the use of TNCs have not yet proved to be a financial risk for 
airports, in part, because airports are subsidizing the reductions with fees 
charged to TNCs.
123
  For example, the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport faced a 
                                                     
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. See BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE 
YEARS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 AND 2015 13 (2017), 
http://www.broward.org/Airport/About/Documents/Fssigned03272017.pdf. 
116. Id. 
117. Bergal, supra note 108. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 
367, 371 n.4 (11th Cir. 1987). 
121. Sandra Tan, NFTA Fears $2 Million in Lost Airport Revenue Because of 
Uber, Lyft, BUFF. NEWS (July 6, 2017), http://www.buffalonews.com/2017/07/06/nfta-fears-2-
million-airport-revenue-loss-due-uber-lyft-services/. 
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 47107(b) (2012); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 
371 n.4. 
123. See Bergal, supra note 108. 
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shortfall in parking fee projections, but will not raise parking rates for the 
first time in five years thanks to the increase in the airport’s ground 
transportation revenue, which has benefitted from TNC fees.
124
  For airport 
authorities looking at the long term coexistence of the economic demands of 
their airports and TNC fees, it is “appropriate for the [a]uthority to factor in 
future development plans when setting user fees.”125  The relationship 
between ground transportation revenue and capital expenditures does not 
have to be perfectly aligned since one revenue stream can be used to 
complement or subsidize other unrelated revenue streams, like fees charged 
to airlines.
126
  In subsidizing airline fees, the airport becomes more attractive 
to airlines.
127
  For instance, at FLL in Florida: 
Non-airline revenues, represented 71.1% of total 
operating revenues in fiscal year 2016.  The main categories of 
non-airline revenues, rental car revenues, parking revenues, and 
concessions, have steadily been increasing over the last few years, 
due to increases in passenger activity and also increases in sales 
per passenger.  This increase in non-airline revenues has 
contributed to the ability to maintain low terminal rents and 
landing fees that result in a low CPE [Cost Per Enplanement].  
This low-cost structure makes the Airport attractive to air carriers, 
especially low-cost carriers.
128
 
Where state laws have not preempted local authorities from setting 
TNC airport fees, many airports have reached agreements with the TNCs.
129
  
The agreements vary in structure, such as a flat fee or a per-ride fee, and in 
amounts.
130
  The agreements are products of often tense and lengthy 
negotiations between policymakers and the TNCs.
131
  Airport authorities 
bargain for an agreement that considers the effect of TNCs on the airport, 
which includes lost revenue from reduced ground transportation, parking, 
                                                     
124. Ahles, supra note 110. 
125. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 906 F.2d 516, 
522 (11th Cir. 1990); Bergal, supra note 108. 
126. BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, supra note 115, at 12. 
127. See id. 
128. Id. 
129. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14; e.g., Bergal, supra note 108 
(Buffalo Niagara International Airport in New York will charge Lyft a three-dollar fee per-
ride and Uber a flat fee of $180,000); Taylor, supra note 14 (Newark Airport signed a $10 
million dollar deal with Uber). 
130. See Bergal, supra note 108.  Lyft is charged on a per-ride basis, while 
Uber is charged a flat fee, both agreements were for one year.  Id. 
131. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
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and car rental fees, as well as enforcement costs.
132
  TNCs look for a fee 
structure that best reflects its operation at that airport and, ultimately, as for-
profit entities with shareholders, looking for the lowest cost possible.
133
 
C. Landscape of TNC Laws at Airports 
Broad preemption language eliminating or limiting the authority of 
local governments to regulate TNCs is not uncommon in enacted state 
laws.
134
  However, a significant amount of states carve out exceptions to the 
preemption for airport and seaport authorities.
135
  Only a small number of 
states have left their state’s airport operator without any authority to impose 
on TNCs fees or other operational directives.
136
  Within those states, the 
authority left to airport authorities varies.
137
  The majority of those states 
allow the airport to set pickup fees and operational directives.
138
  In some 
instances, states provide parameters under which airport authorities must 
abide by when setting TNC fees.
139
 
                                                     
132. See Bergal, supra note 108.  “[O]fficials estimate they could lose more 
than $2 million in revenue a year from parking, taxi, and car rental fees because of TNCs . . . 
.”  Id. 
133. See Eric Anderson, Uber Balks at Airport Process, TIMES UNION (N.Y.), 
July 12, 2017, at A1. 
134. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14. 
135. Id. at 7, 14. 
136. Id. at 7.  Of the states that have left no authority to airport authorities 
under respective TNC laws, Colorado is the only state home to a major airport, Denver 
International Airport.  See id. at 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CALENDAR YEAR 2016 
PRELIMINARY REVENUE ENPLANEMENTS AT COMMERCIAL AIRPORTS 1 (2017), 
http://www.FAA.gov/Airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/p
reliminary-cy-16-commercial-service-enplanements.pdf 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170715205149/https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacit
y/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/preliminary-cy16-commercial-service-
enplanements.pdf]. 
137. Compare Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. 
Laws 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748(15)(b)) (authority to set pickup fees that must be 
consistent with those charged to taxicabs), with GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191 (2016). 
138. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–14. 
139. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191.  One such state is Georgia, home to the 
busiest airport in the world.  FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1.  Georgia limits the 
fees charged to TNCs—ride share network services—and taxi services alike, to “not exceed 
airport’s approximate cost” of regulating the operation of the entities at the airport.  GA. CODE 
ANN. § 40-1-191. 
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D. Florida’s Airports & TNCs 
1. Florida’s Valuable Airport Opportunity 
Florida recently moved ahead of Texas to the number two spot for 
“overall number of passengers boarding airplanes” in the nation.140  Since 
Uber’s arrival in Miami, the company’s share of the business travelers 
segment increased from 17% to 67% in just two years.
141
  As an important 
and profitable client base for TNCs, the positive trend underlies the 
importance of TNCs gaining access to Florida’s airports.142  Florida is home 
to four large hub airports—airports that represent at least 1% of total 
enplanements in the United States.
143
  All four airports are within the top 
thirty airports, according to total passenger enplanements 2016.
144
  Since 
Miami-Dade—Florida’s most populous county—legalized TNCs in May 
2016, the $2 pickup fee imposed on Uber by MIA has translated into over $2 
million in revenue for the airport in one year.
145
 
2. Airport Authorities Under Florida’s TNC Law 
Florida is divided by law into sixty-seven political subdivisions 
called counties.
146
  As in the rest of the United States, subunits of local 
governments have been created by law to operate airports in Florida.
147
  
Florida’s airport authorities, through the power derived from their 
Legislature, “have the right, power, and authority to enter into contracts with 
one or more motor carriers for the transportation of passengers for hire 
                                                     
140. Jim Turner, Florida Passes Texas in Airport Traffic in 2016, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Fla.), July 18, 2017, at 8A. 
141. Douglas Hanks, Miami Business Travelers Abandon Taxis for Uber, 
MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), Feb. 1, 2017, at 8A. 
142. See Close, supra note 107. 
143. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1.  Florida’s Large Hub 
Airports listed by total enplanements in 2016:  Miami International Airport (“MIA”), Orlando 
International Airport (“MCO”), Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International (“FLL”), and 
Tampa International (“TPA”).  Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Taylor, supra note 14; Video clip: Univision Report at 2:15–2:25, Uber y 
Lyft destronan a los taxistas en el aeropuerto de Miami [Uber and Lyft Dethrone Taxi Drivers 
at Miami Airport], UNIVISION COMM., INC.: UNIVISION 23: MIAMI (July 25, 2017, 7:34 PM), 
http://www.univision.com/miami/wltv/uber-y-lyft-destronan-a-los-taxistas-en-el-aeropuerto-
de-miami-video. 
146. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (amended 2014); Auslen et al., supra note 
23. 
147. Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 243; see, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car, 
Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 368–69 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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between such airport or airports and points within such county.”148  Courts 
have ruled that airport authorities may charge different fee amounts to 
different categories of businesses operating in the airport.
149
  The airport 
authority’s justification for the difference in fees is “based upon its rational 
assessment of the relative benefits and the extent of use of each category of 
vehicles that enter the airport.”150  The legitimate purposes supporting the 
different fees could be many—including the regulation and control of airport 
roadway traffic, the protection of the public safety, and the need to generate 
revenue from commercial users of the airport to support the provision of the 
airport facilities to the public—of which only one is needed to uphold the 
regulation.
151
 
In general, the main benefit conferred upon a business operating in 
the airport is the client base of travelers using the airport.
152
  In assessing 
extent of use, courts have considered the volume of vehicles that can be 
accommodated on the airport’s roadways, the number of passengers the 
vehicle can carry, the safety and security costs associated with the increased 
traffic congestion, and designated pickup areas as necessary to accommodate 
the category of users.
153
  Overall, the fees assessed on businesses operating 
within the airport are formulated by a form of benefit-use analysis.
154
  The 
benefits conferred on each business are not always the same, which typically 
gives rise to different fee amounts; in upholding differing fee schedules, the 
Court reasoned: 
 
As the district court found, the on-airport companies 
receive substantial advantages from their presence in the airport, 
including overall customer convenience and access to walk up 
customers, i.e., customers who do not have reservations to rent a 
car from a particular company.  The on-airport companies, 
however, pay negotiated rents for the space they lease in the 
airport terminal and on the airport grounds. Although these rents 
may be below the actual market value of the property, they do 
compensate the Authority for the benefits that the on-airport 
companies receive.
155
 
                                                     
148. FLA. STAT. § 331.15(2) (2016); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 242, 
244. 
149. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 372 (upholding different fee 
schedules for different airport businesses). 
150. Id. at 371. 
151. Id. at 371 n.3–4. 
152. Id. at 373. 
153. Davis v. Miami-Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 
1195 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
154. See id. 
155. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 373. 
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Even though a TNC is “not a common carrier, contract carrier, or 
motor carrier,” eliminating the statutory application provided, the TNC law 
allows airport and seaport authorities to charge reasonable pickup fees.
156
  
The pickup fees must be “consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab 
companies at that airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s 
facilities.”157  In comparing the benefits conferred to TNCs and taxicabs—
one being the “prime curbside real estate when it comes to picking up 
passengers” that taxis and other ground transportation have access to in 
comparison to the designated locations that TNCs are limited to—there are 
substantial advantages to both.
158
  Taxicabs, unlike TNCs—which are 
solicited via smartphone application—rely on street hails or, in the case of 
airport pickups, hails made at the taxicab stand.
159
  But, TNCs do not have to 
wait around in lines to pick up passengers.
160
  Furthermore, taxicabs do not 
pass on the pickup fee to the rider, unlike TNCs; thus, profitability of taxicab 
companies are affected whereas TNCs are not.
161
 
It is presumed, by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s 
text, that the Legislature intended to give airport authorities leeway in setting 
the fee amount because the terms reasonable and consistent with are 
imprecise.
162
  But with the phrase consistent with being used to set the 
relationship between two monetary amounts, of which the baseline number is 
less than $5, it should not result in too big of a difference.
163
  However, when 
                                                     
156. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(2), (15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 3, 
11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748). 
157. Id. § 1(15)(b), at 11.  The preemption exception provided in Florida’s law 
is as follows: 
(b) This subsection does not prohibit an airport or seaport from charging reasonable 
pickup fees consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab companies at that 
airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s facilities or prohibit the 
airport or seaport from designating locations for staging, pickup, and other similar 
operations at the airport or seaport. 
Id. 
158. See Douglas Hanks, Transportation – Uber Getting Special Zone at 
Miami International Airport, MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), May 17, 2016, at 6A; Douglas Hanks, 
Taxis Suing Miami-Dade for $1 Billion over New Uber Law, MIAMI HERALD (May 4, 2016, 
12:41 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article75555187.html [hereinafter Taxis Suing Miami-Dade]. 
159. See Taxis Suing Miami-Dade, supra note 158. 
160. Id. 
161. See Will Robinson, Uber and Lyft Expand Statewide, Thanks to New 
Florida Law, BIZJOURNALS: JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. (July 10, 2017, 10:38 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2017/07/10/uber-and-lyft-expand-statewide-
thanks-to-new.html. 
162. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 11; 
Auslen et al., supra note 23. 
163. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 
11; Robinson, supra note 161 (explaining the airport rates set across some of Florida’s airports 
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these nominal amounts are applied to the volume of rides currently given, 
and the exponential growth rate of TNC rides at airports, they amount to 
large sums of money.
164
  Ultimately, despite the potential disparity in the 
total amount paid, mandating airports to align the fees charged to TNCs with 
those of taxicabs, fits squarely into the benefits and extent of use formulation 
previously used by the courts.
165
  Furthermore, in setting different regulatory 
frameworks applicable to different users, the airport authorities do not need 
to “achieve perfection or mathematical exactitude,” which is in line with the 
statutory text in Florida’s TNC law.166 
Moreover, the criteria set by Florida’s TNC law on airport pickup 
fees is in accordance with the limited input from the FAA on non-
aeronautical fees.
167
  The FAA, in reference to the self-sustaining 
requirement for receipt of grants, has provided that “[f]air market fees for use 
of the airport are required for non-aeronautical use of the airport.”168  Though 
the FAA guidance is centered more on market fees for rental rates of airport 
facilities, it could be construed to have a general application on airport 
facilities for non-aeronautical use as a whole.
169
  For instance, a TNC law 
expressly requires that the fees charged at airports must be in line with FAA 
regulations.
170
  In general, the self-sustaining assurance tied to FAA grants 
goes hand in hand with airports charging competitive market-based pricing 
for all non-aeronautical fees.
171
  Such fees “can be determined by reference 
to negotiated fees charged for similar uses of the airport,” which is precisely 
the criteria provided in Florida’s TNC law.172 
 
                                                                                                                             
are as follows:  “Miami International Airport currently charges $2, Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport charges $3, Palm Beach International charges $2.50, Tampa 
International Airport charges $3.”). 
164. See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25. 
165. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 
367, 371–72 (11th Cir. 1987). 
166. Id. at 371; see also Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 
Fla. Laws 11. 
167. See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 
11; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 5190.6B, FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL: CHAPTER 
17-SELF-SUSTAINABILITY (2009). 
168. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167. 
169. Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999) (explaining that self-sustaining assurance extends to the 
airport receiving fair market value for providing non-aeronautical facilities and services). 
170. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-1710(c)(1) (2016); Policy and Procedures 
Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg. at 7710. 
171. See 49 U.S.C. 47107 (2012); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167. 
172. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167; see also Act effective July 1, 
2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
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V. WHY FLORIDA’S TNC LAW GIVES TNCS A FREE RIDE 
A. Potential Issues:  Oversight 
The TNC driver requirement provision, included in the bi-annual 
research report, is the most important safeguard of the public, because before 
the TNC driver can begin driving, the driver must submit:  an application 
containing basic personal and vehicle information to the TNC, a local and 
national background check is conducted by the TNC or third-party, and a 
driving history research report is obtained and reviewed.
173
  The law 
prohibits TNCs from authorizing a TNC driver to operate if the information 
obtained on the driver through the background check reveals certain 
convictions and driving infractions.
174
  But since the TNC’s compliance with 
the provision would not be confirmed until the bi-annual check, the TNC’s 
non-compliance could expose riders and other drivers to harm, especially 
because the law leaves it up to the TNC or a third-party not specified in the 
law’s text, to conduct the criminal and driving check.175  The foregoing state 
conducted background checks revealed the degree of confidence state 
legislators have in TNCs, which have been shown to be a mistake.
176
  
Furthermore, the law mandates that TNCs retain individual ride records and 
driver records for one year after the date of the ride and for one year after the 
                                                     
173. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11), 2017 Fla. Laws 8; see 
also Adam Vaccaro & Dan Adams, Thousands of Current Uber, Lyft Drivers Fail New 
Background Checks, BOS. GLOBE (Mass.), Apr. 5, 2017, at A1. 
174. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 9.  If 
an initial or subsequent background check of a prospective driver reveals any of the following, 
the TNC may not authorize the driver to operate on the TNC’s platform: 
1. Has been convicted, within the past 5 years, of: 
a. A felony; 
b. A misdemeanor for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, for reckless 
driving, for hit and run, or for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement 
officer; or 
c. A misdemeanor for a violent offense or sexual battery, or a crime of lewdness or 
indecent exposure under chapter 800; 
2. Has been convicted, within the past 3 years, of driving with a suspended or 
revoked license; 
3. Is a match in the National Sex Offender Public Website maintained by the United 
States Department of Justice; 
4. Does not possess a valid driver license; or 
5. Does not possess proof of registration for the motor vehicle used to provide 
prearranged rides. 
Id. 
175. See id. § 1(11)(a)(2), (b) at 8–9 (requiring TNCs to conduct background 
checks for TNC drivers every three years); Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173 (stating that 
Uber conducts criminal background checks on its drivers twice a year). 
176. See Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173. 
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date that a TNC driver’s relationship with the TNC ends, respectively.177  If a 
bi-annual compliance check were to reveal non-compliance regarding driver 
authorization one year after a bi-annual check, relevant ride records or driver 
records—or both—would not, by law, be required to be maintained by the 
TNC.
178
 
B. Lack of Economic Support 
Before Florida enacted its TNC law, most of the local governments 
in the state had put together TNC regulations that allowed the companies to 
operate legally.
179
  Though the local regulations had created “a patchwork of 
local regulations that were in conflict to each other,” the regulations, in 
general, provided the local governments that would be enforcing the 
operation of TNCs with funds to defray the administrative and operational 
oversight required.
180
  Miami-Dade County adopted a TNC license fee of $26 
per vehicle that generated about $1.8 million for the County.
181
  Similarly, 
Hillsborough County came to an agreement with Uber and Lyft to pay 
$250,000 and $125,000 in annual fees, respectively.
182
  However, Florida’s 
TNC law excludes any permit, fee, or license requirements for TNCs to 
operate, except for pickup fees at airports.
183
 
The preemption provision in Florida’s TNC law states that “TNCs, 
TNC drivers, and TNC vehicles are governed exclusively by state law, 
including in any locality or other jurisdiction that enacted a law or created 
rules governing TNCs, TNC drivers, or TNC vehicles before July 1, 2017;” 
essentially eliminating all local regulations, including licensing requirements 
enacted before the law’s effective date.184  The law further prohibits local 
governments from imposing any future economic or administrative 
regulation on TNCs.
185
 
 
                                                     
177. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(14)(a)–(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 
11. 
178. See id. § 1(11)(d), (14)(a)–(b), at 9, 11. 
179. See Auslen et al., supra note 23. 
180. See id.; e.g., Garin Flowers, Hillsborough Reaches Deal with Uber, Lyft, 
WTSP (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/hillsborough-reaches-
deal-with-uber-lyft/350501652. 
181. CHARLES ANDERSON, OFFICE OF COMM’N AUDITOR, BOARD OF COUNTY 
COMMISSIONERS MEETING 4 (May 3, 2016, 9:30 AM), 
http//:www.miamidade.gov/auditor/library/2016-05-03-board-of-county-commissioners.pdf; 
Auslen et al., supra note 23. 
182. Flowers, supra note 180. 
183. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 11. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. 
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A county, municipality, special district, airport authority, port 
authority, or other local governmental entity or subdivision may 
not: 
1.  Impose a tax on, or require a license for, a TNC, a TNC driver, 
or a TNC vehicle if such tax or license relates to providing 
prearranged rides; 
2.  Subject a TNC, a TNC driver, or a TNC vehicle to any rate, 
entry, operation, or other requirement of the county, municipality, 
special district, airport authority, port authority, or other local 
governmental entity or subdivision; or 
3.  Require a TNC or a TNC driver to obtain a business license or 
any other type of similar authorization to operate within the local 
governmental entity’s jurisdiction.
186
 
 
Florida is not the only state that does not charge TNCs an upfront 
annual cost to operate, but is one of the few among comparable states not 
to.
187
  The decision to not impose any administrative or operational costs on 
TNCs foregoes source funds for local governments that could have been 
allocated to defray costs associated with the significant and increasing 
presence of TNCs across the state.
188
  Like airports, local governments must 
harmonize capital expenditures with available and potential sources of funds, 
but unlike airports, local governments were not afforded the same discretion 
under Florida’s TNC law.189  An analysis provided by the House of 
Representative Staff concluded that as a result of the revenue elimination 
from fees imposed on TNCs by local governments after the law’s 
preemption, local governments “will experience an indeterminate, but likely 
insignificant, negative fiscal impact.”190  The same report concluded that the 
airport preemption exception “may provide a positive fiscal impact to 
                                                     
186. Id. 
187. See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–8; BRUCE SCHALLER, 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS:  A BLUEPRINT FOR UBER, LYFT AND TAXI REGULATIONS 3 (2016), 
http://schallerconsult.com/rideservices/blueprint.pdf; Robinson, supra note 161. 
188. See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Tan, supra note 121. 
189. See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Kevin Spear, Orlando Airport Officials 
OK $350 Million Price Hike for New Terminal, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 21, 2017, 4:50 
PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/travel/news/os-airport-terminal-cost-vote-20170621-
story.html.  At Orlando International Airport in Florida, airport officials met and approved a 
$350 million cost increase in the construction of a new terminal; in that same meeting, 
officials set TNC pick up fees at $5.80, which is the highest fee in the United States and 
significantly higher than the $3.30 charged to on-demand taxi services.  Uber, Lyft Pick Up 
Now Allowed at Orlando Airport, CBS MIAMI (June 22, 2017, 2:26 PM), 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2017/06/22/ubert-lyft-pick-up-now-allowed-at-orlando-airport/. 
190. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, HB 221 (2017) Staff 
Analysis 8 (Feb. 14, 2017). 
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airports;” the assertion has proved accurate in 2016, Miami International 
Airport received over $2 million from Uber in pickup fees.
191
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The arrival of TNCs to the Sunshine State has been a blessing for 
some; for others, it has been a lesson in how dynamic, technology-driven 
business can disrupt and cripple an established player in an established 
market.
192
  For local and state lawmakers, it is only one of the many 
regulatory battles to come as technology companies continue to emerge and 
disrupt outdated regulations.
193
  No longer should legislators be reluctant 
adopters of new technologies and businesses in an effort to save the old 
because “[w]ere the old deemed to have a constitutional right to preclude the 
entry of the new into the markets of the old, economic progress might grind 
to a halt.”194 
Whether Florida’s TNC law will be considered an example of a 
successful statewide TNC regulation remains to be seen.
195
  What the law 
provided—much to the satisfaction of the TNCs—was rational insurance 
requirements, parameters on TNC driver authorizations that mirrored those 
the TNCs currently had in effect, minimal administrative and regulatory 
costs, and oversight limited to a bi-annual retroactive compliance check.
196
  
The law is extremely favorable to TNCs, but it ultimately enables thousands 
of Floridians to gain a supplemental income, allows millions to continue 
utilizing their preferred means of transportation, and injects millions of 
dollars into Florida’s airports, but nothing into the municipalities whose 
infrastructures and resources feed the exponential growth of TNCs.
197
 
                                                     
191. Id. at 9; Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25. 
192. See Douglas Hanks & Rene Rodriguez, For Uber, Loyal Drivers and a 
New Fight for Benefits, MIAMI HERALD (May 21, 2015, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article21599697.html.  “Since the company 
launched in Miami-Dade in June 2014, more than 10,000 active driver-partners have taken 
home more than $30 million through more than three million rides the company said this week 
— net which [does not] include above the company’s commission, typically less than [twenty] 
percent.”  Id.; see also Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:08–2:47. 
193. See Ducassi, supra note 26. 
194. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Miadeco Corp. v. 
Miami-Dade Cty. No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017) (quoting Ill. Transp. Trade 
Ass’n v. City of Chi., 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016). 
195. See SCHALLER, supra note 187, at 18. 
196. Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)–(9), (11)(e) 2017 Fla. 
Laws 4–8; Robinson, supra 161. 
197. See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:20–3:29; Ducassi, 
supra note 26. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The State of Florida and the United States of America, by and large, 
have experienced significant prison overcrowding, which has led to the 
development of various sentencing options.
1
  The criminal justice system has 
become increasingly punitive, but many states have not abandoned the idea 
of rehabilitation as an important goal, especially for juvenile and youthful 
                                            
* John Patrikis earned his bachelor’s degree in Political Science at Florida 
State University and is a current Juris Doctor Candidate for May 2019 at Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad College of Law.  John would like to thank his family and friends 
for their tremendous amount of support during his time pursuing a career in law.  He would 
also like to thank the Honorable Judge Nushin Sayfie for inspiring him to pick this topic 
through his experience as a Judicial Intern.  Additionally, John would like to give a special 
thanks to his fellow colleagues of the Nova Law Review for their dedication to this Comment. 
1. FLA. STAT. § 958.04(4) (2016); Carol Ann Nix, Boot Camp/Shock 
Incarceration — An Alternative to Prison for Young, Non-Violent Offenders in the United 
States, 28 PROSECUTOR 15, 15 (1994). 
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offenders.
2
  Some state statutes continue to present a commitment to 
rehabilitation by including practices and programs promoting the best 
interest of young offenders through services meant to create productive, law-
abiding citizens.
3
  The Supreme Court of the United States has established 
that young people uniquely possess an “antithetical—constitutional ‘right to 
a meaningful opportunity to be rehabilitated.’”4  “This right is based on the 
Court’s identification of adolescents as . . . singularly amenable to 
rehabilitation,” which designates them as a separate class from adults.5  
“Where punishment entails the purposeful inflict[ing] of suffering upon its 
recipient, rehabilitation involves a beneficent response aimed at overcoming 
unwelcome aspects of its recipient’s life.”6 
Faced with the growing issue of prison overcrowding and juvenile 
crime, lawmakers developed intermediate sanctions “to fill the gap between 
regular probation and prison.”7  One type of intermediate sanction is boot 
camp or shock incarceration.
8
  Boot camp programs have various names in 
different states including:  “Special Alternative Incarceration, . . . Basic 
Training Program, . . . Regimented Inmate Discipline, . . . and Challenge 
Incarceration,” among others.9  Boot camp programs are considered a 
“constructive approach to . . . rehabilitation. . . . [and are] modeled after 
military basic training.”10  These programs are designed for young offenders 
who have been convicted of a felony and would be facing prison time 
without this rehabilitative option.
11
  Studies show that “public support for 
intermediate sanctions like boot camps is high when applied to [youthful], 
nonviolent offenders.”12  Typically, these programs last between “three to six 
months, depending on the state.”13  “Brief confinement in a boot camp” 
program serves the purpose of shocking participants and teaching the “harsh 
                                            
2. Martin Gardner, Youthful Offenders and the Eighth Amendment Right to 
Rehabilitation:  Limitations on the Punishment of Juveniles, 83 TENN. L. REV. 455, 504 
(2016). 
3. Id. at 504–05. 
4. Id. at 458–59.  Supreme Court cases have classified capital punishment 
and life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders as cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment, which makes them a distinct class from adults.  Id. at 458–60. 
5. Id. at 459–60. 
6. Gardner, supra note 2, at 466. 
7. Nix, supra note 1, at 15. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 15–16. 
10. Id. at 16. 
11. Id. 
12. Jamie E. Muscar, Advocating the End of Juvenile Boot Camps:  Why the 
Military Model Does Not Belong in the Juvenile Justice System, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 3 (2008). 
13. Nix, supra note 1, at 16. 
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reality of prison life without subjecting them to long prison sentences and 
direct contact with hardened criminals.”14  Promising programs across the 
country include non-military rehabilitative services, as well as including 
forming close relationships with department staff and other participants, 
providing “education, vocational training, counseling, . . . drug treatment, 
and creating a structured environment.”15  Rehabilitation boot camp 
programs give young offenders “one last chance to change his or her 
criminal way of life” and puts the offender in the proper state of mind and 
body to make a commitment to personal growth.
16
  Some of the many 
objectives are to instill “self-discipline, self-responsibility, self-respect, self-
esteem, self-motivation, and . . . work ethic.”17  “Boot camps are not 
designed to graduate model citizens.  They are designed to provide young 
offenders with a sound foundation upon which to build new lives.”18 
This Comment will evaluate the history, effectiveness, costs, and 
practices of boot camp rehabilitation programs to consider if the State of 
Florida should embrace this type of rehabilitation for juvenile and youthful 
offenders.
19
  Furthermore, it will explain the Florida statutory process and 
regulations that all programs must abide by within the state.
20
  Finally, this 
Comment will discuss the final standing boot camp rehabilitation program in 
Florida to view its progress and determine if Florida should expand the 
resources put into rehabilitation boot camp programs for youthful 
offenders.
21
 
II. FLORIDA STATUTES 
Florida statutory law provides the standards for the process of 
allowing an offender to replace a sentence with an alternative sanction.
22
  
Florida statutes also provide the requirements for an offender to be classified 
as a youthful offender, and the process of enrollment in a rehabilitation basic 
training program.
23
  In order to serve the statute’s purpose of alleviating 
extreme prison overcrowding, the particular rehabilitative methods and 
                                            
14. Id. 
15. Muscar, supra note 12, at 4. 
16. Nix, supra note 1, at 16. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part IV. 
22. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0026 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 958.045 (2016). 
23. See FLA. STAT. § 958.04 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 958.045. 
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programs are detailed within the statute along with policies used after 
successful completion of the program to limit and track recidivism.
24
 
A. Downward Departure and Judicial Disposition 
According to section 921.0026 of the Florida Statutes, “[a] 
downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence . . . is prohibited 
unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the 
downward departure.”25  One of the listed mitigating circumstances, that 
reasonably justifies “departure from the lowest permissible sentence,” is a 
defendant being sentenced as a youthful offender.
26
  Pursuant to section 
958.04 of the Florida Statutes: 
 The court may sentence [any person] as a youthful 
offender . . . [w]ho is at least [eighteen] years of age or who has 
been transferred for prosecution to the criminal division of the 
circuit court, . . . [any person w]ho is found guilty of or . . . 
tendered . . . a plea . . . to a crime that is . . . a felony if the 
offender is younger than [twenty-one] years of age at the time [the] 
sentence is imposed, and [any person w]ho has not previously been 
classified as a youthful offender. . . .  [A] person who has been 
found guilty of a capital or life felony may not be sentenced as a 
youthful offender . . . .
27
 
Furthermore, the statute allows the court to place a youthful offender 
into the custody of the department for a period of less than six years, and the 
commitment cannot surpass the maximum sentence for the convicted 
offense.
28
 
If an offender successfully participates in the youthful offender 
program, the court may modify the sentence or provide “early termination of 
probation, community control, or the sentence at any time prior to the 
scheduled expiration of [the] term.”29  If the court modifies a sentence and 
imposes probation or community control, the duration—including the term of 
incarceration—cannot exceed the original sentence.30  According to the 
statute, prison overcrowding is an emergency situation and the creation of a 
                                            
24. See FLA. STAT. § 958.04; FLA. STAT. § 958.045. 
25. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(1). 
26. Id. § 921.0026(2). 
27. FLA. STAT. § 958.04(1)(a)–(c). 
28. Id. § 958.04(2)(d). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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basic training program is “necessary to aid in alleviating” this extremely 
problematic issue.
31
 
B. Youthful Offender Basic Training Program 
Florida Statute section 958.045 gives the department authority to 
“implement a basic training program for youthful offenders.”32  Youthful 
offenders enrolled in the basic training program must actively participate for 
at least 120 days.
33
  “The program shall include marching drills, calisthenics, 
a rigid dress code, manual labor assignments, physical training with obstacle 
courses, training in decision making and personal development, high school 
equivalency diploma and adult basic education courses, and drug counseling 
and other rehabilitation programs.”34  In order to be enrolled into the 
program, an offender must be screened to ensure they are capable of 
participating in the physically demanding activities of the program and must 
not have a prior incarceration.
35
  During the screening, “the department 
[must] consider the offender’s criminal history and the possible rehabilitative 
benefits of shock incarceration.”36  “If an offender meets the specified criteria 
and space is available, the department [may] request . . . approval for the 
offender to participate in the basic training program.”37  According to the 
statute: 
The program shall provide a short incarceration period of 
rigorous training to offenders who require a greater degree of 
supervision than community control or probation provides . . . .  
The program is not intended to divert offenders away from 
probation or community control but to divert them from long 
periods of incarceration when a short shock incarceration could 
produce the same deterrent effect.
38
 
 
After being admitted into the program, each offender is given a full 
substance abuse assessment to provide the department with the ability to 
decide if substance abuse treatment is necessary for the offender’s 
rehabilitation.
39
  Additionally, “each offender who has not obtained a high 
school diploma [will] be enrolled in an adult education program designed to 
                                            
31. Id. § 958.04(4). 
32. FLA. STAT. § 958.045(1) (2016). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. § 958.045(1)(a). 
35. Id. § 958.045(2). 
36. Id. 
37. FLA. STAT. § 958.045(2). 
38. Id. § 958.045(3). 
39. Id. § 958.045(4). 
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aid the offender in improving his or her academic skills and earning a high 
school diploma.”40  The progress of each participant is repeatedly evaluated 
to track improvements in educational and career skills.
41
  In the event that an 
offender in the “program becomes [problematic and] unmanageable, the 
department may revoke the offender’s gain-time and place the offender in 
disciplinary confinement for up to [thirty] days.”42  Once the disciplinary 
process is completed, the offender may continue to participate in the program 
unless they were disciplined for an act or threat of violence.
43
  In the case of 
a termination from the basic training program, the offender is removed and 
must complete their original sentence in the general population.
44
 
After completion of the basic training program, successful 
participants are sent to a community residential program where they will stay 
for a term decided by the department.
45
  “If the . . . program director 
determines that the offender is not suitable for the community residential 
program but is suitable for an alternative post release program, . . . within 
thirty days prior to program completion the department [may] evaluate the 
offender’s needs and determine an alternative post-release program or 
plan.”46  During the community residential program, the offender must be 
employed and pay restitution to the victim of the offense.
47
  After they are 
released from the community residential program, offenders are put on 
probation, or post-release supervision, and must comply with various 
conditions.
48
  Successful offenders may also continue their unfinished 
educational programs after their release.
49
 
Furthermore, the statute requires “[t]he department [to] provide a 
special training program for staff selected for the basic training program.”50  
The statute also states that the department can incentivize activities to 
encourage active participation and dedication to the program.
51
  Lastly, the 
statute requires the department to track recidivism of the offenders after they 
are released to compile statistics on rearrests and recommitment.
52
 
                                            
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. FLA. STAT. § 958.045(5)(a). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. § 958.045(6)(a). 
46. Id. 
47. FLA. STAT. § 958.045(6)(b). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. § 958.045(10). 
51. Id. § 958.045(13). 
52. FLA. STAT. § 958.045(14). 
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III. SHOCK INCARCERATION AND BOOT CAMP PROGRAMS 
The correctional policies of the last 150 years can be described as a 
“proverbial pendulum that swings back and forth” depending on prominent 
political ideologies and practices of different time periods.
53
  An era of 
optimism occurred in the 1950s and 1960s involving “a social movement 
away from strictly punitive responses” and towards “interventions with 
treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration” practices.54  The Great Society 
programs of this time period sought to “prevent and [change] criminal 
patterns in early adulthood.”55  A major “goal was to avert and . . . mitigate 
unlawful behavior” in young people before they became habituated to 
crime.
56
  Adolescent and youthful offenders were thought to be more 
responsive and malleable than adult offenders, which made them “the 
primary targets of rehabilitati[on] services.”57  However, a rise in crime 
occurred between 1960 and 1975 and consistently high crime rates through 
the 1990s changed the country’s perspective.58  The accepted rhetoric was 
that “lenient [rehabilitative] sanctions had encouraged more crime and . . . a 
tougher response to law-breaking was” sought.59  During this time, 
rehabilitation programs and practices were largely abandoned with a few 
exceptions.
60 
The currently fashionable suggestion that society abandon efforts 
to find more effective programs to rehabilitate offenders is, we 
believe, irresponsible and premature. . . .  The promise of the 
rehabilitative ideal . . . is so compelling a goal that the strongest 
possible efforts should be made to determine whether it can be 
realized and to seek to realize it.
61
 
                                            
53. Brent B. Benda, Introduction:  Boot Camps Revisited:  Issues, Problems, 
Prospects, in REHABILITATION ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS IN BOOT CAMP 1, 7 (Brent 
B. Benda & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., Haworth Press, Inc. 2005). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 7–8. 
57. Id. at 8. 
58. See Benda, supra note 53, at 8. 
59. Id. at 8. 
60. See id. at 11. 
61. Id. at 11 (quoting PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHAB. TECHNIQUES, NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCIS., NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 22 (Susan 
E. Martin et al. eds., National Academy Press 1981)). 
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A. History of Boot Camp Rehabilitation 
The first boot camp program opened in Chester, Georgia in 
December of 1983.
62
  This era was during a time period heavily focused on a 
punitive response to crime rather than rehabilitation, however, boot camps 
“promised both punishment and rehabilitation in the same sanction.”63  
Momentum “for the development of boot camp[] [programs have] generally . 
. . come from judges, governors, and legislators.”64  Boot camp programs 
“enjoyed extensive favorable media coverage” for years after 1983, because 
they portrayed themes that were consistent with the “popular demand for 
harsh punishment, discipline, and deterrence.”65  Boot camp programs were 
derived from previous correctional programs, including Scared Straight and 
Shock Probation programs.
66
  Both of these programs were specifically 
aimed at deterrence of crime, and Scared Straight programs attempted to 
accomplish this “by causing juvenile offenders to fear prison through short . . 
. performances staged inside [of] a prison by . . . groups of [intimidating] 
inmates serving life sentences.”67  The Shock Probation method involved an 
offender being confined in the general prison population for short periods of 
time to experience the prison lifestyle firsthand.
68
  These programs were 
similar to modern boot camp programs, in that “after serving the term, th[e] 
remainder of the offender’s sentence [was] suspended and he [or she was] 
placed on probation” or supervision.69 
Another correctional program with roots in boot camp rehabilitation 
includes Challenge programs for juveniles, which are modeled after Outward 
Bound programs.
70
  Outward Bound programs were created to give offenders 
“a physically and emotionally challenging experience,” which is structured 
to test and expand the individual’s capabilities.71  The small group of 
offenders, consisting of “[nine] to [twelve people] live together, act as a 
team, and develop cooperative skills” to aid and motivate them to succeed 
later in life.
72
  Similar to boot camp, physical challenges are not the goals in 
themselves, but are used as an instrument through “which personal growth 
                                            
62. Nix, supra note 1, at 16. 
63. Muscar, supra note 12, at 11; see also Benda, supra note 53, at 8. 
64. Nix, supra note 1, at 16. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Nix, supra note 1, at 16. 
70. Id. at 16. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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takes place.”73  Furthermore, as the program strives for personal growth, 
these programs provide opportunities for offenders “to develop self-reliance 
and trust in [their peers].”74  A prominent belief of youthful and juvenile 
crime is that “delinquents suffer from deficiencies in problem-solving skills 
and from dysfunctional views of self.”75  Due to this, the practice of physical 
fitness is especially rehabilitative for youthful offenders because it “has a 
significant impact on self-perception.”76  High self-esteem and self-
confidence increases motivation and correlates with performance variables 
including academic grades and work responsibility.
77
  Research indicates that 
youthful offenders who have successfully completed rehabilitative programs 
have significantly lower recidivism rates than adult offenders.
78
 
1. Rise and Fall of Florida Boot Camp Programs 
“Florida was one of the first states to embrace . . . boot camp[]” 
rehabilitation after implementing a statute in 1989 allowing their operation, 
and opening of its first juvenile boot camp program in 1992.
79
  In the mid-
1990s, Florida operated the most juvenile boot camps in the country with six 
programs.
80
  Even though “criticism of the effectiveness of boot camp” 
rehabilitation began around 1999 in Florida, most programs “continued to 
operate until 2006.”81 
A turning point in Florida’s boot camp programs “was the highly 
publicized death of a fourteen-year-old boy at one of the camps.”82  “Martin 
Lee Anderson was arrested for stealing his grandmother’s [vehicle and] . . . 
was sent to boot camp after violating his probation for trespassing at 
school.”83  In January of 2006, Anderson died at the program after he 
collapsed while running laps, which led staff members to beat and mistreat 
the young offender until he eventually died of suffocation.
84
  Initially, the 
Florida Governor at the time, Jeb Bush, did not move to close the state’s boot 
                                            
73. Id. 
74. Nix, supra note 1, at 16. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Muscar, supra note 12, at 21. 
80. Id. at 21–22. 
81. Id. at 22. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Muscar, supra note 12, at 22. 
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camp program, and instead, called the death one tragic incident.
85
  Months of 
national coverage, and a growing concern about the safety of boot camps, 
followed and led the Florida Legislature to terminate the programs.
86
  These 
highly publicized, but rare, incidents of abuse caused “a national trend to 
move away from boot camps.”87  Specifically, because of changing public 
opinion and unclear data on the effectiveness of boot camp programs, 
legislators sought to reallocate funds used for rehabilitation elsewhere, 
causing a lack of rehabilitation programs for youthful offenders throughout 
the country.
88
 
B. Summary of Boot Camp Rehabilitation 
In large, the specific methods and practices of boot camp programs 
vary from state to state, depending on whether the program is punishment or 
rehabilitation-based.
89
  “Punishment-centered boot camp [programs primarily 
focus] on physical tasks and military training,” while rehabilitation-focused 
programs place more emphasis on “supportive programs, such as education, 
counseling, and drug treatment.”90  Boot camp programs for juvenile and 
youthful offenders typically use elements from both.
91
  Most boot camp 
rehabilitation programs begin at intake, and the arrival to the program is 
described as a rude awakening for the participants.
92
  Many military-style 
programs begin with a “ceremony where participants shave their heads” and 
are organized into squads or platoons.
93
  During the course of the program, 
the “participants engage in a rigid schedule . . . of strict discipline, hard 
labor, drills, and physical training, simulating military basic training.”94  The 
department staff also creates a “militaristic environment by requiring 
participants to address the staff using military titles,” such as sir and ma’am, 
and “requiring . . . the staff and participants to wear [appropriate military] 
uniforms.”95  Some programs use intimidation and humiliation methods 
during the beginning of the course to ensure that the participants take the 
program seriously and are vulnerable to change, while others “prohibit[] 
                                            
85. Id. at 23 (quoting Parents Want Charges in Boot Camp Death, NBC NEWS 
(Feb. 18, 2006, 4:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11396434/#.WdLIX0dOGPsE). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 25. 
88. See id. at 20. 
89. Muscar, supra note 12, at 5. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Nix, supra note 1, at 20. 
93. Muscar, supra note 12, at 6. 
94. Id. (footnote omitted). 
95. Id. 
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verbal abuse and corporal punishment.”96  However, in most of the military-
style rehabilitation boot camp programs, staff members make sure that they 
get the offender’s attention and unambiguously show that they have control 
over the participants.
97
  Intake may be frightening and eye-opening to the 
participants, but “it is the only . . . way to strip away the old street attitudes” 
that are common amongst the participants.
98
  Many of the offenders that are 
enrolled into boot camp programs have low self-esteem and have few 
accomplishments in their lives.
99
  Most have been raised without a structured 
environment and have a lack of positive influences.
100
  The sometimes harsh 
methods used are a last-chance attempt at reforming young criminals into 
law abiding citizens by breaking them down to build them back up with 
motivation and confidence.
101
 
Rehabilitation programs, that are semi-militaristic and heavily 
focused on supportive and positive rehabilitation, are the most successful in 
terms of recidivism and impact on the offenders.
102
  Elements that have been 
identified in successful correctional rehabilitation programs are “formal 
rules, anti-criminal modeling and reinforcement, problem solving, use of 
community resources, quality interpersonal relationships, relapse prevention 
and self-efficacy, and therapeutic integrity.”103  Many of the methods used 
are focused on psychological behavior modification.
104
  Some of the defined 
target behaviors are “attention to detail, hygiene, attitude, communication, 
and physical training.”105  Typically, the relationships formed between the 
department staff and the participant plays a large role in offender 
rehabilitation.
106
  Group support and teamwork are taught in all aspects of the 
program, including “military drill and . . . group counseling sessions.”107  
Other important qualities for rehabilitation, like problem solving, are taught 
in an intensive supervision phase where offenders may “work, complete 
community service, [take classes toward their education], and abide by a 
curfew.”108  Historically, offenders who successfully complete these 
programs display a deep loyalty to the program and the individuals who 
                                            
96. See id. at 3, 5–7. 
97. Nix, supra note 1, at 20. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 16, 20. 
102. See Nix, supra note 1, at 2122. 
103. Id. at 21. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Nix, supra note 1, at 21. 
108. Id. 
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aided in their rehabilitation.
109
  One of the most influential aspects of these 
programs is the realization that the staff cares for them because many of the 
participants have not experienced caring relationships before.
110
  It is 
imperative that staff members push the offenders to put their full effort into 
their progress and motivate them to have something to look forward to when 
they graduate.
111
  The “key question in juvenile [and youthful offender] 
justice is how to effectuate lasting psychological and behavioral changes that 
will lead to rehabilitation and reduced recidivism.”112 
Treatment programs offered by the department staff, as well as an 
extensive aftercare phase, are essential for successful rehabilitation and must 
not be overlooked.
113
  According to research on the topic, treatment 
programs are successful if they “target offenders who are at risk for 
recidivism, are modeled after cognitive-behavior theoretical models and are 
sensitive to juveniles’ learning styles and characteristics, and address the 
characteristics of youth directly associated with criminal activity.”114  
Because of this, participants are most affected by plans that address their 
individual history and needs.
115
  An offender who struggles with drug 
addiction or abuse may benefit from supportive programs like drug abuse 
counseling more than an offender whose lack of social skills are attributed to 
the offense.
116
  Due to this, it is important that the particular characteristics 
and histories of the offenders must be considered to maximize the 
rehabilitative effects.
117
  Furthermore, aftercare and supervision programs are 
especially beneficial in reducing recidivism for offenders with drug abuse 
problems.
118
 
1. Importance of Aftercare on Recidivism 
A major reason boot camp programs across the country have failed is 
due to a lack of follow-up or aftercare for participants when they return to 
                                            
109. Id. at 20. 
110. Id. 
111. See id. at 20–21. 
112. Muscar, supra note 12, at 38. 
113. See id. 
114. Id. (quoting DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE ET AL., NIJ, A NATIONAL STUDY 
COMPARING THE ENVIRONMENTS OF BOOT CAMPS WITH TRADITIONAL FACILITIES FOR JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS 2 (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187680.pdf). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 38–39. 
117. See Muscar, supra note 12, at 38–39. 
118. See id. 
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the community.
119
  This conclusion is made from studies that have compared 
the criminal activities of boot camp graduates who participated in aftercare 
programs to those who have not.
120
  “[One] study compared the recidivism 
[rates] of 337 offenders who received a mandatory [ninety]-day . . . aftercare 
program to [the recidivism rate of] 383 offenders . . . who did not receive 
[any sort of] aftercare.”121  Both of these groups participated in a six-month 
boot camp program “modeled after military basic training but also included 
an emphasis on [supportive] rehabilitation” methods and practices.122  This 
study concluded that “[t]he offenders who received aftercare had 
[significantly] lower recidivism than [the group that] did not.”123  The 
statistics displayed that after one year of release, 16% of the group who 
received aftercare reoffended, compared to the 21% rate for the group who 
did not.
124
  Two years after the programs were completed, 22% of the 
aftercare group reoffended while 33% of the group without aftercare 
reoffended.
125
  These statistical differences emphasize the need for boot 
camp programs to include follow-up practices to supervise the offenders and 
ensure they stay on the right track.
126
  However, like most other aspects of 
boot camp, aftercare practices can vary greatly between states and 
jurisdictions, which lead to varying results.
127
 
The specific aspects of aftercare programs have an impact on their 
success in reducing recidivism.
128
  Supervision in itself may not be 
significant enough to have an impact on recidivism; whereas, programs with 
close supervision and individually tailored rehabilitation methods have more 
success.
129
  A previous Florida boot camp program, in Pinellas County, had 
staff members stay in contact with the participants for at least six months 
after graduation to track their behavior and success in school.
130
  Another 
example of an aftercare program that experienced success in recidivism is the 
New York shock parole aftercare program.
131
  This program mainly 
                                            
119. See Doris Layton MacKenzie, Aftercare Following a Correctional 
Bootcamp May Reduce Recidivism, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 359, 359 (2006). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. MacKenzie, supra note 119, at 359. 
125. Id. 
126. See id. 
127. Id. at 360; Muscar, supra note 12, at 41. 
128. See Muscar, supra note 12, 40–42. 
129. Id. at 41–42; see also Mackenzie, supra note 119, at 360. 
130. Muscar, supra note 12, at 41. 
131. See id.; Nix, supra note 1, at 19. 
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consisted of “employment, drug treatment, and counseling opportunities.”132  
One factor that likely contributed to this program’s success was the light 
caseload of the officers assigned to the program.
133
  Two officers were 
assigned to thirty graduates personally in order to individualize treatment and 
more effectively supervise and monitor the graduates.
134
  While statistics are 
often scarce and vary depending on many factors, the consensus is that 
aftercare programs are a key aspect of successful rehabilitation, and the 
specific practices and methods used by each program play a large role in the 
results.
135
 
C. Goals of Boot Camp Rehabilitation 
Besides the primary goal of rehabilitation for youthful offenders to 
change their lives and reduce crime, other goals of boot camp rehabilitation 
to consider are deterrence, punishment, incapacitation, and cost control.
136
  
Generally, boot camp administrators use “rehabilitation, deterrence, and cost 
control” as their primary goals, while the public and policymakers tend to 
prioritize deterrence and punishment.
137
  The goals and purposes of boot 
camp rehabilitation are similar to those of a traditional correctional facility, 
but supporters believe boot camp programs are a better fit to meet these 
goals.
138
  Legally, deterrence is considered in two ways:  General and 
specific deterrence.
139
 
Specific deterrence refers to a sanction deterring the particular 
individual punished, whereas general deterrence refers to 
vicariously learning from seeing other people punished.  The 
assumption underlying shock incarceration is that the unpleasant 
experience per se will be a potent disincentive to further 
commission of unlawful behavior.  Many boot camps are even 
located in close geographical proximity to more traditional prisons 
to emphasize the potential for serving hard time.
140
 
A common belief among administrators, legislators, and the public is 
that the harsh nature of boot camp will prevent recidivism of the 
individual—specifically by providing a life-changing experience, while also 
                                            
132. Muscar, supra note 12, at 41. 
133. Id. 
134. See id. at 39–41. 
135. Id. at 40–42. 
136. Benda, supra note 53, at 4. 
137. Muscar, supra note 12, at 9. 
138. Id. 
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deterring the general public from committing crimes.
141
  The media coverage 
of boot camps involving early wake-up calls, physical conditioning, and 
yelling drill sergeants can cause young offenders who know of the possibility 
of boot camp or prison to refrain from breaking the law.
142
 
Punishment and incapacitation are also goals viewed favorably by 
legislators and the public because of the retribution aspect and keeping 
offenders out of the community until their desires for criminal behavior have 
decimated.
143
  Punishment is defined as “impos[ing] unpleasantness upon a 
person as a response to his or her commission of a wrongful act.”144  So long 
as rehabilitation boot camp programs are successful, they provide a way to 
incarcerate and punish young offenders in shorter periods of time, creating a 
more effective way to meet the goals of the criminal justice system.
145
 
Furthermore, boot camp programs can reduce prison overcrowding 
and result in significant cost savings due to the considerably shorter 
sentences of participants in the programs.
146
  According to the National 
Institute of Justice, “[b]oot camps could reduce the number of prison beds 
needed in a jurisdiction, which would lead to modest reductions in 
correctional costs.”147  Conversely, boot camp programs have the potential to 
widen the net, or to confine offenders who would otherwise be given 
probation, which could lead to boot camp programs becoming as expensive 
as prison.
148
  The primary reason boot camp numbers have dwindled across 
the country is a result of economic concerns—widening the net may be a 
reason for this because boot camp rehabilitation is more costly than 
probation.
149
  It is also difficult to analyze the economic impact of these 
programs because “states vary in [their budgets and] how they determine 
costs.”150  Because of these economic concerns, it is imperative that states are 
selective in determining enrollment of offenders, and someone who would 
likely be given probation should not be enrolled to prevent unneeded costs.
151
  
Overall, while it may vary from state to state, boot camp programs provide 
an opportunity to lower costs on individual offenders and can be a benefit to 
                                            
141. Id. at 4–5. 
142. Id. at 5. 
143. See id. at 6. 
144. Gardner, supra note 2, at 464. 
145. See Benda, supra note 53, at 6. 
146. See Nix, supra note 1, at 22. 
147. Benda, supra note 53, at 6–7. 
148. Muscar, supra note 12, at 36–37; Nix, supra note 1, at 18. 
149. See Muscar, supra note 12, at 36. 
150. Benda, supra note 53, at 7. 
151. See Muscar, supra note 12, at 36. 
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the economy so long as the programs successfully rehabilitate the 
offenders.
152
 
D. Controversy and Political Climate 
The effectiveness and practice of military-style boot camp 
rehabilitation has been a topic of debate for years and requires a 
multidimensional analysis.
153
  Proponents of the programs believe that 
rehabilitation, especially for youthful offenders, is a necessary and important 
aspect of the criminal justice system.
154
  Most believe that while supportive 
programs like drug counseling and education are crucial to their success, the 
military aspect of the programs are also important to instill self-control and 
discipline in the offenders and to ensure they are dedicated to changing their 
way of life.
155
  Those opposed to the programs view the military aspect as 
undermining rehabilitative efforts by putting the participants in an 
environment of aggression and intimidation.
156
  Those against military boot 
camp programs believe that the nonmilitary aspects are the reason some 
programs have success and the military boot camp itself is inefficient and a 
waste of already limited resources.
157
 
The perceived problems facing boot camp programs are largely 
based on individual programs rather than the effectiveness of boot camp 
programs as a whole.
158
  Perhaps the most significant reason for the lack of 
rehabilitation programs in the United States is inadequate, or lack of, 
funding.159  Further, if programs are being questioned for effectiveness, they 
often end up on the chopping block of budgets.
160
  Another cited problem 
that has caused a political shift away from these programs is the potential for 
abuse.
161
  Like the incident in Florida, there are cases of staff members 
abusing offenders and causing significant injury, leading to the closure of 
programs.
162
  Many citizens view military boot camps unfavorably due to 
their perception that the military mentality may not be appropriate as a 
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153. Muscar, supra note 12, at 25. 
154. See Nix, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
155. Id. at 21; Muscar, supra note 12, at 8, 29–30. 
156. Muscar, supra note 12, at 3. 
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158. See id. at 3, 25–26. 
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160. Muscar, supra note 12, at 19–20, 25. 
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rehabilitation tool for young offenders.
163
  One example of a reported 
extreme initiation practice is as follows: 
You are nothing and nobody, fools, maggots, dummies . . . and 
you have just walked into the worst nightmare you ever dreamed.  
I [do not] like you.  I have no use for you, and I [do not] give a . . . 
who you are on the street.  This is my acre, hell’s half acre, and it 
matters not one damn to me whether you make it here or get tossed 
out into the general prison population, where, I promise you, you 
[will not] last three minutes before [you are] somebody’s wife.  Do 
you know what that means, tough guys?
164
 
While most programs prohibit the use of intimidation and 
humiliation practices, and have become heavily regulated, many believe that 
the risk of abuse in a hostile environment, such as this, is too great.
165
  A 
potential problem with these practices is giving the participants a perception 
that their environment is unsafe, which could potentially have an impact on 
their rehabilitation.
166
  Furthermore, some critics believe that boot camp 
practices and environments may be counterproductive because they could 
create a hardened, more disciplined criminal.
167
  “One critic [stated] that 
people go in feeling like Rambo and come out feeling a whole lot like 
Rambo.”168  Another potential issue that must be considered by 
administrators and legislators debating boot camp rehabilitation is limited 
positive interactions with the staff.
169
  As previously stated, pro-social 
interactions with department staff are crucial to a program’s success, and the 
nature of these programs may limit this aspect of the rehabilitation.
170
  
“[R]esearch [has] indicate[d] that there is a high rate of staff turnover in boot 
camp[] [programs.]”171  In programs where this occurs, it would be difficult 
for participants to bond with staff members, which is a rehabilitative aspect 
boot camp programs are built on.
172
 
Another perceived psychological issue with boot camp programs for 
juvenile and youthful offenders is described by psychologist Dr. Marty Beyer 
in her review of a pilot program.
173
  Dr. Beyer conducted research on 
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165. Id. at 23, 31. 
166. Id. at 31–32. 
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adolescent development and delinquent juveniles in boot camp programs.
174
  
Her research presented the idea that adolescents “are fairness fanatics and 
are ‘very sensitive to anything they perceive as unfair.’”175  Dr. Beyer was 
concerned that participants would perceive the program as unfair, which 
would lead offenders to be resistant to assistance.
176
  Her stance is that young 
offenders respond to encouragement rather than punishment, and the 
underlying attitudes and long-term behaviors are not changed from 
punishment.
177
  There is a risk of offenders temporarily adjusting their 
behavior in order to avoid unwanted punishment, but ultimately not being 
rehabilitated once they are released from the program.
178
 
While there are some perceived risks, boot camp rehabilitation 
programs have, in their nature, a reliable source for the effectiveness of these 
programs, the participants, and graduates themselves.
179
  Studies indicate 
past participants strongly support boot camp programs and have a more 
positive attitude about their situation than offenders in traditional detention 
centers.
180
  One reason for this perceived satisfaction with boot camp 
programs is the structured, safe environment compared to traditional 
correctional facilities.
181
  Current boot camp participants also reported 
feeling “less impulsive and less anti-social” than offenders in other 
facilities.
182
  Studies indicate that participants perceive boot camps as caring 
and just and more therapeutic.
183
  For example, a previous Florida boot camp 
program that was in operation for twelve years before closing due to 
economic reasons, left a lasting impact on many of its graduates.
184
  Five 
years after the program’s closure, one graduate said that “his greatest 
memory from the camp [was] the relationships he formed that changed his 
life forever.”185  The graduate, Andre Edmonds, also reflected on what his 
life would be like without having the opportunity of boot camp 
                                            
174. Muscar, supra note 12, at 28. 
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8 (1997)). 
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179. See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 114, at 10–11; Christin Erazo, Five 
Years After Closing, Martin County Boot Camp Leaves Legacy of Success, TCPALM (June 29, 
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rehabilitation.
186
  Edmonds, who is “now a [law-abiding] construction 
worker in Coconut Creek,” stated, “[w]ithout the camp, [I would] be dead or 
in prison; no doubt . . . .  Kids who need that program are missing out.”187  
This particular program served the Treasure Coast, Palm Beach, and 
Okeechobee counties, and provided its young participants with structure and 
education to earn high school diplomas.
188
  “[The program] was also 
successful in [recidivism and] prevent[ed] about [eighty] percent of its 
graduates, who were [not always] first-time offenders, from committing 
[crimes in their future.]”189 
The Martin County Florida program is another example of a 
successful rehabilitation boot camp program for juvenile and youthful 
offenders that closed for economic reasons.
190
  “Pam Roebuck, [the] assistant 
state attorney in charge of Martin County’s juvenile division,” stated “[there 
is] always a danger when the really good programs close . . . .  State statistics 
show—the boot camps—were the better programs; they were good 
accountability partners.”191  Roebuck believes that the key to success of any 
rehabilitation program must begin “with dedicated individuals who form 
[positive] relationships” with offenders.192  A Martin County Sheriff, Robert 
Crowder, commented on the program and stated “[w]e focused on education, 
self-improvement and responsibility, and other good qualities we want to see 
in young men . . . .  People think boot camp is all about screaming and 
hollering and doing push-ups; it was much more focused on developing the 
individual.”193  Another Martin County Sheriff, Captain Lloyd Jones, worked 
with young offenders at the boot camp program and also expressed the 
importance of a dedicated staff.
194
 
 
I just think we need better people working in the system . . . .  It [is 
not] the [boot camp] program, [it is] the people.  To make people 
responsible and hold them to those life skills, and care about 
children and see these kids become successful, I think [that is] the 
key to making any program successful.
195
 
 
                                            
186. See id. 
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Captain Jones’ statement is consistent with the research that the 
success of programs is largely based on the personal relationships formed 
from the program and the dedication of the staff.
196
  At the end of the day, 
boot camp rehabilitation programs must be viewed individually to determine 
their effectiveness, and the now-closed Martin County program emphasized 
that there is potential in these programs to meet their objective goals.
197
 
 
IV. CURRENT FLORIDA BOOT CAMP PROGRAMS 
 
Currently, the State of Florida is down to one remaining 
rehabilitation boot camp program.
198
  As a state that once embraced 
rehabilitation and led the country in its amount of boot camp programs, 
economic and budgetary concerns have caused all but one program to cease 
operations.
199
  The last boot camp program in Florida is a county-operated 
program in Miami-Dade County that has been successful with regards to 
recidivism and public preference.
200
  However, this program has also been at 
risk of closure for economic reasons as well, regardless of its success.
201
  
Recently, this program has been popularized by celebrity endorsements and 
published success stories.
202
  This program involves practices including a 
“semi-military training regimen[t], [e]ducation and [j]ob [t]raining,” “[d]rug 
[and] [l]ife [s]kills [c]ounseling,” and an extensive aftercare phase to reduce 
recidivism.
203
 
                                            
196. See id.; Nix, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
197. See Muscar, supra note 12, at 25–26; Erazo, supra note 179. 
198. Marybel Rodriguez, Miami-Dade Boot Camp Graduation Marks 
Reinstatement, CBS MIAMI (Oct. 1, 2014, 6:30 PM), 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2014/10/01/miami-dade-boot-camp-graduation-marks-
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199. Id.; Muscar, supra note 12, at 21–23, 36. 
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201. See id. 
202. Douglas Hanks, Miami’s Young Criminals Face Boot Camp—Plus HBO 
Cameras and “The Rock”, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 26, 2017, 4:51 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article140905753.html; Ari 
Odzer, Miami-Dade Boot Camp Gets the Boot, NBC 6 SOUTH FLA. (Mar. 26, 2010, 6:30 AM), 
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/BOOT-CAMP-GETS-THE-BOOT-89175242.html. 
203. Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections & 
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program at 1–2, State v. Kemp, No. F16-12214C (Fla. 
11th Cir. Ct. July 20, 2017). 
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A. Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program 
The Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program was opened in 1995 and has 
enrolled over two thousand youthful offenders into the program ever since.
204
  
Both young men and women can participate in the program if they are 
classified as a youthful offender and are between the ages of fourteen and 
twenty-four.
205
  Furthermore, “[t]o be eligible for the program, [participants] 
cannot be convicted of rape or murder,” but many cadets “have been 
convicted of charges such as resisting officers, possession of a controlled 
substance, or grand theft, among others.”206  According to an order form used 
to place defendants into the program, “[i]nmates are required to serve a 
minimum of . . . 120 days at the camp as an alternative to prison or county 
jail time, followed by [a two-month] [w]ork [r]elease” program, then finally 
a ten-month aftercare.
207
  The program description lists the function of the 
program and the objective goals the program serves to satisfy.
208
  These 
goals are behavior modification, education and job training, work details, and 
drug and life skills counseling.
209
  Behavior modification is used to “provide 
a restructured life style patterned to reorient inmates [mentally] in a way 
[that] best conforms to societal needs.”210  The educational programs 
provided are “access to Adult Basic Education (“ABE”), General 
Educational Diploma (“GED”), computer science training, college 
preparation, and the [learning] of basic economic skills necessary for future 
employment.”211  The inmates in the program also participate in community 
service based activities.
212
  Finally, the program provides “drug counseling, 
psychological counseling and training,” and training “in financial 
management, employment applications, job management, and basic social 
skills.”213 
One component of the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program “is the 
structured semi-military training regimen,” which involves strenuous activity 
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http://www.mdcthereporter.com/boot-camp-program-offers-young-offenders-second-chance/. 
207. Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections & 
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1–2. 
208. See id. at 1. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections & 
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used to safeguard physical and psychological well-being for the 
participants.
214
  In this phase of the program, the inmates participate in 
sixteen weeks of military drills and practices, including push-ups and 
“precise sequences for showering, meals, and bedtime.”215  The participants 
also have their heads shaved, are woken up at 4 AM for jogs, and refer to the 
department staff as sir and ma’am.216  Certain practices during this phase are 
harsh and can be perceived as unfair.
217
  For example, one published practice 
of the program is directing the inmates to “spend an hour making their beds, . 
. . shining their shoes,” and following other demands of the staff just so drill 
instructors can trash the rooms when the cadets leave.
218
  These practices are 
not the focal point of the rehabilitation program, but are completed initially 
during this phase as a tool for turnarounds.
219
  These practices are described 
as “an exercise in internalizing injustices rather than acting rashly” and 
potentially committing crimes.
220
  Acknowledging potential issues in the 
criminal justice system, these methods can be used to teach emotional 
control and how to resist responding in a situation where they are pulled over 
by police and are being profiled in an unfair way.
221
  However, when it 
appears that the cadet’s defenses have faded and they start to break down, the 
“drill-instructor regime can shift into something softer” and more personal.222  
When something like this happens, the staff will pull the participant aside 
and ask about the participant’s life and family.223 
While the semi-military regimen used during this first phase is 
important to ensure the cadets are willing to be rehabilitated, the education 
and job training, drug counseling, and aftercare supervision are crucial to the 
success of this program.
224
  “Miami-Dade County is one of the nine sites 
[nationally that is] awarded [a] $300,000 three-year grant called Project 
Restart:  Improved Reentry Education . . . from the U.S. Department of 
Education . . . .”225  This grant pays for the cadets’ educational classes at a 
local community college and GED classes for younger offenders who have 
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not obtained a high school diploma.
226
  Along with the educational aspect, 
the life skills and job training aspects of the program motivate the inmates 
and give them the skills needed to have something to look forward to once 
they graduate.
227
  Upon completion of the first phase of the program, the 
participants may be released on community control or probation to find 
employment or further their education.
228
  “To ensure a successful probation 
period, the boot camp staff holds an orientation where family members are 
informed of the . . . conditions [their loved ones] must follow to graduate” 
from the program.
229
 
According to an order form, an example of the conditions that must 
be completed in the second phase of the program are obtaining a GED at the 
end of the term, a substance abuse evaluation, alcohol abuse evaluation, and 
an overall health evaluation.
230
  Once the participant graduates to the third 
phase of the program—the ten-month aftercare—they are still in the custody 
of the department and must abide by department conditions.
231
  The cadets 
“must call the facility three times a day and stay in school or find a job.”232  
When boot camp participants leave the program, many go back into “the 
same areas [and have] the same friends,” which can be problematic.233  
Supervisors in this final phase of the program help keep the participants on 
track and focused.
234
 
Most importantly, the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program has become 
part of the success stories of thousands of Miami youth, and has been 
successful in reducing recidivism.
235
  This program has an 11% recidivism 
rate for their graduates, compared to the 27% of regular prison inmates who 
reoffend.
236
  Largely because of the program’s success, it is also highly 
regarded amongst local judges, sheriffs, and previous graduates.
237
  A local 
judge and avid supporter of the program, Miami-Dade Circuit Court Chief 
Administrative Judge Nushin Sayfie, stated, “[t]he [b]oot [c]amp program is 
                                            
226. See id. 
227. See Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections 
& Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1; Nix, supra note 1, at 
16. 
228. See Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections 
& Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1, 5. 
229. Vizcaino, supra note 206. 
230. Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections & 
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203 at 1, 5. 
231. Id. at 2. 
232. Vizcaino, supra note 206. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
235. See Odzer, supra note 202; Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
236. Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
237. See Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
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one of our success stories and a source of enormous pride . . . .  When these 
young men and women leave [b]oot [c]amp, they are completely new 
individuals—respectful, confident, law-abiding, proud of themselves and 
thankful for the chance they have been given.”238  One success story comes 
from current Florida Judge Jason Bravo, who owes his success to the Miami-
Dade Boot Camp Program.
239
  When Judge Bravo was seventeen-years-old, 
he was going down the wrong path and was arrested for armed robbery.
240
  
Bravo stated “[w]hat boot camp gave me was an opportunity . . . to better my 
life and move forward from a mistake that happened as opposed to pretty 
much rotting away in a jail cell.”241  After his graduation from the program, 
Bravo went on to attend college at Florida International University, obtain a 
law degree from Florida State University, and become an attorney at the 
same office that prosecuted him before becoming a judge.
242
  Jason Bravo is 
also an inspirational speaker at the program’s graduation ceremonies for the 
cadets.
243
  The program is also endorsed by celebrity Dwayne The Rock 
Johnson who appears in an HBO documentary on the program.
244
  In a 
speech to new cadets, Dwayne Johnson stated, “I know this [b]oot [c]amp 
program.  I believe in it . . . .  I want the world to see how powerful this 
program is.”245 
Notwithstanding the success stories and lowered recidivism rates of 
graduates, the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program was facing closure to cut its 
$4 million budget.
246
  Realizing the success of the last standing boot camp 
rehabilitation program for youthful offenders, “Miami-Dade . . . Mayor 
Carlos Gimenez found a one-time revenue to save the . . . program” from 
closing.
247
  Regardless of the success of rehabilitation programs, these 
programs always face uncertainty and the potential for closure due to limited 
budgets.
248
  However, the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program saves taxpayers 
money over time by lowering expensive prison terms.
249
  For example, “[a] 
five-year prison term costs taxpayers $86,690,” whereas “[t]he [sixteen]- 
                                            
238. Id. 
239. Odzer, supra note 202. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id.; Vizcaino, supra note 206. 
243. Vizcaino, supra note 206. 
244. Hanks, supra note 202. 
245. Id. 
246. Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
247. Id. 
248. See id.; Muscar, supra note 12, at 23, 25. 
249. Jim Defede, Last Chance:  Boot Camp, CBS MIAMI, 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/last-chance-boot-camp/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). 
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month boot camp [program] costs . . . $46,453.”250  While it still costs 
approximately $4 million a year to operate, the program has the potential to 
be cost effective over time, so long as it successfully rehabilitates the 
inmates, which it has been proven to do.
251
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Florida is a state that once led the country in rehabilitation boot 
camp programs but has recently followed a trend away from rehabilitation 
and is down to one remaining program.
252
  As discussed earlier, the reason 
for this is not the lack of success in recidivism, but rather a result of 
economic concerns and budget limitations.
253
  The success of these programs 
is dependent on many factors, including pro-social relationships with staff 
and peers, aftercare supervision upon release, and supportive programs for 
education and job training among others.
254
  The current Miami-Dade Boot 
Camp Program, and the everlasting impact previous Florida boot camp 
programs have, left behind show that these programs have the potential to 
lower crime rates and make a difference in the lives of thousands of youth.
255
 
The juvenile and youthful offenders who enroll into rehabilitation 
boot camp programs often have backgrounds lacking structure and 
guidance.
256
  Many are headed down a life of crime that will only be 
accelerated by going to prison and being influenced by hardened 
criminals.
257
  The vicious cycle of crime starts at a young age, but young 
people also bare the most potential for change and rehabilitation before their 
lives become irreparable.
258
  With crime rates surging across the State and 
country, a significant step in reducing crime can be accomplished through 
rehabilitation of young offenders.
259
  The Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program 
is an example of the impact these programs can have on young people by 
providing positive influences and mentors, physical and mental conditioning 
to improve perceptions of self, and an aftercare program that continues to 
                                            
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See Muscar, supra note 12, at 21–23, 25; Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
253. Muscar, supra note 12, at 36; see also Rodriguez, supra note 198; supra 
Part III. 
254. See Nix, supra note 1, at 21; MacKenzie, supra note 119, at 359. 
255. See Rodriguez, supra note 198; Erazo, supra note 179. 
256. Nix, supra note 1, at 20. 
257. See id. at 16. 
258. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 459–60. 
259. See Benda, supra note 53, at 8, 11; Erazo, supra note 179. 
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motivate the offenders long after their graduation.
260
  So long as the 
programs are operated similarly to proven programs like Miami-Dade, the 
State of Florida should embrace boot camp programs and restart its effort to 
lead the country in rehabilitation for juvenile and youthful offenders.
261
 
                                            
260. See MacKenzie, supra note 119, at 359; Nix, supra note 1, at 21; 
Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
261. See Nix, supra note 1, at 21; Rodriguez, supra note 198. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was fatally shot on San Francisco’s 
Embarcadero.
1
  The killing was by the hands of Juan Francisco Lopez-
Sanchez, an illegal alien convicted of multiple felonies, who had already 
been deported from the United States on five different occasions.
2
  The 
murder only added fuel to the fire of the immigration debate, shifting the 
general public’s attention to immigration policies and enforcement.3  The 
main object of discussion has since been sanctuary jurisdictions—and 
sanctuary policies in general.
4
  An obscure object to most, sanctuary policies 
define the relationship between states and local jurisdictions and the federal 
government with regards to immigrant residents.
5
  Specifically, sanctuary 
policies often limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement 
actions and are implemented by many of the largest cities in the country.
6
  
However, perception of sanctuary policies varies among different sides of the 
political spectrum.
7
  While some believe sanctuary policies foster criminal 
                                                     
* Davide Macelloni received his B.A., summa cum laude, in Political 
Science from Florida Atlantic University in 2014 and is a J.D. Candidate for May 2018 at 
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law.  The author would like to 
thank his wife, Jocelyne, for her unwavering support and unconditional love.  He would also 
like to thank his parents, Marcello and Giovanna, his sister, Laura, and his grandfather, 
Claudio, for always believing in him and encouraging him, even from thousands of miles 
away.  The author also thanks his fellow associates and board members of the Nova Law 
Review for their dedication to this Comment.  Lastly, he dedicates this Comment to his 
birthplace, Rome, Caput Mundi. 
1. Christina Littlefield, Sanctuary Cities:  How Kathryn Steinle’s Death 
Intensified the Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:10 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-kathryn-steinle-
20150723-htmlstory.html. 
2. Julia Preston, Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration Enforcement, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A10; David Bier, Kate Steinle and San Francisco’s “Sanctuary 
City” Policy, CATO INST.: CATO LIBERTY (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:54 PM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/kate-steinle-san-franciscos-sanctuary-city-policy. 
3. See Jerry Markon, California Killing Inflames Debate on Illegal 
Immigrants, ‘Sanctuary Cities’, WASH. POST: POL. (July 6, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calif-killing-inflames-debate-on-illegal-immigrants-
sanctuary-cities/2015/07/06/8dc6eb50-241e-11e5-b72c-2b7d516e1e0e_story.html. 
4. See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?, 
CNN: POL. (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuary-
cities-explained/index.html; Littlefield, supra note 1; Janell Ross, 6 Big Things to Know About 
Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST: FIX (July 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/07/08/4-big-things-to-know-about-sanctuary-cities-and-illegal-immigration/. 
5. See Kopan, supra note 4. 
6. Id. 
7. See Loren Collingwood et al., Sanctuary Cities Do Not Experience an 
Increase in Crime, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/sanctuary-cities-do-not-
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activities and hot-beds for gang violence and drug-trafficking, others affirm 
the exact opposite, claiming sanctuary jurisdictions to be safer and more 
cooperative with law enforcement.
8
  The Executive Branch of the federal 
government interprets the issue in agreement with the former position.
9
 
On January 25, 2017, the newly elected President of the United 
States, Donald J. Trump, signed Executive Order 13768 titled “Enhancing 
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” (“Executive Order”).10  
The Executive Order targets sanctuary jurisdictions in an attempt to foster 
cooperation between federal and state law enforcement agencies in the fight 
against illegal immigration.
11
  Sanctuary jurisdictions have in fact been 
accused by the White House of defying United States Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) orders.12  The Executive Order specifically 
targets violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which forbids restrictions on the 
sharing of information regarding citizenship or immigration status of 
individuals with ICE.
13
 
Advocates of the Executive Order argue that implementation of its 
policies would improve the safety of citizens throughout the United States 
and further allow a more efficient execution of federal laws and statutes 
regarding immigration.
14
  Critics, on the other hand, argue that the Executive 
Order infringes upon constitutional rights of state and local jurisdictions by 
exercising powers—not constitutionally granted to the Executive Branch of 
government—in violation of the fundamental principle of separation of 
                                                                                                                             
experience-an-increase-in-crime/; William Lajeunesse, Sessions Says When Cities Protect 
Illegal Immigrants, ‘Criminals Take Notice’, FOX NEWS: POL. (July 12, 2017), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/07/12/sessions-says-when-cities-protect-illegal-
immigrants-criminals-take-notice.html. 
8. See Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants:  
Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin, 2017 CATO INST.: IMMIGR. RES. & 
POL. BRIEF 1–2; Lajeunesse, supra note 7. 
9. See Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?, 
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuary-
cities-donald-trump/. 
10. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799, 8803 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
11. See id. at 8799. 
12. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The White House’s Claim That ‘Sanctuary’ 
Cities Are Violating the Law, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (April 28, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/04/28/the-white-houses-claim-
that-sanctuary-cities-are-violating-the-law/. 
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
14. See Tal Kopan, House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Declaring War on 
Sanctuary Cities, CNN: POL. (June 29, 2017, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/kates-law-sanctuary-cities-house-bill-
immigration/index.html. 
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powers.
15
  Critics, in fact, affirm that ordering Congress to withhold federal 
funding, one aspect of the Executive Order, as punishment for the failure to 
comply with federal immigration laws, is an unconstitutional form of 
coercion in violation of the Tenth Amendment—which prohibits the federal 
government from forcing states and local governments to enforce federal 
laws.
16
 
Jurisdictions across the country have responded differently to 
President Trump’s Executive Order:  Cities like Los Angeles and New York 
promised to stand behind their sanctuary policies, while Miami-Dade County 
retracted its sanctuary policy.
17
 
Part II of this Comment will illustrate the historical development of 
sanctuary jurisdictions from their biblical origin to the most recent 
application in the western legal system, specifically in the United States.
18
  
Part III introduces the language of the Executive Order and its connections to 
the statute that it is designed to enforce.
19
  Part IV analyzes, in depth, the 
possible constitutional challenges to the Executive Order, and the arguments 
both in favor and against its constitutionality.
20
  Finally, Part V of this 
Comment will consider the possible repercussions of the provisions within 
the Executive Order in Florida, with particular attention paid to the South 
Florida region, historically home to thousands of immigrants.
21
 
II. SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS 
A. Historical Development:  From Its Biblical Origin . . . 
The concept of a sanctuary dates back to at least biblical times, and 
was originally rooted in the power of religious authorities to grant protection 
within an inviolable religious area or structure to persons fearing for their 
                                                     
15. See Devin Watkins, 5 Ways Trump’s Anti-Sanctuary City Orders Are 
Unconstitutional, TIME: LAW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.time.com/4720749/trump-
sanctuary-cities-unconstitutional/. 
16. Id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
17. See Henry Goldman, Sanctuary-City Mayors Vow to Defy Trump After He 
Threatens Funding, BLOOMBERG: POL. (Jan. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/trump-threat-to-deny-funds-draws-
defiance-from-sanctuary-cities.  But see Ray Sanchez et al., Florida’s Largest County to 
Comply with Trump’s Sanctuary Crackdown, CNN: POL. (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/miami-dade-mayor-sanctuary-
crackdown/index.html. 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See infra Part III. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part V. 
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lives or liberty.
22
  Sanctuary practices existed in many Western societies, and 
were extensively used by ancient Hebrews after being freed from slavery in 
Egypt.
23
  Sanctuary practices were further used in both ancient Greece and 
Rome, with characteristics similar to the concept of asylum.
24
 
While originally granting asylum for all crimes, with many temples 
extending what was considered as divine protection, Greeks later reduced the 
use of asylum to individuals who had committed unpremeditated crimes.
25
  
Contrarily, sacred edifices in Rome were not sanctuaries.
26
  In fact, Romans 
only extended asylum to give immunity and protection from violence 
throughout the inquisition process.
27
  Once judgment on the evidence was 
rendered, the asylum would be revoked and punishment would be inflicted 
on the defendant found guilty of a crime.
28
  With the emergence of 
Christianity, the concept of sanctuary extended to a wider range of 
individuals.
29
  In 303 A.D., Constantine’s Edict of Toleration granted 
Christian churches permission to extend protection to fugitives.
30
  Sanctuary 
was later recognized as a legal right through the promulgation of the 
Theodosian Code by the emperor Theodosius in 392 A.D.
31
  Extensively 
used in medieval times—enjoying recognition in both Canon law and Saxon 
law—sanctuaries suffered as centralized governments increased throughout 
Europe, and Church and State clashed over its control.
32
  Resulting from the 
                                                     
22. Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary:  A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 583, 609 (2014); see also ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY 62 (1988); Michael Scott 
Feeley, Towards the Cathedral:  Ancient Sanctuary Represented in the American Context, 27 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 802 (1990).  “Sanctuary is the power of guardians of a defined 
religious site to grant protections to one who seeks safety out of fear of life or limb.”  Feeley, 
supra at 802.  Most ancient cultures, including Syrians and Phoenicians developed sanctuary 
towns and temples.  William C. Ryan, The Historical Case for the Right of Sanctuary, 29 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 209, 211, 211 n.20 (1987). 
23. Ryan, supra note 22, at 211. 
24. See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary:  The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a 
Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 
751 (1986) (analyzing the “[n]on-[b]iblical [o]rigins of [w]estern [s]anctuar[ies]”). 
25. Id. (affirming that sanctuary would also be extended to a person “in 
danger of cruel and summary vengeance”). 
26. Ryan, supra note 22, at 213–14. 
27. Carro, supra note 24, at 751. 
28. See id. 
29. Id. at 752. 
30. Davidson, supra note 22, at 587. 
31. Carro, supra note 24, at 752. 
32. Feeley, supra note 22, at 810; see also Ryan, supra note 22, at 216–18 
(discussing in depth the rise of the sanctuary privilege in Anglo-Saxon society and its 
development in English common law). 
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schism between the English Crown and the Catholic Church, the privilege of 
sanctuary came to an end in England in 1624.
33
 
B. . . . To Its Modern American Application . . . 
In the United States, sanctuaries by religious authorities against civil 
authorities were not invoked for almost 200 years.
34
  Prior to the American 
Civil War, clergymen and members of religious communities offered aid to 
slaves escaping bondage through an intricate system of routes known as the 
Underground Railroad.
35
  Although activism in the Underground Railroad 
was spread across religious figures and churches, no record exists of any 
church invoking the right to sanctuary.
36
  The first instance of the modern 
application of sanctuaries was during the Vietnam War, a military action that 
was strongly opposed by the religious community, which offered safe havens 
to draftees conscientiously resisting the draft.
37
  Although participants to the 
movement made no claim asserting legal recognition, the renewed concept of 
sanctuary was empowered by its characteristics of civil disobedience.
38
 
The current sanctuary movement in the United States developed in 
the 1980s when, after the enactment of the Refugee Act, “thousands of 
immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala” applied for asylum.39  As a 
consequence of asylum applications being routinely rejected by federal 
                                                     
33. Davidson, supra note 22, at 593; Feeley, supra note 22, at 810. 
34. IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND 
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES 160 (1985); Davidson, supra note 22, at 594.  Early colonial 
history of the United States makes no mention of sanctuary privileges.  BAU, supra at 159.  
The inexistence of sanctuary privileges in the United States at the time was probably due to 
the fact that pilgrims considered America as a sanctuary in its entirety, and therefore saw no 
reason to formally adopt the privilege.  Id. at 158–59; James H. Walsh & Mary Ellen O’Neill, 
Sanctuary - A Legal Privilege or Act of Civil Disobedience?, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1987, at 11, 13. 
35. Davidson, supra note 22, at 594–95; see also Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note, 
The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement:  A Comparison of History, 
Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1436, 1440–41 (1987) (drawing a thorough 
comparison between the Underground Railroad movement of the 1840s and 1850s to the 
sanctuary movement). 
36. Davidson, supra note 22, at 595. 
37. Id. at 597–98. 
38. Walsh & O’Neill, supra note 34, at 14. 
39. Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139 
(2008); see also Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine:  Trial Without Jury—A 
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 30–31 
(1986).  The two groundbreaking events igniting the civil war in El Salvador were the 
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador, murdered while saying mass, and 
the rape and murder of four American Catholic missionaries by National guardsmen.  Colbert, 
supra at 30–31 (explaining the unfolding of the sanctuary movement on behalf of Central 
American immigrants in the United States). 
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agencies, many churches across the country declared themselves sanctuaries 
to offer refuge to immigrants and protest against the policies of the federal 
government.
40
  In March of 1982, the Southside Presbyterian Church of 
Tucson, Arizona, was the first to publicly announce itself as a sanctuary for 
Central American immigrants fleeing war.
41
  In addition to offering 
protection, the churches and religious communities involved in the 
movement provided food, clothing, and legal services.
42
 
Following the wave of sanctuary initiatives ignited by churches and 
religious groups around the country, many local governments established 
sanctuary policies.
43
  Sanctuary laws passed by cities and states generally 
declared public places as sanctuaries.
44
  Jurisdictions that passed sanctuary 
laws during the 1980s included cities—Seattle, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, 
Chicago, Rochester—and states, including New Mexico, New York, and 
Massachusetts.
45
 
C. . . . And Its Contemporary Version 
Dissipating at the same pace as the political turmoil in Central 
America, the sanctuary movement regained momentum in the wake of the 
attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
46
  A few months 
                                                     
40. Villarruel, supra note 35, at 1433; see also Feeley, supra note 22, at 820. 
41. Davidson, supra note 22, at 603. 
42. Villazor, supra note 39, at 141. 
43. Jennifer L. Gregorin, Comment, Hidden Beneath the Waves of 
Immigration Debate:  San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 175, 182 
(2011). 
44. Villazor, supra note 39, at 142 (affirming that laws were indicative of 
political stands against federal immigration policies regarding the Central American crisis); 
Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?  Local Sovereignty and the Federal 
Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2006) (stating that local governments 
passed sanctuary laws allowing asylum-seekers to remain within their jurisdictions’ 
boundaries without threat of arrest for violation of federal immigration laws by local law 
enforcement). 
45. Pham, supra note 44, at 1383; see also Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and 
State Sanctuary Declarations:  Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 
297, 311–12 n.88–97 (1989) (describing the extended implementation of sanctuary policies 
across the country and listing, among others, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and 
Sacramento, California; Rochester and Ithaca, New York; and Cambridge, Massachusetts as 
municipalities which also passed resolutions or city ordinances in favor of sanctuaries); Daniel 
D. McMillan, Note, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine:  Much Ado 
About Nothing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (1987) (affirming that the cities of 
Berkeley, California, and Madison, Wisconsin, also passed resolutions establishing 
themselves as “cities of refuge for Central American refugees”). 
46. Laura Sullivan, Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement:  Countering the 
Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National 
Crime Information Center Database, 97 CAL. L. REV. 567, 572 (2009). 
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after the attack, answering concerns of the general public regarding national 
security and immigration, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a 
memorandum announcing the inherent authority of local officials to arrest 
and detain illegal immigrants for both civil immigration and criminal 
violations.
47
  Disapproving the policies set forth by the memorandum, local 
enforcement authorities adopted new sanctuary policies.
48
  The trend of 
implementing favorable sanctuary policies has grown steadily since then, 
albeit the heinous crime committed against innocent civilians in New York 
on September 11, 2001 would have warranted otherwise.
49
  By 2008, many 
states throughout the country counted sanctuary jurisdictions within their 
territorial boundaries.
50
 
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) responded to local 
jurisdictions’ implementation of sanctuary policies by creating “Secure 
Communities, [a program requiring] local law enforcement agencies to run 
fingerprints through the DHS illegal immigrant database upon booking.”51  
When a match occurred, ICE would be alerted and a detainer would be 
issued.
52
  DHS discontinued the program in 2014 due to complications in its 
administration arising out of lawsuits for violation of arrestees’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.
53
  DHS substituted Secure Communities with the Priority 
Enforcement Program (“PEP”), a program designed to limit the applicability 
                                                     
47. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, on Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to 
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 35 (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice). 
48. Sullivan, supra note 46, at 573; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws 
in the Inherent Authority Position:  Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2004). 
49. Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to 
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006); see also Kris W. Kobach, The 
Quintessential Force Multiplier:  The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration 
Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 184 (2005).  Four different members of the terrorist commando 
responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11—Nawaf al Hazmi, Mohammed 
Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah—had previously violated federal immigration laws, but 
state or local law enforcement failed to detain them.  Kobach, supra at 184–87. 
50. See Gregorin, supra note 43, at 183; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2–7, 9 (2008). 
51. See Bridget Stubblefield, Note, Development in the Executive Branch 
Sanctuary Cities:  Balancing Between National Security Directives, Local Law Enforcement 
Autonomy, and Immigrants’ Rights, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 541, 542 (2015); Secure 
Communities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last 
updated May 19, 2017). 
52. Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543; see also Barbara E. Armacost, 
“Sanctuary” Laws:  The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1209 
(2016). 
53. See Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543. 
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of detainers merely to illegal immigrants convicted of a civil immigration 
priority offense[].
54
 
The implementation of federal immigration detention mandated by 
ICE did not produce the results hoped for, leading cities across the country to 
once again implement counter-policies in opposition to the federal 
immigration regulations.
55
  Currently, approximately 400 local 
jurisdictions—with New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles once again 
at the forefront of the movement—refuse to comply with federal immigration 
mandates and, either officially or unofficially, refuse to apply sanctuary 
regulations within their territories.
56
 
Modern sanctuaries do not conceal undocumented aliens nor shelter 
them from detection.
57
  “[W]hen a city says that it is being a sanctuary, it 
means that the city will not be an arm of federal immigration authorities.”58  
The lack of intent to physically protect individuals from law enforcement is 
what specifically separates modern sanctuaries from the original 
movement.
59
  In an interview released to Politico, the director of special 
projects at the New York Immigration Coalition contended that “the term 
sanctuary cities is a misnomer.”60  Shifting substantially from their historical 
meaning, nowadays sanctuary jurisdictions are considered to be cities, 
counties, or states, which limit government employees—specifically local 
law enforcement—from inquiring about the immigration status of 
immigrants they encounter; with an exception recognized for cases of serious 
criminal offense[s].
61
 
                                                     
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 542–43. 
56. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, City & Cty. of 
S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr. 
2017, at 60, 60; Liz Robbins, Angry Mayors Vow to Defy Trump Immigration Order, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2017, at A.17; Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary 
Cities, USA, OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017). 
57. Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60. 
58. Id. 
59. See id.; Villazor, supra note 39, at 148–49. 
60. Gloria Pazmino et al., Few Guarantees as Local Governments Plot 
‘Sanctuary’ Policy, POLITICO: CAL. (Mar. 27, 2017, 5:16 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2017/03/with-sanctuary-cities-in-trumps-
crosshairs-local-governments-craft-a-response-110692. 
“For people that are anti-immigrant, sanctuary cities are places where anyone can 
come and commit a crime and there is no law and order, and we know that is 
fiction” . . . .  “At the same time, sanctuary cities are not places where we can stop 
the federal government from entering and using information they have access to. 
Id. 
61. Corrie Bilke, Note, Divided We Stand, United We Fall:  A Public Policy 
Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 165, 
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Although scholars and local policymakers have traditionally divided 
modern sanctuary policies into three major categories, such categories are 
often times combined by jurisdictions within one regulation.
62
  The first 
category, the so-called don’t ask policies, limits inquiries as to the nationality 
or immigration status of an individual by local law enforcement.
63
  The 
second category, don’t enforce policies, creates limitations on the power of 
local law enforcement to arrest or detain violators of immigration laws.
64
  
Don’t tell regulations, the third category, establishes limitations on the 
authority by local enforcement agents to report immigration status 
information to federal agencies.
65
 
States and municipalities, as well as individual police departments, 
have adopted diverse mechanisms to ensure that unauthorized aliens in their 
jurisdictions are not turned over to federal immigration authorities.
66
  For 
instance, Cook County, Illinois, home to Chicago, instructs its county jail 
system to deny compliance with ICE detainer requests;
67
 Los Angeles’ 
Special Order 40, the oldest city sanctuary ordinance, refrains police action 
for the mere purpose of determining a person’s immigration status;68 and San 
                                                                                                                             
180 (2009) (discussing the historical development of sanctuary cities in the United States and 
the potential hazards that nonfederal enforcement of immigration law that sanctuary cities 
seek to avert); Villazor, supra note 39, at 147–48 (examining the narrower scope of the 
definition of sanctuary cities compared to its original meaning). 
62. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; see also Sullivan, supra note 46, at 574. 
63. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. 
64. Id.; see also Pham, supra note 44, at 1390 (dividing don’t enforce 
provisions between “[n]o [e]nforcement of [i]mmigration [l]aws”—often reducing the 
resources available to officers to enforce federal immigration laws—and “[n]o [e]nforcement 
of [c]ivil [i]mmigration [l]aws”—barring cooperation in immigration law enforcement when 
the alleged violation is exclusively a civil violation). 
65. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. 
66. LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING 
IMMIGRATION LAW:  THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2006). 
67. See Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities:  Chicago, NYC, 
San Francisco, Philadelphia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2017, 7:27 AM), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc-san-
francisco-philadelphia/article/2629466. 
68. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, SPECIAL ORDER NO. 40, UNDOCUMENTED 
ALIENS (1979); Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1469.  Los Angeles was one of the first cities in the 
United States to promote sanctuary policies.  Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.  The Office of the 
Los Angeles Chief of Police promulgated Special Order 40 to stop local enforcement agents 
from initiating police action with the sole purpose of discovering the immigration status of a 
person.  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, supra.  The Order, however, allowed officers to 
communicate to federal agencies arrest records when the person arrested had been previously 
convicted of a felony.  Id. 
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Francisco Sheriff’s Department’s policy is that, absent a court issued warrant 
or signed order, contact with ICE representatives should be limited.
69
 
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROMISE 
Since officially entering the presidential race in June of 2015, 
President Trump focused his campaign leitmotif on issues of public safety 
and threats presented by illegal immigration.
70
  On several occasions during 
his campaign, President Trump vowed to crack down on sanctuary 
jurisdictions in an attempt to lower criminal rates and defeat criminal 
organizations operating in the United States.
71
  Highly critical of the federal 
immigration policies implemented by former President Barack H. Obama—
his predecessor at the presidential helm—President Trump identified 
sanctuary policies as one of the main causes of the proliferation of criminal 
organizations.
72
  Since his election, as the forty-fifth President of the United 
States on November 8, 2016, President Trump’s position on immigration has 
not changed.
73
  Faithful to his campaign promises to the electorate, on 
January 25, 2017, exactly five days after taking the Oath of Office, President 
Trump signed the Executive Order.
74
 
                                                     
69. Letter from Ross Mirkarimi, Sheriff, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to All 
Personnel, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Mar. 13, 2015) (on file with San Francisco Sheriff’s 
Department). 
70. Jason Le Miere, Immigrants Are Not ‘Criminals, Drug Dealers and 
Rapists,’ ICE Director Says, Contradicting Trump, NEWSWEEK: U.S. EDITION (June 28, 2017, 
4:42 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/immigrants-mexico-rapists-ice-immigration-629866. 
71. Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump Wants to Do 
in His First 100 Days, NPR: POL. (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-his-
first-100-days. 
72. Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?, 
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuary-
cities-donald-trump/; see also Jose A. DelReal, Trump Blames Obama for Orlando Shooting, 
Blasts Clinton on Immigration, WASH. POST: POST POL. (June 13, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/06/13/trump-blames-obama-for-
orlando-shooting-blasts-clinton-on-immigration/. 
73. Priscilla Alvarez, Trump Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-down-
sanctuary-city/514427/; see also Dan Brekke, Trump:  California ‘Out of Control’ and 
Defunding Could Be in Store, KQED NEWS: CAL. REP. (Feb. 6, 2017, 11:50 AM), 
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/02/06/trump-california-out-of-control-and-defunding-could-
be-in-store/; Kelly & Sprunt, supra note 71.  In his interview with Bill O’Reilly, President 
Trump stated that defunding sanctuary cities would certainly be a weapon in the hands of the 
federal government to ensure compliance with federal directives.  Brekke, supra. 
74. Alvarez, supra note 73. 
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A. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States 
Composed of eighteen sections, the Executive Order lays out the 
presidential plan against illegal immigration.
75
  Specified in section one, 
“[t]he purpose of [the Executive Order] is to direct executive departments 
and agencies . . . to employ all lawful means to enforce immigration laws of 
the United States.”76  Further, affirming that aliens illegally entering the 
United States—and those aliens overstaying their visas—are a significant 
threat to both public safety and national security, the Executive Order asserts 
that faithful execution of federal immigration laws is impossible when 
exemptions apply to different classes and categories of removable aliens.
77
  
In a direct attack on sanctuary jurisdictions, section one also stresses that 
“[s]anctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate [f]ederal 
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States.  
These jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people 
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”78 
In an additional effort to equalize the categories of removable aliens, 
section five of the Executive Order lists multiple classes of aliens that fulfill 
the federal requirements for removal.
79
  In its language, the Executive Order 
allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize for removal, in 
addition to those recognized by congressional acts, aliens who: 
 
a) Have been convicted of any criminal offense; 
b) Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such 
charge has not been resolved; 
c) Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal 
offense; 
d) Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in 
connection with any official matter or application before a 
governmental agency; 
e) Have abused any program related to receipt of public 
benefits; 
f) Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not 
complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or 
g) In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose 
a risk to public safety or national security.
80
 
 
                                                     
75. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799–803 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
76. Id. at 8799. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 8800. 
80. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8800. 
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In order to implement the policies laid out in the Executive Order, in 
section eight, President Trump states that it is the intent of the Executive 
Branch to empower law enforcement agencies at both the state and local 
level to perform those functions generally employed by federal immigration 
officers.
81
  Attempting to foster cooperation between federal, state, and local 
agencies, the Executive Order further provides that the Secretary of State has 
the authority to enter into statutorily regulated agreements with state 
governors and local officials to permit local agencies to enforce federal 
laws.
82
  However, in opposition to the constructive language of section eight, 
the Executive Order provides punitive language in section nine for those 
jurisdictions that fail to enforce federal immigration policies.
83
 
B. Section Nine—The Source of Discord 
Section nine of the Executive Order is titled Sanctuary Jurisdictions, 
and affirms that “[i]t is the policy of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to ensure, to 
the fullest extent of the law, that a [s]tate, or a political subdivision of a 
[s]tate, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”84  Specifically, subsection 9(a) 
establishes that: 
 In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the 
Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law, 
shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 
U.S.C. § 1373—sanctuary jurisdictions—are not eligible to receive 
[f]ederal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement 
purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary.  The Secretary 
has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent 
consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction.  The 
Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against 
any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. § 1373, or which has in effect a 
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement 
of [f]ederal law.
85
 
The stated goal of section 9(a) of the Executive Order is to take 
enforcement actions against any entity or jurisdiction that fails to comply 
                                                     
81. Id. 
82. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012).  In 8 U.S.C § 1357(g), this section 
allows agreements between federal agencies and state or local agencies within the scope to 
permit local law enforcement to enforce federal laws and regulations.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)–
(2). 
83. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
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with federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
86
  Stated within the language 
of section 9(a), and also confirmed by the language of section two, President 
Trump’s objective is to ensure that jurisdictions not in compliance with 
federal law do not receive federal funds and grants, with exceptions made for 
disbursements mandated by law.
87
 
C. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 
Signed into law by President Bill Clinton in September of 1996—
just a few months after another statute with similar language, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”), 
was signed into law—the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) contained the provision which was later 
codified at Title 8 § 1373 of the United States Code.
88
  8 U.S.C. § 1373 
regulates communications between government agencies, including federal, 
state, and local agencies, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”).89  Specifically, the statute prohibits any federal, state, or local 
government entity or official from restricting “any government entity or 
official[s] from sending to, or receiving from, the [INS] information 
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any 
individual.”90  The statutory language further prohibits any person or agency 
                                                     
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 8799, 8801. 
88. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM & IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 
1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 180 (1996) (Conf. Rep); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration 
Sanctuary Policies:  Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public 
Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 263–64, 294 (2012) (affirming the similarities between the 
provision of the IIRIRA and the language of the PRWORA, better known as the Welfare 
Reform Act, signed into law by President Clinton just a few weeks before the IIRIRA in 
August 1996.  Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644, the Welfare Reform Act contained a provision 
regulating communications between state and local government and federal governmental 
agencies in a manner similar to the IIRIRA).  8 U.S.C. § 1644 provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local law, 
no [s]tate or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, 
from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the 
United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012). 
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). 
90. Id. § 1373(a).  The Senate version of the bill noted in its report that the 
section: 
Prohibits any restriction on the exchange of information between the 
[INS] and any [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local agency regarding a person’s immigration 
status. . . .  The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related 
information by [s]tate and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of 
considerable assistance to, the [f]ederal regulation of immigration and the achieving 
of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
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to “prohibit, or in any way restrict a [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local government 
entity from” sending, requesting, or receiving information regarding the 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual from the INS; 
maintaining such information; and exchanging information with other 
government agencies.
91
  Although prohibiting restrictions on information-
sharing between state and federal agencies, neither of these anti-sanctuary 
statutes renders cooperation with federal immigration authorities—or sharing 
of information—mandatory.92  As some scholars have noted, the 
characteristic of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is to encourage cooperation among 
different levels of law enforcement by prohibiting certain conduct instead of 
directly requiring local cooperation.
93
 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES 
The reaction from states and municipalities, to the signing of the 
Executive Order, was strong and immediate.
94
  On January 31, 2017, the City 
and County of San Francisco filed a suit in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of the 
Executive Order.
95
  The County of Santa Clara, California filed suit shortly 
thereafter on February 3, 2017, on similar grounds, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against all named defendants, which included President 
Trump himself.
96
  The City of Richmond, California also filed suit 
challenging the Executive Order on March 21, 2017, and on March 23, 2017, 
moved to relate its case to the suits brought by the Counties of Santa Clara 
and San Francisco.
97
  An additional action seeking declaratory and injunctive 
                                                                                                                             
Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law:  A Failed Approach to Immigration 
Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 177 
(2016) (quoting IMMIGRATION CONTROL & FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996, S. Rep. 
No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996)). 
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1996). 
92. See McCormick, supra note 90, at 169. 
93. Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79 
UMKC L. REV. 901, 911 (2011).  The statute is enforceable exclusively against so-called 
don’t tell policies, while it is silent on the other two major categories of sanctuary policies, 
don’t enforce and don’t ask.  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
94. See Michelle Mark, ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Are Ready to Fight Trump’s 
Potentially ‘Unconstitutional’ Executive Order, BUS. INSIDER: POLITICS (Jan. 27, 2017, 10:09 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sanctuary-cities-brace-for-trumps-executive-order-on-
immigration-2017-1. 
95. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 1–2. 
96. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, 4041, Cty. of 
Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017). 
97. Administrative Motion of City of Richmond to Consider Whether Cases 
Should Be Related Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-12(B) & Notice of Related Case Pursuant to Civil 
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relief was filed on February 8, 2017, by the City of Lawrence, 
Massachusetts, and the City of Chelsea, Massachusetts, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
98
  The counties and cities 
specifically challenged section 9(a), the enforcement provision within the 
language of the Executive Order, on several grounds.
99
 
In general, the cities and counties each argue that section 9(a) of the 
Executive Order violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine by improperly 
seeking to exercise congressional spending powers.
100
  In addition, even if 
President Trump could exercise such spending powers, the cities and 
counties contend that the Executive Order would be in violation of those 
powers—and thereby unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment—and, 
lastly, that section 9(a) violates the anti-commandeering clause of the Tenth 
Amendment.
101
 
On the other hand, support for the Executive Order—and the policies 
and objectives stated therein—has come from Patrick Morrissey, the 
Attorney General of West Virginia, and Jeff Landry, the Attorney General of 
Louisiana.
102
  In their amici curiae brief—filed in the action brought by the 
                                                                                                                             
Local Rule 3-13 at 12, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. 
filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Administrative Motion]; see also Complaint for Injunctive & 
Declaratory Relief Concerning Federal Executive Order 13768 at 3, 29, City of Richmond v. 
Trump, 2017 WL 3605216 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01535-WHO).  Cty. of 
Santa Clara v. Trump and City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump had already been consolidated in 
February pursuant to an order issued by Judge William H. Orrick of the District Court for the 
Northern District of California.  See Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City & 
County of San Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768 at 29, 
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017). 
98. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 2. 
99. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 15; Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Sues Trump over ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Order, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 2017, at A11; Maura Dolan & James Queally, Santa Clara County Seeks to Block 
Trump’s Order to Defund Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 2:25 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-clara-sanctuary-trump-lawsuit-20170223-
story.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); Alison 
Frankel, Cities Say Trump’s Sanctuary Policy Is Unconstitutional, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017, 
5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-sanctuary-idUSKBN171361. 
100. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 1622; Frankel, supra note 99; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
101. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, 
at 16; see also Frankel, supra note 99; Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801. 
102. See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Louisiana, 
Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, & Texas at 1, 12, 
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) 
[hereinafter Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae].  The Amici states supporting the Executive 
Order also include the states of “Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Texas.”  Id. at 1 n.1. 
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City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara—both 
maintain that the Executive Order is constitutional and challenges the 
validity of the action taken by these cities and counties based upon 
justiciability grounds.
103
  Without going into the specific merits of whether 
any of the plaintiffs have standing to bring the action, the following analysis 
will focus on the constitutionality of the Executive Order, including possible 
arguments in favor or against it.
104
 
A. Spending Clause 
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes what 
has been defined as the Taxing and Spending Clause.
105
  The Taxing and 
Spending Clause textually affirms that “Congress shall have the Power To 
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; 
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.”106 
Vast jurisprudence has interpreted the language of the Taxing and 
Spending Clause, starting with United States v. Butler,
107
 which defines the 
federal spending power broadly to promote the general welfare.
108
  The 
                                                     
103. Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 2.  The first argument 
presented by the brief is the lack of standing to bring suit due to the absence of any injury to 
the jurisdictions.  Id. 
104. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799; Proposed Brief of 
Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 3; State of California’s Administrative Motion for Leave to 
File an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, 
City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter State of California’s Administrative Motion]. 
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
106. Id.; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the 
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111–12 (1987).  The Founding Fathers disagreed on the 
extent of the General Welfare Clause, with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
expressing ideas at the opposite end of the spectrum.  Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at 
178 (Alexander Hamilton) (American Bar Association ed., 2009), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 
41, at 233–34 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed., 2009).  Alexander Hamilton 
thought that additional power was provided by the General Welfare Clause to Congress 
without limits imposed by other enumerated powers.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra.  
Contrarily, James Madison interpreted the General Welfare Clause as confining Congress’ 
taxing and spending powers to those fields enumerated by the Constitution.  See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra at 233–34. 
107. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
108. Id. at 65–66.  “[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public 
money[] for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in 
the Constitution.”  Id. at 66 (adopting Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of the General 
Welfare Clause); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 106, at 177–78 (Alexander 
Hamilton); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause?  (or the President’s Paramour):  An 
127
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Supreme Court of the United States further affirmed in South Dakota v. 
Dole
109
 that “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, 
and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by 
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient 
with federal statutory and administrative directives.’”110  Articulating 
limitations to the applicable conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist announced 
in Dole a four-part test stemming from previous, singular rulings of the 
Court.
111
  First, the use of spending power by Congress must be in 
furtherance of the general welfare.
112
  Reaffirming the principle established 
in Helvering v. Davis,
113
 the Chief Justice recognized that courts should 
observe some degree of deference to Congress in determining “whether a 
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes.”114  
Second, conditions imposed by Congress on grants must be unambiguous.
115
  
Third, there must be a relation between the conditions imposed by Congress 
                                                                                                                             
Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of 
the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 103 (1999). 
109. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
110. Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).  
South Dakota brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. § 158, a federal 
statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold otherwise allocable funds from 
states in which the drinking age was legally below twenty-one years.  Id. at 205.  The United 
States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the complaint, and the ruling 
was later confirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding the statute to be a constitutional exercise of 
Congress’ spending power.  Id. at 212.  “Congress can trade things within its power—like 
money, or regulatory authority, or forbearance from preemption—for state assistance that 
would otherwise lie beyond its reach.”  Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal:  Immigration 
Enforcement and the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 120 (2016). 
111. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 91 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-
155, 166 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936). 
112. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Butler, 297 
U.S. at 65). 
113. 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
114. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.  Changing the terms of an existing funding 
agreement would be a breach similar in nature to changing the terms of an existing contract.  
Andrew Hanson, “Economic Dragooning”:  Limiting Trump’s Ability to Punish Sanctuary 
Cities, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Dec. 1, 2016), 
http://www.harvardlpr.com/2016/12/01/economic-dragooning-limiting-trumps-ability-to-
punish-sanctuary-cities/. 
115. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
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and the purpose of the federal program—a limitation of germaneness.116  
Fourth, congressional intent in establishing the program cannot constitute a 
violation of other specific restrictions imposed on the federal government by 
the Constitution.
117
  Chief Justice Rehnquist also interestingly affirmed near 
the end of the opinion “that in some circumstances the financial inducement 
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.”118  Although no compulsion was found in 
Dole, the opinion created a new threshold for congressional legislative acts 
to be deemed constitutional—opening the gates to additional challenges.119  
Although not all parts of the four-part test are allegedly challenged by the 
language of the Executive Order, arguments can be made as to at least three 
parts.
120
 
1. Clarity of Intent 
In the specific words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, when “Congress 
desires to condition the [s]tates’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so 
unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the [s]tates to exercise their choice 
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”121  The 
contractual nature of the Taxing and Spending Clause enables jurisdictions to 
know the requirements and expectations set forth by Congress before 
accepting their end of the bargain.
122
  Thus, it is counter-intuitive that 
Congress’ legitimate use of its spending power depend on whether 
acceptance of conditions on funds by local jurisdictions is made 
                                                     
116. Craig Eichstadt, Twenty-Year Legacy of South Dakota v. Dole, 52 S.D. L. 
REV. 458, 458 (2007); accord Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
117. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.  Language in previous rulings of the Supreme 
Court of the United States uncontrovertibly affirms the “proposition that the [spending] power 
may not be used to induce the [s]tates to engage in activities that would themselves be 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at 210. 
118. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937)). 
119. See id. at 211–12; e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2604 (2012). 
120. See Eddie Nasser, President Trump Overstepped His Authority on 
Sanctuary Cities, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Feb. 28, 2017), 
http://harvardlpr.com/2017/02/28/president-trump-overstepped-his-authority-on-sanctuary-
cities/. 
121. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. 
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2000)). 
122. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17. 
129
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voluntarily.
123
  Voluntary and knowing acceptance of federal funds implies 
that no implementation of after-the-fact conditions are permitted.
124
  In fact, 
“[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it 
does not include surprising participating [s]tates with post-acceptance or 
retroactive conditions.”125  The Court in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius
126
 clearly states that Congress is not free to penalize 
States for their choice to not participate in new programs by taking away 
existing funding—a decision that resembles less of a constitutional use of 
spending powers, and more of an abuse of it.
127
 
The jurisdictions challenging the Executive Order affirmed that the 
main purpose of the Executive Order is to retroactively condition all federal 
grants to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
128
  Doubting the clarity of the 
Executive Order, the cities and counties bringing the action claimed that the 
conditions, being inexistent at the time federal grants were accepted, could 
not be accepted knowingly and willingly—as is required by the Dole test—
thus creating forcible conditions on federal grants in violation of the 
Constitution.
129
  These jurisdictions further contended that the ambiguity of 
the Executive Order extends to the exact nature of the grants being 
conditioned.
130
  If the Executive Order applies conditions on federal grants, 
both the nature of the grants and the amount of federal funds being 
conditioned need to be stated clearly, thus allowing the voluntary choice by 
States and municipalities to either accept or reject the federal grants.
131
 
Additionally, the ambiguity of the Executive Order extends to the 
conduct being specifically targeted.
132
  If no clear directions are given by the 
federal government on whether a certain conduct would fall under the 
umbrella of conduct that the Executive Order is trying to limit, then it 
becomes nearly impossible for jurisdictions to avoid penalties through policy 
adjustments.
133
 
                                                     
123. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602. 
124. Id. at 2606. 
125. Id. 
126. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
127. See id. at 2607. 
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 56, at 12. 
129. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Complaint for 
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12. 
130. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12. 
131. Cf. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
132. See Eric Levenson, Seattle Challenges Trump over Executive Order on 
‘Sanctuary Cities’, CNN: POL. (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/seattle-lawsuit-trump-sanctuary-city/index.html. 
133. See Frankel, supra note 99; cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28 
130
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On the other hand, although refraining from discussion about 
whether any existing grant program meets the Dole criteria—compliance 
strongly denied by those jurisdictions bringing the lawsuit—the states in 
support of the Executive Order confirm the validity of the Executive 
Order.
134
  According to the filed Amici Brief, an authorization by Congress 
allowing the Attorney General and Secretary of State to administer grant 
programs, conditioning receipt on compliance with specific federal 
immigration laws, is well within constitutional boundaries.
135
  A 
memorandum issued by Attorney General Jeff Sessions also helps further 
clarify the essence of federal grants potentially conditioned on compliance 
with federal immigration laws, thereby rendering meritless the claims of 
ambiguity with regard to the nature of the grants.
136
  The memorandum 
affirms that “section 9(a) of the Executive Order . . . will be applied solely to 
federal grants administered by the [DOJ] or the [DHS], and not to other 
sources of federal funding.”137  However, the memorandum arguably fails 
one of its main objectives—specifying the conduct leading to denial of 
federal funds.
138
  Although limiting the term sanctuary jurisdiction to those 
jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373,” the 
memorandum fails to clarify the characteristics of a willful refusal, leaving 
states and localities in the dark as to the exactitude of the targeted conduct.
139
 
2. Nexus Requirement 
As a third requirement to achieve constitutionality, Dole affirmed 
that a connection must exist between the condition applied to federal grants 
and the government interest to be achieved.
140
  The Dole Court stated that 
“conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to 
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”141  What has 
                                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000). 
134. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 
102, at 1–2. 
135. See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 8. 
136. See Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Office of the 
Attorney Gen. on Implementation of Executive Order 13768, to All Department Grant-
Making Components 1–2 (May 22, 2017) (on file with Office of the Attorney Gen.). 
137. Id. (emphasis added); see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 
8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
138. See Priscilla Alvarez, Sessions’s Climbdown on Sanctuary Cities, 
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessionss-
climbdown-on-sanctuary-cities/527844/. 
139. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). 
140. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
141. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)). 
131
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been recognized as the nexus requirement under the Dole test is only 
established when a reasonable relationship between the condition applied by 
Congress and the purpose of the federal program exists.
142
 
Thus, a connection must exist between the federal funds being 
conditioned by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, and the 
ultimate goal of the Executive Order—compliance with § 1373 of Title 8 of 
the United States Code.
143
  The language of the Executive Order, in 
conjunction with the memorandum released by the Attorney General might, 
however, frustrate the Executive Order’s intentions.144  In fact, the Attorney 
General’s clarification on the identity of the federal grants that could 
potentially be affected in the process sheds some light on, but also clashes 
with, the express language of the Executive Order.
145
  The Executive Order 
alleges specifically the non-applicability of conditions on grants necessary 
for purposes of law enforcement.
146
  However, since all grants mentioned by 
the Attorney General as possible targets are, on different levels, designed for 
law enforcement purposes, it becomes unclear what other grants could be 
affected.
147
  The issue is of major relevance, because conditions on grants 
unrelated to immigration purposes—thus running afoul of the concept of 
germaneness—would be the exact type of federal activity the Dole Court 
intended to eliminate.
148
 
3. Coercion 
While not an integral part of the four-prong test developed in Dole, 
the anti-coercion requirement is not any less important in establishing 
whether conditions on federal grants are constitutional.
149
  Nevertheless, 
although—as noted above—courts recognize that financial inducement 
                                                     
142. See id. at 213.  “I agree that there are four separate types of limitations on 
the spending power:  [T]he expenditure must be for the general welfare, . . . the conditions 
imposed must be unambiguous, . . . they must be reasonably related to the purpose of the 
expenditure, . . . and the legislation may not violate any independent constitutional prohibition 
. . . .”  Id. (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
143. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Letter from Annie Lai, 
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine Sch. of Law et al., to Donald J. Trump, 
President of the United States of America 3 (Mar. 13, 2017) (on file with the Immigrant Legal 
Resource Center). 
144. See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99. 
145. See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99. 
146. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
147. See id.; Vivian Yee & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Narrows Order Against 
Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2017, at A18. 
148. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. 
149. See id. at 207–08, 211. 
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offered by Congress can be over-coercive, congressional threats to withhold 
money are upheld when they affect a limited amount of funds.
150
 
In Dole, the Supreme Court found the threat of losing 5% of 
highway funds was not impermissibly coercive, and the financial inducement 
a “relatively mild encouragement to . . . [s]tates” to implement the language 
of the statute.
151
  In similar scenarios, states have the faculty to decide 
whether to accept the condition applied by Congress or deny acceptance of 
the grant.
152
  As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
153
 courts “look to the [s]tates 
to defend [its] prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not 
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the 
federal policies as their own.”154  When conditions attached to federal funds 
resemble a gun to the head, congressional encouragement to state action is 
not considered a valid exercise of spending powers.
155
  If States are not 
allowed to practically exercise a choice between acceptance or denial of 
conditions, but can only theoretically preserve such power, congressional 
actions appear as economic dragooning and are therefore unconstitutional.
156
 
The threat of coercion varies based on the jurisdiction and their 
degree of reliance on federal funding for the daily management of duties and 
services to the resident population.
157
  Among the jurisdictions directly 
involved in opposing the Executive Order, San Francisco’s yearly budget 
gravitates around $10 billion, with approximately $1.2 billion coming 
directly from the federal government.
158
  Santa Clara’s federal funding for 
the 2015 to 2016 fiscal year was approximately $1 billion, a staggering 15% 
                                                     
150. Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); 
see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
151. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
152. Id. at 211–12. 
153. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012). 
154. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)).  Being 
separate and independent sovereigns, states need to act like it by demonstrating their will.  Id. 
155. Id. at 2604–05. 
156. Id. at 2605; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60; Hanson, supra 
note 114. 
157. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604.  “When we consider . . 
. that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable 
minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specifi[c] highway grant 
programs, the argument as to coercion is . . . more rhetoric than fact.”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
158. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 16; see 
CITY & CTY. OF S.F., MAYOR’S OFFICE OF PUB. POLICY & FIN., MAYOR’S 2017–2018 & 2018–
2019 PROPOSED BUDGET 11 (2017), 
http://www.sfmayor.org/sites/default/files/CSF_Budget_Book_2017_Final_CMYK_LowRes.
pdf. 
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of the county’s total budget.159  Further, Chicago received $1.08 billion in 
federal funding in 2015, with an estimated increase to $1.25 billion for 
2016—roughly 13.5% of the yearly city’s budget.160 
The outcome of a coercion analysis regarding whether the Executive 
Order represents a coercive exercise of federal spending powers depends on 
the exact federal grants that would be withheld in case of non-compliance 
with the statute by a state or local jurisdiction.
161
  Therefore, a coercive effect 
would likely be an inevitable outcome if more than just federal funds for 
policing were affected.
162
  Contrarily, it is likely that Courts would rule in 
accordance with Dole and uphold the conditions on federal grants.
163
 
B. Tenth Amendment Umbrella 
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution affirms that “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”164  In an 
effort to shape the relationship between the federal and state governments, 
the language of the Tenth Amendment helps define the concept of 
federalism.
165
  The basic principle established by the Tenth Amendment is 
that if powers are “delegated to Congress [by] the Constitution, [then] the 
Tenth Amendment . . . [refutes] any reservation of that [specific] power to 
the [s]tates.”166  Nevertheless, when a power is “not delegated to [Congress] 
by the Constitution,” it belongs to the [s]tates.167 
                                                     
159. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 96, at 7. 
160. See CITY OF CHICAGO, 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW 34 (2016), 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2016Budget/2016Budget
OverviewCoC.pdf [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW]. 
161. See Cities Under Siege, ECONOMIST (London), May 6, 2017, at 36.  For 
example, Chicago would only lose $2 million if “the order would affect only federal funds for 
policing” as argued by the Attorney General in his memorandum.  Id.  However, if more 
federal grants will be affected, Chicago would lose, according to some estimates, up to $3.6 
billion for the current year.  Id. 
162. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
163. See id. 
164. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
165. See id. 
166. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992). 
167. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1941) (emphasis added).  
“It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which has 
not been surrendered.’”  New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124). 
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1. Anti-Commandeering 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ understanding and 
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has been that “[t]he States 
unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to 
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers 
and transferred those powers to the federal government.”168 
[T]he preservation of the [s]tates, and the maintenance of their 
governments, are as much within the design and care of the 
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance 
of the National [G]overnment.  The Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible [s]tates.
169
 
New York v. United States,
170
 solidified the principle of anti-
commandeering.
171
  The Supreme Court of the United States held that 
Congress does not have the power to “commandee[r] the legislative 
processes of the [s]tates by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”172  Upheld in Printz v. United States,173 the 
prohibition extends to federal directives requiring particular problems to be 
addressed, and to orders given to states’ officers to administer and enforce 
any federal regulatory program.
174
  Prohibition to compel states to enact and 
                                                     
168. New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (noting that the structure of the Constitution reveals the system of dual 
sovereignty as a controlling principle). 
169. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868). 
170. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
171. Id. at 145, 202 (White, J., concurring).  The language of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 specified that a state or regional compact 
failing to provide disposal of internally generated waste by a particular date must take title and 
possession of the waste.  Id. at 153–54 (majority opinion).  The provision also directed States 
to assume liability for internally generated waste if they failed to comply.  Id.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor found the provision impermissibly coercive, and thus, 
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.  Id. at 176, 188. 
172. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (affirming that the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 was constitutional for the exact reason that it did not commandeer 
the States into regulating mining)). 
173. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
174. Id. at 935.  The Supreme Court held the Brady Handgun Violence 
Prevention Act of 1968, which required the Attorney General to establish a national system 
for instant background checking of prospective handgun purchasers and to command the chief 
law enforcement officers nationwide to conduct checks and related police tasks, 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 933–34. 
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administer federal programs applies regardless of whether congressional 
commands to regulate are pointed directly to states, or a state is coerced to 
implement a federal regulatory system.
175
  Notwithstanding the principles 
enunciated in both New York and Printz, support of state governments and 
officials is possible when national security is at stake, therefore authorizing 
an exception to anti-commandeering for reasons beyond the general control 
of the federal government.
176
 
The Executive Order arguably affects states and local jurisdictions in 
two ways:  First, compelling jurisdictions to comply with federal detainer 
requests in order to avoid being labeled as a sanctuary, thus losing 
funding;
177
 and second, preventing jurisdictions from exercising those police 
powers assigned to them under the Tenth Amendment.
178
 
a. ICE Detainers 
The language of section 9(b) of the Executive Order indicates that 
jurisdictions failing to comply with any ICE detainer request fall within the 
category of sanctuary jurisdictions.
179
  An ICE civil detainer consists of local 
law enforcement agencies requesting local jurisdictions to keep inmates held 
for actual or suspected violations of state criminal laws for up to forty-eight 
hours after the inmate’s scheduled release—potentially extending detention 
up to five days when arrests and custody stretch over a holiday weekend.
180
  
The detainers serve the purpose of giving ICE agents enough time to verify 
the information within federal databases and determine whether the 
individual should be taken into federal custody.
181
 
In its attempt to enforce ICE detainers, the language of the Executive 
Order—perceived as mandatory—runs afoul of constitutional principles 
established by judicial interpretation.
182
  In 2014, the Third Circuit Court of 
                                                     
175. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07 
(2012). 
176. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 940; Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on ICE:  
State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1063, 
1073 (2006).  “Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a 
military draft . . . or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national 
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 940 
(Stevens, J. dissenting). 
177. See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1. 
178. Id. 
179. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
180. Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 546–47. 
181. Id. at 545; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 306-112-002B, 
ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 2, 4 (Mar. 24, 2017). 
182. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799.  But see Galarza v. 
Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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Appeals in Galarza v. Szalczyk,
183
 affirmed that local governments are not 
under any duty to comply with ICE civil detainer requests, which are strictly 
voluntary.
184
  In fact, “settled constitutional law clearly establishes that 
[immigration detainers] must be deemed requests” because, under the Tenth 
Amendment, any other interpretation would render them unconstitutional.
185
  
Ordering imprisonment of suspected aliens subject to removal would, in fact, 
be inconsistent with the essential principles of anti-commandeering.
186
  The 
constitutional violations resulting from mandated imprisonment are not 
limited to the Tenth Amendment, but often further extend to violations of the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
187
 
In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County,
188
 the court found 
Clackamas County in violation of Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable seizures.
189
  Although the county argued that the 
seizure was a mere continuation of the original arrest, the court found 
otherwise.
190
  The “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment 
custody” by the county jail was not justified by the pending detainer request 
by ICE.
191
  A similar ruling was given by the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in Morales v. Chadbourne,
192
 where the court found a twenty-four-
hour imprisonment pursuant to an ICE detainer a violation of the arrestee’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.
193
  The court stated that, absent a warrant, 
immigration officers have the faculty to arrest an alien “only if they have 
‘reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation 
                                                     
183. 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014). 
184. See id. at 643, 645. 
185. Id. at 643. 
186. Id. 
187. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 
3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1, 9, 11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).  A well-
established principle is that “[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, 
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”  United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
188. No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014). 
189. See id. at *11.  “Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a . . . 
restraining order and booked into the [county] [j]ail.”  Id. at *1.  According to its policy to 
report arrests of foreign-born persons “on a warrant or probable cause charge[s],” the jail 
notified ICE, and a detainer request was issued to the jail the following day.  Id.  In 
furtherance of ICE objectives, the jail also honors detainers “even if the underlying state 
criminal charges are resolved or bail is posted.”  Id. at *2.  Arrested on March 14, 2012, 
“Miranda-Olivares remained in custody . . . on . . . state charges until March 29, 2012,” but 
due to the ICE detainer, remained in custody until the following day, when picked up by DHS 
agents.  Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2–3. 
190. Id. at *9. 
191. Id. 
192. 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015). 
193. See id. at 211, 218, 223. 
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of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a 
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.’”194  The court further affirmed that 
reason to believe must be effectively considered equal to probable cause for 
the arrest, and that arrests made in its absence are in violation of Fourth 
Amendment principles.
195
  The plethora of lawsuits and consequential 
liability for Fourth Amendment violations are some of the reasons why cities 
and counties across the United States enact policies restricting compliance 
with ICE detainers.
196
 
Given the extensive jurisprudence on the unconstitutionality of 
detainer requests, which often lead to prolonged arrest periods for aliens 
absent probable cause, it becomes difficult to not justify the decision of local 
jurisdictions to refuse compliance to ICE detainers, which is likely a mere 
exercise of constitutional police powers.
197
 
b. Police Powers 
The so-called police powers are the states’ reserved constitutional 
authority under the Tenth Amendment to promote health, safety, and welfare 
of their residents.
198
  In Sligh v. Kirkwood,
199
 the Supreme Court of the 
United States affirmed that: 
The police power, in its broadest sense, includes all legislation and 
almost every function of civil government.  It is not subject to 
definite limitations, but [it] is coextensive with the necessities of 
the case and the safeguards of public interest.  It embraces 
regulations designed to promote public convenience or the general 
prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to 
promote the public safety or the public health.
200
 
Sanctuary policies reflect determination by states and local 
jurisdiction to exercise their judgment and promote health and safety of their 
                                                     
194. Id. at 216 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(a)(2) (2012)). 
195. Id. (citing Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 
721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). 
196. See Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to 
Hold Noncitizens for Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014, at A10. 
197. See Morales, 793 F.3d at 211–12; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., 
No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Medina, supra 
note 196. 
198. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59 
(1915). 
199. 237 U.S. 52 (1915). 
200. Id. at 59 (citations omitted). 
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residents.
201
  It is undisputed that “[t]he promotion of safety of persons and 
property is . . . at the core of the [s]tate’s police power.”202  United States v. 
Morrison
203
 affirms the long recognized principle that states possess a unique 
domain of authority over many functions of government.
204
  In fact, the 
Founders “ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by 
governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal 
bureaucracy.”205  Moreover, the choice to limit direct involvement in the 
enforcement of federal immigration policies is dictated by practical issues of 
community management, and is strongly supported by those charged with 
patrolling the community to ensure its safety.
206
  The Executive Order 
arguably infringes upon the discretion of local law enforcement authorities to 
make the policy judgments deemed necessary, replacing them with federal 
preferences.
207
  Law enforcement agencies throughout the country have 
shown support for sanctuary policies.
208
  Police chiefs and sheriffs, together 
with the Major Cities Chiefs Association, sustain that using local law 
                                                     
201. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1. 
202. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976). 
203. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
204. Id. at 618. 
205. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 262 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed., 
2009)).  The issue of accountability is a fundamental factor in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court.  Id. at 2592, 2602.  “Accountability is considered a particularly powerful 
argument against commandeering . . . .”  Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009); cf. New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (affirming that “where the federal government directs the [s]tates to 
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the 
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral 
ramifications of their decision[s].”). 
206. Pham, supra note 48, at 981. 
207. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fe. Reg. 8799, 8799-801 (Jan. 25, 2017); 
Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties-Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo 
Alto, Fremont, Marin, Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose, 
Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at 5, 10–11, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO 
(N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & 
Counties].  The argument is based on the Supreme Court’s assertion that the wide discretion 
given to the states to determine what is necessary—and what is not—must be respected.  East 
N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945). 
208. See Chuck Wexler, Police Chiefs Across the Country Support Sanctuary 
Cities Because They Keep Crime Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wexler-sanctuary-cities-immigration-crime-
20170306-story.html. 
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enforcement agents to further federal immigration laws would be a detriment 
to the safety of local communities.
209
 
Police apprehension towards local officers enforcing federal 
immigration laws is based upon multiple reasons.
210
  First, enforcement of 
immigration laws risks “[u]ndermin[ing] [the] [t]rust and [c]ooperation of 
[i]mmigrant [c]ommunities.”211  Studies have shown that a majority of chiefs 
and sheriffs—from both red and blue states—consider maintaining high 
levels of trust with the immigrant communities towards police officers a 
priority.
212
  If any sort of trust is lacking, a reasonable consequence to the 
legitimate fear for deportation, the process of community policing is halted, 
hindering the community.
213
  Second, “budgets and resources of local police 
agencies” are limited when compared to the economic power of the federal 
government—making the use of local officers to implement federal 
immigration laws financially burdensome for local communities.
214
  Third, 
federal immigration laws present complicated policies, both on the civil and 
criminal side of the law, and local agents are not necessarily fit to enforce 
them.
215
  Fourth, local police lack the degree of authority that federal agents 
can exercise when enforcing immigration laws, thus increasing the level of 
difficulty for local agents to discern whether a particular violation results in 
criminal charges or mere civil violations.
216
  Finally, participation of local 
police officers in the enforcement of immigration laws would possibly 
expose local agencies to civil litigation and liability.
217
  “By upending the 
independent judgment of local officials responsible for ‘the suppression of 
                                                     
209. See Tom Jawetz, Trump’s Deportation Rules Will Make America Unsafe 
Again, FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.fortune.com/2017/02/24/donald-trump-public-
safety-executive-order-deportation-immigration-illegal-undocumented/. 
210. See CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGRATION 
COMM., M.C.C. NINE (9) POINT POSITION STATEMENT: ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS 
BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 5–8 (2006). 
211. Id. at 5. 
212. See id. at 5–6; Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Giving Sanctuary to 
Undocumented Immigrants Doesn’t Threaten Public Safety—It Increases It, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 
2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sanctuary-cities-trump-
20170202-story.html. 
213. Amicus Brief of 34 Cities & Counties in Support of County of Santa 
Clara’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7–8, Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-
00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae 
California Cities & Counties—Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo Alto, Fremont, Marin, 
Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at 
5, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) 
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties]. 
214. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., supra note 210, at 6. 
215. See id. at 7. 
216. See id. at 7–8. 
217. Id. at 8. 
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violent crime and vindication of its victims,’ . . . the Executive Order 
intrudes upon a power reserved for the states and local governments, and 
threatens to undermine the mission of local law enforcement.”218 
Data analysis hints to a different reality than the one claimed by 
President Trump, and police departments across the country seem to agree 
with it.
219
  The data evidences that sanctuary jurisdictions present a lower 
average criminality level when compared to comparably sized non-sanctuary 
jurisdictions.
220
  Although numerically not impressive, researchers point out 
results that are statistically important, like lower crime and homicide rates.
221
  
Generally, however, production of conflicting studies and interpretation of 
data render an objective analysis of the issue all but simple.
222
  Taking 
Phoenix, Arizona as an example, data shows that crime rates fell by 
impressive margins following the city renouncing its sanctuary status.
223
  A 
six-year study from the University of California, Riverside found levels of 
violent crimes to be “slightly higher in sanctuary cities.”224  Independent 
from the crime rates analysis, it is important to highlight that one of the main 
fears of pro-sanctuary police departments across the country—decrease in 
crime reports resulting from the distrust towards law enforcement and 
immigration agents in non-sanctuary jurisdictions—is legitimate.225  Crime 
reports in Latino communities throughout the United States are decreasing, 
thus making police officers’ investigating jobs harder while simultaneously 
increasing the amount of silent victims.
226
  Therefore, although conflicting 
data exists, it is indisputably within the interest, right, and power of local 
                                                     
218. Amicus Brief, supra note 213, at 8 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)). 
219. See Christopher Ingraham, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities Are Hotbeds of 
Crime.  Data Say the Opposite., CHI. TRIB.: NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-sanctuary-city-crime-data-
20170127-story.html. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
222. See William Lajeunesse, Crime Drops in Phoenix After City Drops 
Sanctuary City Status, Former Cops Say, FOX NEWS: POL. (June 30, 2017), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/06/30/crime-drops-in-phoenix-after-city-drops-
sanctuary-city-status-former-cops-say.html. 
223. See id. 
224. Id. 
225. See James Queally, Latinos Are Reporting Fewer Sexual Assaults Amid a 
Climate of Fear in Immigrant Communities, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES: LOCAL (Mar. 21, 2017, 
8:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-immigrant-crime-reporting-drops-
20170321-story.html. 
226. See id. 
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jurisdictions to foster participation of all members of the community when it 
comes to crime reporting and cooperation.
227
 
 
2. Are Sanctuary Policies Targeted by the Executive Order Preempted 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1373? 
 
As confirmed by the Attorney General, the intent of the Executive 
Order is to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1373 against jurisdictions deemed to be in 
violation of the language of the statute.
228
  However, it is not clear whether 
by implementing their policies, sanctuary jurisdictions are in violation of the 
statute, thus triggering federal preemption.
229
  The relationship between 
federal and state law in case of a conflict is regulated by the preemption 
doctrine, which provides the superiority of federal law over state law.
230
  A 
classical analysis of preemption principles generally considers whether the 
language of the “federal law expressly precludes state and local governments 
from passing such a law.”231  De Canas v. Bica232 developed a similar 
analysis to determine whether state or local policies are preempted.
233
  The 
three-prong analysis first considers “whether the law is attempting to 
regulate immigration;” second, whether it occupies “a field [generally] 
occupied by Congress;” and third, whether it is in conflict with federal 
law.
234
  The first and second prongs are easily discernible because they “are 
unique to immigration law.”235  It is a widely recognized principle that the 
power to regulate immigration matters is retained by the federal 
government.
236
  The third prong is based upon the Supremacy Clause.
237
 
                                                     
227. See Jawetz, supra note 209. 
228. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2; see 
also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Maria Sacchetti & Sari Horwitz, Sessions Memo Defines 
Sanctuary Cities — and Hints That the Definition May Widen, WASH. POST: SOC. ISSUE (May 
22, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/sessions-memo-defines-
sanctuary-cities--and-hints-that-the-definition-may-widen/2017/05/22/68f8c9ec-3f1a-11e7-
9869-bac8b44829a_story. 
229. See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2, 
2 n.7; Yee & Ruiz, supra note 147. 
230. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771 
(1994). 
231. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies & 
Immigration Federalism:  A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1698 (2009). 
232. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
233. See id. at 356–63; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699. 
234. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1698–99; see also De Canas, 
424 U.S. at 35463. 
235. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699. 
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  “The Congress shall have [the] [p]ower . . . 
[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .”  Id. 
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The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 primarily targets only one of the 
three scholarly-developed categories of sanctuary policies namely the so-
called don’t tell policies.238  Summing up the language of the statute 
analyzed in Part II of this Comment, the statute “prohibits government 
entities, agencies, officials, and persons from preventing the voluntary 
reporting of a person’s immigration status by any governmental entity, 
officials, or employees to federal immigration authority.”239  Sanctuary 
policies have been enacted by jurisdictions throughout the country, however, 
did not include, for the most part, any language prohibiting communications 
between local and federal authorities.
240
  For example, Santa Clara 
authorities prohibit employees from using County resources to transmit any 
information to federal agencies that was collected while providing services to 
the community.
241
  Santa Clara further prohibits employees from initiating 
inquiries or enforcement actions based upon the actual or suspected 
immigration status of the individual, national origin, race, ethnicity, or 
English-speaking ability.
242
  Another example of a don’t ask policy is given 
by the City of Philadelphia, where police officers are required “not [to] ask 
about the documentation status of people they encounter,” although 
cooperation with federal agencies in “anti-terrorism and drug trafficking task 
forces” is encouraged.243  New Orleans also has similar policies.244  The New 
Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) forbids officers from initiating 
investigations or taking law enforcement actions due to immigration status, 
“including the initiation of a stop, an apprehension, [or] arrest,” a policy 
                                                                                                                             
237. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 This Constitution, and the [l]aws of the United States which shall be made in 
[p]ursuance thereof; and all [t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the [a]uthority of 
the United States shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every state shall 
be bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id. 
238. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700, 1704; see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373 (1996). 
239. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700. 
240. See id. at 1692–93; CITY OF PHILA., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, IMMIGRATION 
& SANCTUARY CITIES:  CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ACTION GUIDE (2017), 
http://beta.phila.gov/posts/office-of-immigrant-affairs/2017-02-24-immigration-sanctuary-
cities-city-of-philadelphia-action-guide/. 
241. See Bd. of Supervisors of the Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010). 
242. Id.; see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2015).  
Reasonable suspicion is required for police officers to stop individuals and inquire about 
“them regarding their immigration status.”  Morales, 793 F.3d at 215. 
243. CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. 
244. See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL CH. 41.6.1, 
IMMIGRATION STATUS 1 (2016). 
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fitting the parameters of so-called don’t enforce policies.245  The NOPD also 
explicitly states that the activities of police officers must be in compliance 
with the statutory requirements, and that communications between federal 
and local law enforcement agents are welcomed.
246
  Jurisdictions 
implementing don’t ask policies also respect judicial doctrines against brief 
stops—absent reasonable suspicion—of alien individuals for inquiries on the 
alien’s immigration status.247  Detention to inquire about an individual’s 
immigration status has in fact been ruled a seizure implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.
248
  Further, “no exception to the Tenth Amendment” permits 
federal mandates to the states to disclose private information of residents 
gathered by the exercise of sovereign capacity.
249
  The principle is embedded 
in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reno v. Condon,250 allowing federal 
requirements of information sharing only when not requiring states “to enact 
any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the 
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”251 
Nothing within the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 can be read to 
preempt jurisdictions from prohibiting the use of local funds to help federal 
agencies in enforcing immigration laws.
252
  Further, the statute does not 
proscribe the implementation of policies designed to prevent police officers 
from proactively searching for information that would not be promptly or 
inevitably available to them.
253
  In fact, although an argument could be 
presented that the language of the statute impliedly preempts proscriptions of 
information-gathering activities by police officers, it appears that the statute 
was designed to foster communication between agencies of already available 
information.
254
  It is well established that: 
                                                     
245. Id.; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.  Multiple jurisdictions across the 
country implemented policies presenting the same characteristics.  Gulasekaram & Villazor, 
supra note 231, at 1694. 
246. See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, supra note 244, at 1, 3. 
247. CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; Pham, 
supra note 48, at 982. 
248. Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216–17 (1984)). 
249. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 5; see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
250. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
251. Id. at 151; Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 
143, at 5. 
252. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996). 
253. See id. 
254. See id.; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703. 
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal 
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:  
[C]onflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; 
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference.  But none 
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Congress, in passing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, opted not to require state 
and local governments to ask for an individual’s immigration 
status or mandate them to report such status to immigration 
officials.  Congress was well aware of the sanctuary movement 
when it passed this law yet it chose not to mandate the gathering or 
reporting of information.
255
 
Realistically, the statute only prohibits jurisdictions from imposing 
restrictions on the sharing of collected information.
256
  An argument under 
the Supremacy Clause would likely fail, because no inconsistency with the 
language of the statute is created by sanctuary policies.
257
  Courts may 
conclude, and many scholars have agreed, that “sanctuary policies [are] not 
[in] violat[ion] [of] 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”258 
Albeit this interpretation of the statute is probable, some jurisdictions 
opted to accept the request of the federal government and vowed to strictly 
implement the statute.
259
  Under the pressure of the DOJ, the Mayor of 
Miami-Dade County ordered jails to comply with detainer requests from 
federal officials—a decision later upheld by the county commission.260 
V. FLORIDA LOCALITIES 
The State of Florida is no stranger to the debate around sanctuary 
jurisdictions and possible defunding from the federal government.
261
  As a 
final destination to many immigrants, both legal and illegal, Florida contains 
                                                                                                                             
of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive 
constitutional yardstick. 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
255. Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703 (emphasis in original). 
256. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b). 
257. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Bd. of Supervisors of the 
Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010).  But see Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra 
note 102, at 10–12. 
258. Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2 
(emphasis in original); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 
259. See Skyler Swisher, Crackdown on ‘Sanctuary’ Counties by Trump Spurs 
Policy Change in Miami-Dade, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2017, at B3; Elise Foley, 
Miami-Dade Will Abandon ‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Policies After Trump Order, Mayor 
Says, HUFFPOST: POL. (Jan. 26, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miami-
dade-sanctuary-city_us_588a887ee4b0230ce61b0476. 
260. See Swisher, supra note 259; Foley, supra note 259; Alan Gomez, Miami-
Dade Commission Votes to End County’s ‘Sanctuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017, 
8:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-county-
grapples-sanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/. 
261. Foley, supra note 259; Swisher, supra note 259. 
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one of the highest foreign-born populations in the country.
262
  In the twenty-
five year span between 1990 and 2015, the percentage of foreign-born 
residents of Florida grew from 12.9% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2015.
263
  
According to the 2015 census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
American Community Survey, over four million Florida residents are foreign 
born.
264
  Among them, 75.1% were born in Latin America.
265
  Online data 
sources show that Florida has, within its territory, about two dozen 
jurisdictions with sanctuary policies including Broward County, Palm Beach 
County, and Miami Beach.
266
  However, many jurisdictions disagree with the 
label of sanctuary that has been given to them.
267
  Both Broward County and 
Palm Beach County affirmed their compliance with federal immigration 
laws.
268
  Nevertheless, actions taken by the Sheriff’s Department in both 
counties may be considered otherwise.
269
  Broward County Sheriff’s Office 
stopped honoring ICE detainers after courts ruled them unconstitutional in 
2014.
270
  Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office also enforces similar detainer 
procedures.
271
  Moreover, in an attempt to appease their large immigrant 
communities, Broward County passed a resolution defining itself as “an 
inclusive county which welcomes, celebrates, and offers refuge to all 
residents and visitors irrespective of race, religion, ethnicity, or national 
                                                     
262. See State Immigration Data Profiles: California, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/CA (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/FL (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: New York, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/NY (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Texas, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/TX (last visited Dec. 
31, 2017). 
263. State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. See Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA, 
OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017). 
267. See Swisher, supra note 259. 
268. See id. 
269. See Rebecca Sharpless, Dade, Broward Lead the Way, MIAMI HERALD 
(July 24, 2014, 6:09 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article1976943.html. 
270. Larry Barszewski, Broward Seeks Sanctuary from ‘Sanctuary’ Label, SUN 
SENTINAL: BROWARD POL. (Mar. 14, 2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/local/broward/broward-politics-blog/fl-blog-broward-sanctuary-city-20170314-
story.html. 
271. See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Report Shows Law Enforcement 
Agencies in at Least 30 Florida Counties Would be Punished by Proposed Anti-Immigrant 
Law (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/report-shows-law-enforcement-
agencies-least-30-florida-counties-would-be-punished. 
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origin.”272  Parallel efforts were also made by the City of West Palm Beach, 
which declared itself “a welcoming city for immigrants.”273  Although non-
compliance with ICE detainers is among the types of conduct that the 
Executive Order is trying to eliminate, it is not established whether friendly 
relationships with immigrant communities risk labeling Florida jurisdictions 
as sanctuaries.
274
  However, one thing is clear:  Some degree of confusion 
exists regarding the conduct targeted by the Executive Order and the possible 
consequences for non-complying jurisdictions.
275
 
Florida State Legislators, however, are trying to solve some of the 
issues and to untie the Gordian Knot.
276
  The Florida House of 
Representatives approved a bill “prohibiting local law enforcement from 
resisting compliance with federal immigration laws and [detainer] requests” 
from ICE.
277
  Although the bill will unlikely become law—because no 
discussion has occurred yet on the floor of the Senate—legislators are 
showing anxiety regarding the possible consequences of the Executive 
Order.
278
  However, the Florida House of Representatives is not the first 
legislating body within state boundaries to adopt policies in compliance with 
federal requests.
279
 
                                                     
272. Broward Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 2017–030, § 1 (2017); Chris Persaud, 
Six Federal Grants to South Florida That Trump Could Threaten Under Sanctuary Cities 
Order, WLRN (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.wlrn.org/post/six-federal-grants-south-florida-
trump-could-threaten-under-sanctuary-cities-order. 
273. See Peter Haden, West Palm Beach Declares Itself ‘Welcoming City’ for 
Immigrants, WGCU (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://news.wgcu.org/post/west-palm-beach-
declares-itself-welcoming-city-immigrants. 
274. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); 
Garrett Epps, Trump’s Sloppy, Unconstitutional Order on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
30, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trumps-sloppy-
unconstitutional-order-on-sanctuary-cities/514883/; Persaud, supra note 272. 
275. See Barszewski, supra note 270; Sacchetti & Horwitz, supra note 228. 
276. See Kristen M. Clark, Florida House Approves Ban—and Penalties—on 
‘Sanctuary’ Cities, MIAMI HERALD, (Apr. 28, 2017, 4:56 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article147453654.html. 
277. Id. 
278. Id.; see also Daniel Ducassi, Bill Cracking Down on ‘Sanctuary Cities’ 
Clears First Committee Stop, POLITICO: FLA. (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/03/bill-cracking-down-on-sanctuary-cities-
clears-first-committee-stop-110339.  The bill, later affirmed by the Florida House, compels 
state and local governments to support enforcement of federal immigration law, barring the 
creation and implementation of any law or practice hindering the operations of federal 
officers.  Ducassi, supra; see also Clark, supra note 276.  The bill is a response to judicial 
injunctions of the Executive Order, and bypasses constitutional challenges to the Executive 
Order through state action.  See Ducassi, supra. 
279. See Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor, Miami-Dade Cty., to 
Daniel Junior, Interim Dir., Corrections & Rehab. Dep’t (Jan. 26, 2017). 
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A. Miami-Dade County 
Miami-Dade is the only county in the United States where foreign-
born residents constitute the majority.
280
  According to the latest census data 
from the United States Census Bureau, 51.7% of Miami-Dade County’s 
population is foreign-born, with a heavy majority being of Hispanic or 
Latino heritage.
281
  Yet, on January 26, 2017, the day after President Trump 
signed the Executive Order, Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Gimenez 
announced his agreement with the new policies.
282
  The Mayor released a 
memorandum to all county jails, directing them to observe federal detainer 
requests.
283
  The memorandum stated that, “[i]n light of the provisions of the 
Executive Order, I direct . . . to honor all immigration detainer requests 
received from the Department of Homeland Security.  Miami-Dade County 
complies with federal law and intends to fully cooperate with the [F]ederal 
[G]overnment.”284  In an effort to avoid the label of sanctuary city, thus 
risking sanctions in the form of cuts in federal funding, Miami-Dade County 
Commissioners voted in favor of the mayoral policy.
285
  The decision 
reversed a previous county policy, approved in 2013, opposing detention as a 
result of detainer requests from federal agencies.
286
 
The 2013 policy created a two-fold threshold to allow detainers.
287
  
First, for the county to allow ICE detainers, the federal government had to 
agree to reimburse all costs associated with the detention—an agreement 
which had to be in writing.
288
  Second, once the reimbursement was agreed 
                                                     
280. See State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262; U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts: Miami-Dade County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/miamidadecountyflorida/POP060210 (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2017). 
281. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 280. 
282. Jonathan Levin, Miami’s Mayor Climbs Aboard the Trump Train, 
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 16, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/miami-s-mayor-climbs-aboard-the-
trump-train; Kate Samuelson, Miami-Dade Is No Longer a ‘Sanctuary’ for Undocumented 
Immigrants, TIME: MIAMI (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.time.com/4651518/miami-dade-mayor-
sanctuary-city-donald-trump/. 
283. Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez to Daniel Junior, supra note 279. 
284. Id. 
285. Patricia Mazzei & Douglas Hanks, Fearing Trump, Commission Drops 
Miami-Dade’s ‘Sanctuary’ Protections, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 17, 2017, 4:05 PM) 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article133413384.html. 
286. See id.; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Plans to Stop Paying for Federal 
Immigration Detentions, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:22 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1958627.html. 
287. See Letter from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU of Florida et al., to 
Miami-Dade Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 3–4 (Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with ACLU of Florida). 
288. Id. at 4. 
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upon, detainers would be implemented only against individuals charged or 
convicted of certain enumerated offenses—principally felonies.289  Although 
the Board of County Commissioners passed a resolution upholding the anti-
detainer policies in December of 2013, the tide changed quickly after 
President Trump signed the Executive Order, and a February vote by the 
same body reinstated full cooperation for detainers.
290
  The county’s 
decisions have already presented legal consequences.
291
 
1. Lacroix v. Junior 
On March 3, 2017, Judge Milton Hirsch of the Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County ruled the detention of James Lacroix, 
a Haitian national, unconstitutional.
292
  Judge Hirsch found the coercive 
conduct of ICE, pushing the Miami-Dade County jail to continue to 
incarcerate Lacroix, a violation of the Tenth Amendment.
293
  Questioning the 
constitutionality of the detainer, and denying the Miami-Dade County 
alleged sanctuary city status, Judge Hirsch affirmed that:  “[T]he issue raised 
. . . has nothing to do with affording sanctuary to those unlawfully in this 
country.  It has everything to do with the separation of powers between the 
state and federal governments as reflected in the Tenth Amendment to, and 
in the very structure of, the United States Constitution.”294 
The jail’s decision to comply with ICE’s demands to detain Lacroix 
is, in the words of Judge Hirsch, “a demand with which the local government 
is constitutionally prohibited from complying.”295  The beneficiaries of the 
                                                     
289. Id. 
290. See Alan Gomez, Miami-Dade Commission Votes to End County’s 
‘Sanctuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:27 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-county-grapples-
sanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285. 
291. See Elise Foley & Cristian Farias, Judge Rebukes Miami-Dade County for 
Appeasing Trump on ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, HUFFPOST: POL. (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miami-dade-sanctuary-
trump_us_58b9d325e4b05cf0f4008a46; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285. 
292. Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, 15, Lacroix v. Junior, 
No. F17-376, 2017 WL 1037453, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017); David Ovalle, Judge 
Shoots Down Miami-Dade Detention Policy Adopted to Follow Trump Deportation Order, 
MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 3, 2017, 10:06 AM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article136179733.html; 
Kalhan Rosenblatt, Miami-Dade’s Policy of Holding Inmates for ICE Is Unconstitutional:  
Florida Judge, NBC: NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/miami-s-policy-holding-inmates-ice-unconstitutional-florida-judge-n728786. 
293. See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9–11. 
294. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
295. Id. at 8.  “It might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise . . . to 
insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national 
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constitutional structure are the people, whose rights and liberties are 
protected through a strong-willed local government in opposition to a heavy-
handed federal government.
296
 
Judge Hirsch’s ruling lends way to the fact that, regardless of 
whether or not a jurisdiction is a sanctuary—and regardless of the fact that 
local agencies and officials support President Trump’s crackdown on 
immigration—there are constitutional rights afforded to every person in this 
country, legal or illegal, which simply cannot be infringed upon.
297
 
2. Creedle v. Gimenez 
Tenth Amendment violations, however, are not the only claims that 
have been raised against Miami-Dade County as a result of the new 
policies.
298
  The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Florida, in 
conjunction with the University of Miami School of Law’s Immigration 
Clinic, filed a federal suit against the county for violation of the Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.
299
  In Creedle v. Gimenez,
300
 
the action was filed on behalf of Garland Creedle, an American citizen 
voluntarily detained by Miami-Dade County in response to an ICE 
detainer.
301
  After being arrested on the evening of March 12, 2017, Creedle 
was fingerprinted by county correctional officials.
302
  After receiving an 
immigration detainer from ICE, correctional officers refused to release 
Creedle upon bond being posted.
303
  Although notified that Creedle was an 
American citizen by Creedle himself, county correctional officers did not 
release him until the next day.
304
 
The Fourth Amendment violation, alleged by the ACLU, is a direct 
result of the nature of the ICE detainers implemented by Miami-Dade.
305
  
                                                                                                                             
government, nowhere delegated or [e]ntrusted . . . to them by the Constitution.”  Id. (quoting 
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842)). 
296. See id. at 8–9. 
297. See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 14. 
298. See Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Citizen Detained by Mistake Sues Miami-
Dade Over Immigration Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/us/immigration-sanctuary-lawsuit-miami.html. 
299. Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief at 12, 15, Creedle v. 
Gimenez, No. 1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017); Dickerson, supra note 298. 
300. Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, Creedle v. Gimenez, No. 
1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017). 
301. Id. at 1. 
302. Id. at 9. 
303. Id. at 11. 
304. Id. at 1011. 
305. See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at 
1112. 
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Since detainers are issued by immigration officers, the procedure lacks the 
necessary “probable cause determination by a detached and neutral” 
magistrate.
306
  It is indeed only logical that an immigration officer, due to the 
basic nature of his position, can hardly be a neutral and detached 
adjudicator.
307
  For the alleged violations perpetrated against him, Creedle is 
seeking compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any additional 
equitable relief deemed appropriate by the court.
308
  The absence of probable 
cause, added to the often nonexistent presence of an arrest warrant, exposes 
Miami-Dade County and its correctional agencies to hypothetically infinite 
legal liability, with the costs taken on by taxpayers.
309
 
B. What Does Federal Defunding Mean for Florida Jurisdictions? 
Cities throughout the state risk losing “hundreds of millions of 
dollars” in federal funding if found not in compliance with the directives of 
the Executive Order.
310
  However, the exact amount will depend on the 
interpretation of the language of the Executive Order and the exact nature of 
the targeted grants.
311
  Summed together, the counties of Palm Beach, 
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe received a total of $565 million in grants 
from the federal government in 2016 alone.
312
  The funds are used for 
programs in different areas, from education and public health, to 
transportation and housing.
313
  Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract previous 
county policies regarding detainers is likely a response to the threat of losing 
hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding.
314
  In fact, “Miami-Dade 
County is due to receive $355 million” in federal government money that the 
county cannot afford to lose.
315
  In an effort to explain the rationale behind 
the choice made, Gimenez affirmed that losing federal funding to keep 
implementing restrictions on detainer requests is not worth the risk.
316
  And 
although Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract county policies is 
                                                     
306. Id. at 10, 12. 
307. Id. at 10. 
308. Id. at 14. 
309. Id. at 5, 7–8. 
310. Persaud, supra note 272. 
311. See id. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. See Serafin Gomez, Miami-Dade Mayor Orders Jails to Comply with 
Detention Requests After Trump’s ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, FOX NEWS: POL. (Jan. 27, 
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/27/miami-dade-mayor-orders-jails-to-
comply-with-detention-requests-after-trumps-sanctuary-city-crackdown.html; Sanchez et al., 
supra note 17. 
315. See Gomez, supra note 314. 
316. See Pazmino et al., supra note 60; Sanchez et al., supra note 17. 
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understandable under the circumstances, it is exactly the type of coerced 
reaction the Constitution protects against.
317
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judge William H. Orrick III of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California issued a court order granting a motion for 
nationwide injunction of section 9(a) of the Executive Order.
318
  After being 
requested to revisit the Order in light of the Attorney General’s 
memorandum clarifying the language of the Executive Order, Judge Orrick 
confirmed the injunction, leaving President Trump with a difficult task:  
Solve immigration problems and appease the electorate without infringing 
upon constitutional rights and principles.
319
  The power of states to 
implement and enforce their own laws is one of the cornerstones of 
American democracy.
320
  Compelling states, counties, municipalities, and 
other local jurisdictions into enforcing federal immigration laws threatens the 
system’s balance, and violates the Constitution so dear to most.321 
The independence of state and local jurisdictions has been 
established by the Founding Fathers in hopes of a new, better world, 
distinguishing itself from the crooked, corrupted, oppressive Motherland.
322
  
Centralization of power is a dangerous threat to democracy, and risks 
shifting constitutional balances to a direction of no return.
323
  The question 
that should be asked is whether we, as a democracy, prefer independent, 
empowered, knowledgeable, competent, engaged, and accountable local 
governments and representatives ruling over us, or a distant, centralized, 
controlling federal government.
324
  In promoting the ratification of the 
Constitution, James Madison affirmed that: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
[F]ederal [G]overnment are few and defined.  Those which are to 
remain in the State [G]overnments are numerous and indefinite.  
                                                     
317. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Sanchez et al., 
supra note 17. 
318. Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City & County of San 
Francisco’s Motions, supra note 97, at 1, 29–30. 
319. Id. at 25, 30; see also Dan Levine, Judge Refuses to Remove Block on 
Trump Sanctuary City Order, REUTERS: POL. (July 20, 2017, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ruling-idUSKBN1A531K. 
320. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
321. See id. at 920–21. 
322. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012); 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 920–21. 
323. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29. 
324. See id. 
152
Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1 3
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 42, Issue 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
2017] A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE 137 
The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as 
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce . . . .  The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, 
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State.
325
 
The right answer may have indeed been given by James Madison in 
his promotion of the Constitution, on January 26, 1788.
326
  Although an 
injunction is currently in place, there still exists a real possibility that the 
Attorney General, Secretary of State, and President Trump may enforce the 
stated intent of the Executive Order to the detriment of states and localities 
around the country, including within Florida.
327
  “[H]undreds of millions of 
dollars” in federal grants could be taken away, to the disadvantage of the 
people in communities that rely upon the funding.
328
  Clarification—by the 
courts or the President himself—of the federal funds involved and the 
sanctuary jurisdictions that will be impacted needs to be made clear, so that 
states can make rational and knowledgeable decisions as to whether to 
comply with the Executive Order.
329
 
                                                     
325. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 205, at 262 (James Madison). 
326. See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Project 
Gutenberg ed.). 
327. See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at 1; 
Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9; Levine, supra note 319. 
328. See Persaud, supra note 272. 
329. See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1, 
3. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Doe v. 
State
1
 that a judicial officer must be physically present at hearings that 
involuntarily commit individuals to mental health facilities pursuant to 
section 394.467 of the 2016 Florida Statutes,
2
 otherwise known as the Baker 
Act.
3
  Fifteen mental health patients brought this case through their public 
defenders in response to an email sent on behalf of a judge and magistrate 
from Lee County, Florida, announcing that Baker Act hearings would be 
held by teleconference from the courthouse, instead of in-person.
4
 
Patient advocates and patients argued that holding Baker Act 
hearings through teleconferences created a myriad of problems that violated 
                                                 
* Clarisa Mondéjar earned her bachelor’s degree at the University of 
Chicago, her master’s degree at the University of Miami, and continued her graduate studies 
as a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, before becoming a Juris 
Doctoral Candidate at Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law.  
Clarisa would like to thank her mother for always providing her with constant guidance and 
support.  Clarisa also thanks her best friend, who inspired her to choose this topic and was 
present in spirit as she wrote during the summer months of 2017.  Lastly, Clarisa would like to 
express her gratitude to all Nova Law Review members for their time, effort, and dedication 
while editing this Comment. 
1. 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017). 
2. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016).  Throughout this paper, this statute will be 
referred to as (“The Baker Act”) for uniformity. 
3. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1022, 1032. 
4. Id. at 1023. 
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patients’ procedural and substantive due process rights.5  These violations 
would affect the fairness of these hearings and could create, or perpetuate, 
abuses sought to be remedied by costly reforms that had been implemented 
by the legislature since the late 1990s.
6
  Adversely, the respondents, judges, 
and court personnel in favor of holding Baker Acts via teleconferences 
argued that involuntary commitment is a civil process—as opposed to a 
criminal process—which means that “no rule, statute, or constitutional 
prohibition” exists banning the use of teleconferences in Baker Act 
hearings.
7
  Respondents also argued that trial court judges had the discretion 
to administer hearings, as they feel most appropriate and effective in the 
absence of an express legal right or constitutional prohibition.
8
  The 
respondents claimed—given the funding limitations of an already indebted 
system—only conducting in-person Baker Act hearings was excessively 
arduous, inefficient, and hindered patients’ treatment and reintroduction into 
society.
9
  The use of teleconferences in Baker Act proceedings provides a 
judge to work within a failing mental health reform system by limiting costs, 
lessening wait time, improving services to the community, and increasing 
efficiency in the rehabilitation and treatment of mental health patients.
10
 
This Comment will examine the public policy and historical 
development of the Baker Act,
11
 the debate over the Act’s constitutionality, 
practicability, and the cost-benefits of the Baker Act’s community-based 
treatment programs for the mentally ill.
12
  This Comment will also examine 
calls to reform the Baker Act and the effectiveness of those reforms.
13
  Part 
IV will analyze the practical and procedural repercussions of the holding in 
Doe v. State that prohibited the use of teleconferencing in Baker Act 
hearings.
14
  Finally, this Comment will conclude with recommendations that 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the judges’ concerns within an underfunded, 
short-sighted, reactionary—rather than proactive—mental health care 
system.
15
 
                                                 
5. Id. at 1026. 
6. See infra Parts IV–V. 
7. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, 4, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC16-
1852). 
8. Id. at 2. 
9. See id. at 9, 20. 
10. Id. at 9–10, 14–15. 
11. See infra Part I. 
12. See infra Parts I–II. 
13. See infra Parts II–III. 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. See infra Part V. 
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A. The Public Policy Behind the Baker Act 
The Baker Act was named after State Representative Maxine Baker, 
who served as chairperson on the House Committee on Mental Health in the 
1960s and into the early 1970s.
16
  The Florida Legislature passed the act into 
law as the Florida Mental Health Act in 1971.
17
  The Act was an overhaul 
revision of the standing mental health laws that had been in existence for 
ninety-seven years.
18
  The Baker Act came of age when government officials 
began to consider patients’ civil rights and protect patients’ rights, while also 
submitting to the necessity and authority of states’ parens patriae.19  The 
intent was to provide mental health patients with the choice to voluntarily 
seek treatment and to provide them with their constitutional rights to liberty 
and due process.
20
 
Before the Baker Act passed, the statutes governing mental illness 
could place a patient into an institution for an undetermined amount of 
time.
21
  Patients could easily be institutionalized into a state hospital 
arbitrarily if “three people signed affidavits and secured the approval of a 
county judge.”22  Children could be placed with adults in these institutions, 
hospitals could request and require payments from the friends or families of 
the patients, and patients were limited to corresponding with only one person 
while institutionalized.
23
 
                                                 
16. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, HISTORY OF THE BAKER ACT: IT’S DEVELOPMENT & INTENT 1 (2002), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/histba.pdf; see also Jim Abbott, 
Maxine E. Baker, Originator of State’s Baker Act, Dies, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Feb. 1, 
1994, at C3; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY, 
2014 BAKER ACT USER REFERENCE GUIDE:  THE FLA. MENTAL HEALTH ACT i, ix, 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/BakerActManual.pdf. 
17. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
18. Id. 
19. See id.; Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines parens patriae as the “state in its capacity as provider of 
protection to those unable to care for themselves.”  Parens Patriae, supra. 
20. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1; see also MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459) 
(explaining that patients must be accorded individual dignity, and it provides that “[a] person 
who is receiving treatment for mental illness shall not be deprived of any constitutional 
rights.”). 
21. STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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Emblematic of the deprivations and abuses of the mental health 
system in Florida before the Baker Act, is the United States Supreme Court 
decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.24  Respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, 
brought his original action against J.B. O’Connor, the superintendent of the 
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in 1957.
25
  Donaldson was 
institutionalized by his father, who believed he was suffering from 
delusions.
26
  After a court proceeding in Pinellas County, Donaldson was 
confined for fifteen years for care, maintenance, and treatment against his 
will after he “was found to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.”27  
Throughout the fifteen years, Donaldson repeatedly demanded his release 
without success.
28
  While the superintendent denied Donaldson’s demands 
and claimed it was because he was a danger to society, Donaldson stated that 
the hospital was not providing him treatment for his illness.
29
  Testimony at 
the trial court level provided no evidence that Donaldson posed a danger to 
others while he was confined.
30
  Donaldson never showed he was suicidal or 
thought of committing an injury against himself.
31
  Further, Donaldson’s 
demands for relief were supported by responsible individuals who were 
willing to care for him and help him after his release.
32
  Donaldson’s college 
classmate, John Lembcke, wrote the superintendent requesting Donaldson’s 
release, and stated he would take care of the patient, but was refused.
33
  Even 
a representative of the Helping Hands, a halfway house, wrote on behalf of 
Donaldson in 1963 and said they would take on his care upon release.
34
  The 
Supreme Court stated that, at the trial level, “[t]he evidence showed that 
Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care, 
not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.”35  
“O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as milieu therapy,” which the 
                                                 
24. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
25. Id. at 564. 
26. Id. at 565. 
27. Id. at 565–66.  The Mayo Clinic defines paranoid schizophrenia as “a 
severe mental disorder in which people interpret reality abnormally.”  Schizophrenia, MAYO 
CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/schizophrenia/home/ovc-
20253194?p=1 (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).  “Schizophrenia may result in some combination 
of hallucinations, delusions, and extremely disordered thinking and behavior that impairs daily 
functioning, and can be disabling.”  Id.  “Schizophrenia is a chronic condition, requiring 
lifelong treatment.”  Id. 
28. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 565, 567–68. 
29. Id. at 565. 
30. Id. at 568. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 569. 
33. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 569. 
34. Id. at 568. 
35. Id. at 569. 
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hospital staff later described as a polite way of describing Donaldson’s 
unstructured confinement within the hospital.
36
  Hospital staff confirmed that 
his treatment consisted of being kept in a large room with sixty other 
patients, including many who were criminally committed.
37
 
B. The Historical and Systematic Overhaul of the Mental Health 
System:  Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill 
As previously mentioned, the Baker Act was a product of an 
evolving philosophy regarding the treatment of the mentally ill.
38
  Ninety-
seven years came and went where mentally ill patients were locked up in 
hospitals and watched over, as described in Donaldson’s case.39  Patients 
who were perhaps arbitrarily institutionalized by friends, family, or doctors 
could be placed with other patients who were ostensibly ill and those who 
were criminally and homicidally insane.
40
  The mentally ill were not 
considered patients who could be rehabilitated.
41
  Individualized treatment 
with a goal of recovery was overlooked and, instead, public safety was 
prioritized.
42
 
Deinstitutionalization was introduced in the mid-1950s as a response 
to an outcry by mental health advocates and politicians; they argued that 
patients’ civil rights were being violated and that the system was both 
ineffective and a heavy cost burden on the federal and state governments.
43
  
The primary goal of deinstitutionalization was to move treatment out of 
commitments in hospitals and provide treatment through community-based 
outpatient treatment centers.
44
  This movement gained steam because state 
mental hospitals were extremely underfunded, outdated, and excessively 
crowded.
45
  The Baker Act encourages patients to voluntarily admit 
                                                 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1, 3. 
39. See id. at 1. 
40. See Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs:  Administering a 
Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2405 (2000); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T 
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
41. Cristina Bianchi, America’s Mental Health System:  Closing the Revolving 
Door Between Hospitals, Correctional Facilities & the Streets, 28 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 99, 
102 (2015). 
42. See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2402. 
43. Steven Strang, Note, Assisted Outpatient Treatment in Ohio:  Is Jason’s 
Law Life-Saving Legislation or a Rash Response?, 19 HEALTH MATRIX:  J.L. MED. 247, 250–
51 (2009); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–03. 
44. Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 250–51. 
45. Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2407; Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
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themselves into psychiatric care if they are competent, but also allows 
individuals to be involuntarily committed and examined if specific criteria 
are met.
46
  The revolution of new medications and newly created monetary 
incentives by the federal government also promoted this shift.
47
 
In 1955, Smith, Kline, and French Laboratories developed the first 
antipsychotic medication to land on the market, Thorazine.
48
  Before the 
introduction of Thorazine, the treatment of diseases, “such as schizophrenia, 
[was] long-term confinement” because no medication proved effective.49  
Thorazine led to mentally ill patients being prone to less violent episodes 
because it relieved mental health symptoms, such as psychosis, delusion, 
paranoia, hallucinations, and irritability.
50
  Mentally ill patients were now 
considered capable of being reintroduced and integrated into society because 
there was a possibility they could function within their communities.
51
  In 
that year, an estimated 560,000 mentally ill patients from state-run hospitals 
were released with no follow-up care provided.
52
  These new medicines, 
coupled with the political environment of the 1960s and its specific focus on 
civil rights, provided patients a voice.
53
  Concerns grew throughout the 
mental health community that patients’ rights to seek and refuse treatment 
were being violated.
54
 
But the most effective and influential push away from 
institutionalization of mental health patients towards deinstitutionalization 
came in 1965.
55
  The federal government began Medicaid in 1965 and 
hospitals could receive payments from patients who had Medicaid.
56
  
However, hospitals realized that discharging mentally ill patients had 
monetary benefits because patients institutionalized in state psychiatric 
                                                 
46. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, BAKER ACT INVOLUNTARY EXAMINATION: 
CRITERIA, PROCESSES AND TIMEFRAMES 1 (2002), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/MentalHealth/laws/bainvex.pdf. 
47. See Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103–04; Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406; 
Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
48. Strang, supra note 43, at 250. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 250–51. 
52. Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103. 
53. See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
54. Strang, supra note 43, at 251. 
55. See Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s 
Law:  New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1181, 1184–85 (2001) (explaining that Thorazine is also known as chlorpromazine); Bianchi, 
supra note 41, at 103–04; Candice T. Player, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment:  The Limits 
of Prevention, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 168 (2015). 
56. See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1184–85. 
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hospitals were excluded from the Medicaid payment system.
57
  This was not 
an accidental outcome of the changes made to mental health laws and its 
funding made by the legislature; excluding mentally ill patients from the 
Medicaid payment system was done to shift the burden and costs of 
individualized medical care for patients from the federal government to the 
individual states.
58
  By discharging patients out of state hospitals and into 
community-based treatment programs, the states were able to receive 
Medicaid reimbursements.
59
 
C. The Supreme Court’s Historical Declarations Regarding the 
Constitutionality of the Baker Act and the Current Law 
Florida does not specifically prohibit the use of teleconferencing to 
conduct Baker Act hearings.
60
  However, the use of teleconferences during 
these proceedings arguably works in direct opposition to case law precedent 
that aims to ensure that the mentally ill are provided their constitutional right 
of liberty when not dangerous to themselves or others.
61
  In order to commit 
an individual under the Baker Act to a state mental health facility, the State 
must prove specific criteria.
62
  When met, this criteria shows that the 
                                                 
57. Id. 
58. See id. 
59. E. Fuller Torrey, Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence:  
Way of Life for Almost Half of Americans with Untreated Schizophrenia and Bipolar, MENTAL 
ILLNESS POL’Y ORG., http://www.mentalillnesspolicy.org/consequences/consequences-2.html 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 104 n.38. 
60. See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)(2) (2016); Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 
157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017); Brief for the Chief 
Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, 
at 5. 
61. FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT 
PLACEMENT 9 (2008), 
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/involinpplac0809.pdf; cf. In re 
Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977). 
62. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1).  To commit a patient involuntarily into inpatient 
mental health facilities, the finding of the court must meet the following criteria by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
(a)  He or she has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness: 
1.a.  He or she has refused voluntary inpatient placement for treatment after 
sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of inpatient 
placement for treatment; or 
b.  He or she is unable to determine for himself or herself whether inpatient 
placement is necessary; and 
2.a.  He or she is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and 
responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without 
treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself, 
and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his 
or her well-being; or 
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individual is incapable of surviving alone, or that there is significant cause to 
believe that the individual would inflict serious bodily harm upon himself, 
and all less restrictive means and treatment alternatives were judged 
inappropriate.
63
  This is because once the patient is involuntarily committed, 
he or she is deprived of his or her liberty as provided by the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution.
64
 
D. The 1970s:  Establishing a “Clear and Convincing Evidence” 
Standard to Involuntarily Commit Patients 
In the 1970s, Florida courts were preoccupied with determining the 
burden of proof necessary to involuntarily commit a mentally ill patient and 
were also concerned with validating the constitutionality of depriving private 
citizens of their liberty while they were in such vulnerable health states.
65
  A 
patient can be involuntarily committed through a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence that they meet the requirements as set forth in the Baker 
Act.
66
  In 1977, in In re Beverly,
67
 the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
given that the standard of proof of civil commitment hearings was clear and 
convincing evidence, the Baker Act was not unconstitutionally overbroad or 
vague, as long as all the elements of the Baker Act were met by the burden of 
proof described by the court.
68
  Strict adherence to the rules was imperative 
given the serious nature of the deprivation of liberty.
69
  The balance between 
state interests and the individual’s interest70 must be constantly evaluated and 
                                                                                                                   
b.  There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious 
bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, 
or threatening such harm; and 
(b)  All available less restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an 
opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to be 
inappropriate. 
Id. 
63. Id. 
64. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1); Brief 
for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
supra note 7, at 4; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & 
POLICY, supra note 16, at ix. 
65. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 488–90 (Fla. 1977); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T 
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1. 
66. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a)–(b). 
67. 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977). 
68. See id. at 486, 490. 
69. Id. at 489. 
70. Id. at 489–90.  The state’s interest is to protect society from individuals 
who are dangerous either to themselves or to others, while protecting the individual interest 
pertains to providing individuals with their basic constitutional right of freedom without the 
undue imposition of a state’s governmental restraints.  Id. 
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weighed.
71
  Neff v. State
72
 reiterated what the Donaldson case had already 
established and held that in Florida, if an individual is mentally ill and unable 
to recognize their illness, they still cannot be held against their will if they 
are considered non-dangerous, capable of caring for themselves, and 
ultimately able to survive despite their mental illness without help.
73
 
E. The 1980s and 1990s:  Explicit Examinations to Determine, Case-
by-Case, if Involuntary Commitment Is Necessary 
By the 1980s and into the 1990s, Florida courts began to define case-
by-case what clear and convincing evidence meant regarding the elements of 
the Baker Act.
74
  They also began defining on a case-by-case basis whether 
involuntary commitment was the appropriate and least restrictive measure 
needed by the patient to meet his or her needs while ensuring the safety of 
the public.
75
  Schexnayder v. State
76
 held that, even if a person was severely 
mentally ill, the state would not meet the clear and convincing burden of 
proof if a person had a place to live, had financial resources, and had 
knowledge they needed medication but would periodically forget their 
medication, which often led to the patient’s hospitalization.77  Despite the 
patient’s mood changes and hospitalizations, the court held that these 
instances did not show clear and convincing evidence that she was dangerous 
to herself or the public or that these events led to substantial harm to her 
well-being.
78
 
The Everett v. State
79
 case, in 1988, demonstrated the incredible and 
detrimental impact an incorrectly imposed court order of involuntary 
commitment against an individual can have on the liberty rights of that 
patient within the Baker Act system.
80
  The patient appealed the finding by 
the circuit court that held that she be involuntarily committed at a treatment 
facility to the First District Court of Appeal.
81
  The First District Court of 
                                                 
71. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489–90. 
72. 356 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
73. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Neff, 356 So. 2d at 
903. 
74. Everett v. State, 524 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing Schexnayder v. State, 495 So. 2d 850, 851–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)); see also 
Welk v. State, 542 So. 2d 1343, 1344–45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
75. See Burley v. State, 59 So. 3d 131, 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
76. 495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
77. Id. at 851–52. 
78. Id. 
79. 524 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
80. See id. at 1092–93. 
81. Id. at 1092. 
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Appeal reversed the decision of the circuit court because it found that the 
State did not provide evidence that showed involuntary placement was 
necessary and that she refused voluntary placement for mental health 
treatment.
82
  The devastating result in this case was that the appeal process 
endured beyond the original court order and, when the original court order 
expired, she had already been ordered to continue her involuntary 
placement.
83
  While the district court agreed that the State had not met its 
burden of proof in the original hearing, the order for continuing involuntary 
placement was not automatically considered null and void.
84
  Further, the 
patient’s liberty and time spent involuntarily committed while waiting for the 
appeal to be heard by the court could not be undone or recovered.
85
 
Welk v. State
86
 established that if there is insufficient evidence to 
show that a person poses real and current harm to themselves or others, then 
involuntary commitment is not justified even if an expert testifies that 
without supervision problems with the mentally ill patient will continue to 
arise.
87
  The Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Hedrick v. Florida 
Hospital Medical Center
88
 that even if the State can prove that the patient 
shows potential for poor judgment, without the evidence of a present and 
current threat to substantially harm himself or herself or someone else, the 
statutory test of clear and convincing evidence was not met.
89
  Conclusory 
statements that a patient had potential to cause substantial harm to himself 
and a potential for aggression did not meet the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to substantiate a court ordered continued involuntary placement 
under the Baker Act.
90
  Even the testimony of a psychologist stating that a 
patient should be institutionalized through the Baker Act—because she was 
incapable of taking care of herself and surviving alone, and would cause her 
own suffering through neglect and a refusal to take care of herself—did not 
pass the clear and convincing evidence standard according to the First 
District Court of Appeal in the Archer v. State
91
 case.
92
  The test was not met 
because the psychologist conceded that the patient had not threatened to hurt 
                                                 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Everett, 524 So. 2d. at 1092–93. 
85. See id. 
86. 542 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
87. See id. at 1344–45. 
88. 633 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
89. Id. at 1153–54. 
90. See id. 
91. 681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
92. Id. at 300–01. 
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herself or others, and the patient testified that she would take her 
medication.
93
 
To this end, the First District Court of Appeal in Lyon v. State,
94
 held 
that a schizophrenic woman, who refused to care for herself and was “likely 
to suffer from neglect,” did not show signs of a “real [or] present threat of 
substantial harm” to herself or anyone else and did not meet the requirements 
of involuntary commitment under the Baker Act.
95
  In this case, a doctor 
stated that the woman would become incoherent in her speech, would be 
unable to take care of herself, and would need supervision and structure 
when and if she did not take her medications.
96
  Still, despite these 
statements in the trial court hearing, the appellate court reversed the 
involuntary commitment order and found that the trial court’s holding did not 
meet the clear and convincing evidence burden.
97
  In Adams v. State,
98
 a 
petition for the involuntary placement of a patient for treatment was not 
granted because it did not meet the clear and convincing evidence burden, 
since a witness mentioned in the original Baker Act petition was not present 
at the hearing.
99
  This highlighted the ever-important issue of ensuring that 
the liberty of a patient is not deprived, without confirmation that all 
information and facts within the petition are confirmed by the judge, and 
rendered presently clear and convincing that the patient meets all the Baker 
Act requirements.
100
 
F. The Role of Teleconferences in Baker Act Hearings: State’s Interests 
Versus Mental Health Patients’ Constitutional Rights 
Historically, there are court proceedings that occur by video, such as 
arraignments.
101
  On November 12, 1998, video hearings were suggested as a 
means for involuntary commitment hearings to be held in a more convenient 
and cost-effective manner.
102
  While some judges commented that the 
videoconferences would lessen the need for patients to be transported to the 
courthouse, other mental health professionals pointed out several issues 
regarding mental health patients being provided their court hearings through 
                                                 
93. Id. at 301. 
94. 724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). 
95. Id. at 1241–42; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016). 
96. Lyon, 724 So. 2d at 1242. 
97. Id. at 1243. 
98. 713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
99. See id. at 1063–64. 
100. See id. 
101. FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9. 
102. Id. 
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videoconferences.
103
  Many mental health patients suffer from paranoia and 
will react negatively to video hearings.
104
  Mental health patients can be 
confused and unable to understand that the videoconference was a formal 
court hearing.
105
  Representatives from the Mental Health Program Office of 
the Department of Children and Families were concerned that the use of 
videos to conduct court hearings would deter mental health patients from 
participating in their involuntary placement proceedings.
106
  Judge Winifred 
Sharp, from the Fifth District Court of Appeal, admitted that it would be 
difficult to make a video proceeding feel like a formal court hearing, making 
it more difficult to ensure that a patient understands the proceeding was a 
formalized court proceeding which determines stakes as serious as their 
liberty and possible involuntary commitment.
107
  While the legislature never 
enacted the recommendations of the Supreme Court Commission, the 
Commission did recommend that to improve administrative justice during 
Baker Act hearings the use of videoconferences for involuntary placement 
hearings should not be used.
108
 
The Supreme Court of Florida cited to Ibur v. State,
109
 which stated, 
“[b]ecause involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at 
which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be 
denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be 
heard.”110 
Part of the specified criteria in the Baker Act is that an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted for involuntary inpatient treatment.
111
  The court 
must also conduct the hearing within five court-working-days, except for 
when a continuance is granted.
112
  And unless otherwise represented, the 
individual will be appointed a public defender by the court within one court-
working-day.
113
  The Baker Act requires that, unless for good cause, the 
hearing would be held in the county or facility where the patient was located, 
as deemed appropriate.
114
  The hearing would need to be “convenient [for] 
the patient [and] consistent with orderly procedure,” and would need to be in 
                                                 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
106. FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 765 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
110. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Ibur, 765 So. 2d 
at 276). 
111. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2), (6) (2016). 
112. Id. § 394.467(6)(a)1. 
113. Id. § 394.467(4). 
114. Id. § 394.467(6)(a)2. 
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a physical setting that is not dangerous to the patient’s condition.115  
Magistrates, along with judges, are allowed to preside over these hearings.
116
 
These procedural safeguards were established by the legislature to 
protect and recognize that individuals who fell under the auspices of the 
Baker Act were some of “the most vulnerable individuals of . . . society.”117  
No doubt, the safeguard spelling out that hearings must be held by judges 
physically present was not in the statute.
118
 
II. RECIDIVISM AND THE PUSH FOR REFORM 
Before twenty years had passed since the Baker Act’s initial 
implementation, calls for reform were prevalent throughout Florida.
119
  
Reformers and civilians alike began to question the effectiveness of the 
Baker Act system at providing patients with treatment without depriving 
them of their constitutional rights.
120
  In many cases, mentally ill patients 
could not recognize they were ill and needed services.
121
  The Baker Act’s 
aim was to promote families and patients to voluntarily seek help at 
outpatient community centers, yet patients consistently lacked the insight to 
know they were ill.
122
  The Baker Act was originally drafted to authorize law 
enforcement officers and agents to provide emergency services through 
                                                 
115. Id. 
116. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)3. 
117. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1025 (Fla. 2017). 
118. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467. 
119. FLA. STAT. § 394.467; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & 
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 2; Mark D. Killian, Fairness 
Commission Says Baker Act Is in Need of an Overhaul, FLA. B. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2000), 
http://www.floridabar.org/news/tfb-
news/?durl=%2FDIVCOM%2FJN%2Fjnnews01.nsf%2FArticles%2FD7ADEF93C0A14EE7
85256B1100775780; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, Baker Act Reform:  Protect 
the Vulnerable with Changes in Law, SUN-SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/opinion/sfl-edittdmental4feb18-story.html. 
120. See Killian, supra note 119 (explaining that in the 1990s, while the law 
required a Baker Act hearing to occur within four to five days after the initial seventy-two-
hour involuntary commitment time had passed and a petition was filed, only 40–50% of Baker 
Act hearings would occur within that time frame).  Thus, 50–60% of Baker Act hearings were 
not occurring within the statutory time frame, and individuals were being effectively held 
against their will without committing a crime and without recourse to combat their 
detainment.  Id.  Hence, these individuals were denied their constitutional right to due process 
during this time.  See id. 
121. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
122. Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum:  A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by 
Contract:  A System of Advance Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the 
Intermittently Mentally Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (1999); see also 
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 
16, at 1. 
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inpatient involuntary commitments to stabilize persons dangerous to 
themselves or others for only seventy-two hours.
123
  These two elements 
combined led to individuals being repeatedly involuntarily committed.
124
  
From 1965 until 1995, involuntary commitments increased dramatically,
125
 
and in 2002, over 900 Florida adult patients were admitted to hospitals 
through the Baker Act over four times.
126
  In one extreme case, a patient 
received forty-one examinations, and cost the State of Florida in excess of 
$81,000.
127
 
Reforms attempting to overhaul the Baker Act in 1996 and 1999 did 
not rid Florida’s Mental Health system of the constitutional abuses against 
patients.
128
  The overhaul, from as recently as 1996, attempted to lessen 
inappropriate commitments, such as vulnerable elderly individuals who were 
committed despite not needing psychiatric treatment.
129
  These abuses 
continued because patients became vulnerable once they were placed in the 
seventy-two hour hold and unable to voluntarily make any decisions until 
either released from the hospital or released by a judge.
130
  Further, while the 
law guarantees that involuntary commitment will be imposed upon an 
individual when all other methods are exhausted and the commitment is 
considered the least restrictive means for that patient to receive help, the 
definition of least restrictive is in itself up for interpretation.
131
  Receiving 
facilities and hospitals are allowed to hold a patient for seventy-two hours if 
the patient meets the involuntary commitment criteria.
132
  However, they 
may also ask a judge to allow them to hold a patient for longer periods if the 
facility feels that the person is a harm to themselves or others.
133
  In these 
                                                 
123. South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
124. See id. 
125. See Torrey, supra note 59. 
126. South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
127. Id. 
128. See Jonathan Abel, Police Resort to Baker Act for a 7-Year-Old’s 
Tantrum, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 14, 2009, at 1B; Carol Marbin Miller, Locked in 
Hospital, Woman Caught in Baker Act Fight, MIAMI HERALD: MIAMI-DADE CTY. (Aug. 18, 
2015, 9:05 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article31483943.html. 
129. Miller, supra note 128. 
130. Id.; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL 
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 46, at 3. 
131. See Miller, supra note 128; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, 
supra note 119. 
132. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016) (referring to the criteria a 
patient must meet by clear and convincing evidence in order to be involuntarily committed 
under the Baker Act). 
133. Miller, supra note 128. 
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instances, the facility receives Medicaid money to cover the cost of 
treatment—putting a price tag on each Baker Act patient’s head.134 
 
A. Unfunded and Short-Sighted Reforms Lead to a Resurgence of Old 
Abuses and Re-Institutionalization via Criminalization and Incarceration 
 
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida Commission on Fairness 
organized and evaluated whether the 1970s Baker Act was providing 
treatment, access, and opportunities to participate and receive services 
through the state court system in an equal manner.
135
  The chair of the 
Commission was Eleventh Circuit Judge Gill S. Freeman, and she wrote that 
Florida “failed to develop . . . adequate . . . community programs [that met] 
the needs of its people.”136  In 1997, the Commission reported that over half 
a million people in the State of Florida suffered from mental illness—more 
than 300,000 from Alzheimer’s; that “more than 70,000 [people] were 
involuntarily examined [by] the Baker Act;” and close to “20,000 petitions 
for involuntary civil commitment [were filed requesting] psychiatric 
treatment.”137  The Commission focused on the idea that inadequate funding 
was the main problem in meeting the goals and purpose described by the 
1970s Baker Act.
138
  The system was slowed down and, as a result, 
detentions in involuntary civil commitments became lengthier, and abuses 
began to increase because monetary gains could be achieved by holding 
individuals for longer than necessary, especially with regard to the elderly.
139
  
“[T]he tension between fiscally driven policy and clinically desirable 
outcomes” has been named the key cause of these issues.140  The switch from 
treating mentally ill patients with federally funded money to providing them 
treatment through state-funded programs has caused a major shift in how 
treatment is provided to patients and what patients qualify for state-funded 
help.
141
 
                                                 
134. Id.; see also Killian, supra note 119. 
135. See Killian, supra note 119. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. 
140. Jeffrey L. Gellar, Excluding Institutions for Mental Diseases from Federal 
Reimbursement for Services:  Strategy or Tragedy?, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1397, 1397 
(2000). 
141. See id. at 1399; Derek Gilliam, Panel Looks at Mental Health Reform; 
Proper Treatment and Funding Could Help Many More in Need, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 30, 
2015, at B8 (explaining that this tension in 2015 was a result of Medicare only reimbursing 
60% of treatment provided to patients who qualified for Medicare funds, and the lack of funds 
coupled with a “lack of uniformity [between] mental health courts, . . . a shortage of 
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Other major issues that the Commission cited as to why the Baker 
Act needed reform were:  (1) time frames were not defined and up to 
interpretation—five days could mean “five working days or five consecutive 
days;” (2) no due process was afforded to a patient until the court hearing 
occurred; (3) “justice system participants [were] not always . . . trained on 
[the] mental health issues” they were either representing or making 
judgments; (4) almost exclusively, mental health patients were only 
represented by public defenders; (5) the quality of representation was not 
uniform, despite most being represented by their county’s public defender 
office; (6) resources to public defenders were not uniform; (7) 
communication about the priority which these cases were to take in public 
defender offices was not uniform; (8) compliance by state attorneys’ offices 
to represent and participate at every involuntary commitment hearing did not 
always occur, leading to the release of dangerous patients; (9) law 
enforcement officials and agencies lacked training on mental health as well; 
and (10) persons were, and could be, involuntarily committed because of the 
vindictiveness of an enraged spouse or neighbor given some officials were 
not trained properly.
142
  Beyond these issues cited by the Commission, the 
deinstitutionalized system depended on patients who lacked self-recognition 
and insight by mental health patients that they were sick and needed help.
143
 
Mental health advocates argued that as the system stood in 2004, a 
reform was needed because the system “deinstitutionaliz[ed] . . . persons 
with mental illness [away] from . . . mental health hospitals” and, ultimately, 
led them to “their re-institutionalization [within] the criminal justice 
system.”144  In 1992, a Public Citizen Survey found that sometimes 
individuals with no charges against them are incarcerated because they are 
waiting for a psychiatric evaluation, a hospital bed, or transportation to the 
hospital.
145
  One sheriff in Florida stated, “I have had mentally ill inmates in 
paper gowns in holding cells for close observation for up to six weeks before 
we could find a hospital bed for them.”146 
                                                                                                                   
psychiatrists, and [a] need for flexible spending” created a system that was constantly in 
turmoil). 
142. Killian, supra note 119. 
143. Id.; see also Stavis, supra note 122, at 21–22. 
144. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr. 
1, 2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY 
ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD:  MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, 
SAN BERNADINO, AND ANCHORAGE 2, 10 (2000), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf. 
145. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S 
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 37 (1997). 
146. Id. 
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B. The Disastrous Failures of Deinstitutionalization and the Move to 
Implement New Reforms in 2004 
In July 1998, forty-three year old Alan Singletary of Seminole 
County, Florida, killed Deputy Eugene Gregory after a thirteen-hour standoff 
ensued over a simple landlord-tenant dispute.
147
  Singletary had untreated 
schizophrenia, and his family had sought help for him for years without 
success.
148
  The landlord-tenant dispute quickly plummeted into a confusing 
and unsettling “standoff between Singletary, Seminole [Florida] Sheriff’s 
deputies, and SWAT team members.”149  Ultimately, Singletary died after 
killing Deputy Gregory and wounding two other law enforcement officers.
150
  
Politicians and law enforcement agents would state that this incident was 
emblematic of a growing “law enforcement and humanitarian issue” 
regarding the treatment of mentally ill patients.
151
  While Florida was 
considered a pioneer in mental health law, heavy burdens induced upon law 
enforcement, the court system, and hospital crisis units made the 
practicalities of enforcing the 1971 Baker Act exceedingly difficult.
152
  
Loopholes in implementing the law existed and continuing care was not 
provided.
153
  If an inpatient bed was not readily available, that patient was 
released, and the continued care they needed was not always provided.
154
 
By 2004, a call for Baker Act reform headed by Seminole County 
Sheriff Don Eslinger, made it to the State Legislature calling for sustained 
outpatient commitment orders combined with intensive mental health 
services.
155
  On the session’s last day, a major rewrite of the Baker Act was 
instituted.
156
  The reform was enacted into law by Governor Jeb Bush in 
2004.
157
  The push was to begin to enact reforms; to create avenues which 
                                                 
147. In Memoriam…, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION (Treatment Advocacy 
Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 9. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Jan Pudlow, Baker Act Rewrite Calls for Outpatient Treatment, FLA. B. 
NEWS, June 1, 2004, at 7. 
152. Lilac, Editorial, Sensible Help; Our Position:  Continuing Treatment 
Should Be Required for Violent Mental Patients., ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 25, 2004, at 
G2; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); In Memoriam..., supra note 147, at 9; Killian, 
supra note 119. 
153. Lilac, supra note 152; see also In Memoriam…, supra note 147, at 9. 
154. TORREY, supra note 145, at 10; Lilac, supra note 152. 
155. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
156. Id. 
157. New Help, New Hope, in Florida, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION, 
(Treatment Advoc. Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 
(2016). 
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provide mental health patients with the resources they need—while keeping 
the public safe: to not create confusion in an underfunded mental health 
system; and to not overburden the court system.
158
  Mental health advocates 
believed that people with serious mental illness could avoid hospitalization if 
they received early interventions and treatments that were appropriate before 
their mental health deteriorated.
159
 
Mental health advocates began to look at other states’ mental health 
systems and eventually fixated on New York’s Kendra’s Law.160  The law in 
New York authorized court ordered assisted outpatient treatment to 
individuals with mental illness.
161
  Kendra’s Law, developed after a man 
with severe mental illness who was unable to comply with doctor’s orders 
and medical prescriptions, pushed thirty-two-year-old Kendra Webdale into a 
New York City subway train and killed her.
162
  Many Baker Act reforms 
were passed in 2004, intending to solve the problems that were discussed 
above.
163
  However, the amount allotted to institute these reforms was 
devastatingly under the estimated $150 million needed to institute Kendra’s 
Law in its first five years.
164
  Citing only to a 25% government match and 
one additional administrator at each mental health location to input 
additional data, the bill only loosely defined its financial terms and 
reforms.
165
 
Judges and other legal personnel in Florida’s criminal system argued 
that persons with mental illness often committed misdemeanors and would 
cycle in and out of county jails.
166
  This was attributed by judges and legal 
professionals in the criminal legal community as resulting from persons with 
mental illness not being diagnosed correctly; the lack of management of 
mental health patients outside inpatient facilities, and that for some 
individuals treatment only occurred when in jail, but was discontinued, along 
with their use of medications, once released from imprisonment.
167
  Some 
even argued that the newest rewrite of the Baker Act would save money by 
                                                 
158. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
159. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr. 
1, 2004). 
160. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id.; see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff 
Analysis 1. 
164. See Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 
12; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
165. Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12–13. 
166. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 9. 
167. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6. 
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keeping patients out of a revolving door of expensive hospitals and jails.
168
  
While others predicted oppositely and believed that the legislation that came 
with no funding would, in fact, overburden courts and create confusion; and 
the workload cost, while not determined, would undoubtedly be excessive.
169
  
The legislation was deemed by many as a mandate without resources, both in 
physical and monetary support.
170
  Even the House of Representatives’ Staff 
Analysis Report stated that HB 463 would create a recurring fiscal impact, 
but only estimated the impact to be at $636,608 to $954,912.
171
 
Given that the laws put into place in 2004 were modeled after New 
York’s Kendra’s Law, the recurring estimated amount to fund SB 700/HB 
463 was grossly underestimated over the actual cost of $150 million to 
institute Kendra’s Law in New York.172  The $150 million was only allotted 
to pay for the first five years of its implementation.
173
  Beyond the 
considerable discrepancy between the amount used to fund Kendra’s Law 
and the amount estimated to institute the 2004 reforms, the workload cost 
was described as the most detrimental in the 2000 Commission on Fairness 
Report, which stated that more training on mental health issues was needed 
and more thorough efforts by those representing and involuntarily 
committing patients needed to be provided to both protect the patient and the 
state’s interests.174  Judge Mel Grossman from the Seventeenth Circuit 
pointed to the fact that the legislation entitled patients to resources that the 
State did not currently have.
175
  “[T]he statute talks about entitlements to 
guardian advocates.  In most areas of the state, there are very few people.  
[You are] talking about people committing to multi-year supervision, 
because mental illness is not something that is cured overnight.  I think there 
will be some difficulty there.”176  President of the Florida Public Defender 
Association, Nancy Daniels, stated that the new legislation would very likely 
“bring a lot of new cases into the system.”177 
A major problem that Kendra’s Law faced in New York, and persists 
as a major concern in Florida, is that the mentally ill will become 
incarcerated, homeless, and loiter in public spaces.
178
  Laws focused on 
                                                 
168. Pudlow, supra note 151. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 14. 
172. Id.; see also South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
173. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
174. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12; 
Killian, supra note 119; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
175. Pudlow, supra note 151. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. See id.; Watnik, supra note 55, at 1186–87. 
174
Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1 5
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 42, Issue 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
2017] THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS 159 
deinstitutionalizing mental health, such as Kendra’s Law, moved away from 
traditional notions of mental illness treatment that institutionalized patients in 
hospitals where they received structured, guided, and controlled care.
179
  
Kendra’s Law was a move towards deinstitutionalization of mental health 
treatment for patients.
180
  The move to deinstitutionalize allowed patients to 
gain liberty in exchange for treatment.
181
  However, those who are 
imminently at danger often qualify for outpatient treatment until an actual 
danger, risk, or harm occurs.
182
  While patients gain their liberty and freedom 
through this process, the discharge of thousands of mentally ill patients from 
psychiatric hospitals, without providing a means to ensure that those same 
patients receive and take the medications they need to stay healthy, creates a 
crisis produced by deinstitutionalization.
183
 
One major contribution to the predicted workload increase was a 
new requirement that all Baker Act cases be reviewed every six months, 
making for heavy traffic within the court system without any resources or 
means to meet the excess demands on the court system.
184
  Predicting these 
difficulties, a prosecutor and chair for the House Appropriations Committee, 
Republican Bruce Kyle put in an amendment that funds would be provided 
to “state attorneys and public defenders” to assuage the predicted increase 
workload.
185
  However, the amendment was later taken off, before the bill 
was actually passed in the House by final vote 100 to 15.
186
  Ultimately, the 
bill was passed and predictions were that hearings would double or even 
triple, yet few resources were offered by politicians to alleviate 
implementing laws through practical procedures.
187
  Judge Grossman stated 
the frustration felt by many:  “They gave us no money to go with this.  They 
[did not] give us any new judges.  It is an unfunded mandate.”188 
                                                 
179. See Pudlow, supra note 151; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, 
supra note 119; E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Why Deinstitutionalization Turned 
Deadly, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Aug. 4, 1998, at A18. 
180. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
181. Watnik, supra note 55, at 1185–86; see also TORREY, supra note 145, at 8, 
10. 
182. See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1187 n.29; Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 
179. 
183. See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179. 
184. Pudlow, supra note 151. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
175
et al.: Nova Law Review
Published by NSUWorks, 2018 6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
160 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
C. The Curious Case of Cindy Mertz:  Abuses Recalling Back to 
Florida’s Mental Health System Pre-Baker Act Still Exist 
A systematic upheaval, the deinstitutionalization of a system, and a 
revolving door of reforms have not rid Florida’s Mental Health System of the 
abuses and problems that the Baker Act promised and aimed to resolve since 
1971.
189
  The case of Cindy Mertz is one case that typifies this abuse.
190
  
Mertz was an intellectually disabled twenty-one-year-old who was held 
under the Baker Act in 2015.
191
  She was a child of abuse, placed into the 
foster system, and eventually adopted by a family in 2008.
192
  Against the 
wishes of her adopted family who became her legal guardians, Mertz was 
locked into North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital instead of the state-
funded group home where staff and her family had placed her originally.
193
  
North Tampa Behavioral Health is owned by Acadia Healthcare—a 
conglomerate that runs 225 health facilities in thirty-seven states.
194
  North 
Tampa Behavior Health came into trouble, only a year earlier, when a 
woman admitted herself into the hospital voluntarily and was then refused 
release.
195
  The hospital was also criticized in 2014 for not ensuring that 
patients were competent to consent when admitting themselves pursuant to 
what the Baker Act laws in Florida require.
196
  At the time the article was 
printed, August 18, 2015, Mertz had been locked up for three weeks in the 
North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital, well beyond the seventy-two hour 
hold prescribed by the Baker Act.
197
  Nikki Drake, a board member of the 
National Association for Mental Illness, wrote an email to hospital staff on 
August 13, 2015, asking what needed to be done in order for Mertz to leave 
the hospital.
198
  She stated in the email, “[s]he can[not] live there.  You 
[cannot] cure her developmental disability.”199  Two days after the original 
article was published in the Miami Herald, Mertz was sent back to her group 
                                                 
189. See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (2016); Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–04, 
113, 117–19; Editorial, Baker Act Is Inadequate and Overused, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 8, 
2015, at F4; Miller, supra note 128. 
190. See Miller, supra note 128. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Miller, supra note 128. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
176
Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1 7
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 42, Issue 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
2017] THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS 161 
home.
200
  The original arguments for keeping her in the hospital no longer 
appeared to apply as reasons for keeping her in the facility.
201
 
Mertz’s case is not unique, and it is possible under the Baker Act to 
be taken against one’s will legally.202  Richard Smith’s seven-year-old son 
was involuntarily committed into a mental institution by officers and school 
officials when he threw a temper-tantrum in his second-grade class.
203
  After 
reporting to the boy’s elementary school, seeing a classroom torn apart, 
hearing he stepped on a teacher’s foot, and battered another school official, 
the officers decided that the boy needed to be evaluated for his mental 
health.
204
  While school officials and officers believe that their decision to 
have the boy involuntarily committed under the Baker Act was valid, other 
legal officials, and the boy’s parents, believe that this was an abuse of the 
mental health system, given that the most harm caused was stepping on a 
teacher’s foot.205  In Pinellas County alone, in the school year of 2008 to 
2009, between August and early February, the Pinellas School Police 
reported that it Baker Acted eighty-three children within its system alone.
206
 
III. REFORM FAILURE WITHIN FLORIDA’S BAKER ACT SYSTEM AND THE 
CAUSES OF SYSTEMIC ABUSE 
The numerous allegations of abuse and the general overbreadth of 
those alleged abuses have many causes.
207
  The 2004 reforms were instituted 
as a humane measure that would prevent the mentally ill from hurting 
                                                 
200. Carol Marbin Miller, Woman Locked in Florida Mental Hospital Released 
to Her Group Home, MIAMI HERALD: FLA. (Aug. 20, 2015, 11:56 AM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article31620170.html. 
201. See id.; Miller, supra note 128. 
202. See FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); Abel, supra note 128. 
203. Abel, supra note 128. 
204. Id. 
205. See id. 
206. Id. (comparing this number to the fact that the figure of eighty-three 
children, in less than six months, excludes all other legal agencies in the area and is specific to 
the Pinellas School Police Force); see also Laura C. Morel, Numbers Show Surge in Baker Act 
Exams of Kids in Tampa Bay Area, TAMPA BAY TIMES: NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:55 AM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/numbers-show-surge-in-baker-act-exams-of-
kids-in-tampa-bay-area/2306799 (referring to the fact that children are being committed 
involuntarily by the school system and parents because there is no oversight of the initial 
commitment by the court system and patient/minor child confidentiality prevents further 
investigation into the matter). 
207. Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, SUN-SENTINEL 
(Dec. 15, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-more-judges-needed-
20161215-story.html; see also Miller, supra note 128; Editorial, supra note 189; Associated 
Press, Involuntary Health Commitments Surge in Minors, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Dec. 20, 2016), 
http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/involuntary-mental-health-commitments-surge-minors. 
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themselves or others.
208
  Yet, a Times-Union editorial declared—as recent as 
November 2015—the 2004 reforms had not solved the problems they set out 
to resolve.
209
 
A. Misuse and Abuse of the Baker Act System:  Ever-Increasing 
Involuntary Commitments 
From 2004 to 2015, involuntary commitments in Florida increased 
by 64%.
210
  The Times-Union reported that involuntary commitments were 
often misused and abused.
211
  The article referenced reported Baker Act 
hospitalizations by schools and parents who cannot or will not care for their 
difficult children.
212
  Meanwhile, the frail, elderly population—who suffer 
from dementia and act out as a symptom of the disease or other illnesses—
are also often Baker Acted
213
 rather than placed where their needs would be 
better addressed.
214
  While mental health advocates applauded the Baker Act 
in the 1970s, they are now concerned with the Baker Act being a dumping 
ground used to commit and institutionalize individuals when the system has 
nowhere else to place them.
215
 
Continuous increases in involuntary commitments also reflect mental 
health advocates’ concerns regarding the validity of research used to promote 
the status-quo and subdue the call for more reforms of the current Baker Act 
system.
216
  While Baker Act patients are in contact with substance abuse 
services, mental health advocates question the validity of that research and 
state real concerns about a missing connection or coordination between 
those Baker Acted and substance abuse services.
217
  This problem becomes 
compounded in situations where the mentally ill are homeless or without 
resources and help once released.
218
  Once released, the revolving door 
                                                 
208. See Editorial, supra note 189. 
209. See id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Miller, supra note 128; see also Voices on Baker Act Reform, TREATMENT 
ADVOC. CTR., 
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/voices_on_baker_act_reform.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017).  It is generally understood and accepted that if someone is Baker 
Acted, he or she has been involuntarily committed under the Baker Act.  Voices on Baker Act 
Reform, supra. 
214. See Editorial, supra note 189. 
215. Id. 
216. See id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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becomes almost inevitable as patients leave with only pills, a prescription, 
and no easy access to continued mental health care.
219
 
The Baker Act Reporting Center reported that thirty-one mental 
health patients were Baker Acted sixteen or more times in one year alone.
220
  
From 2004 to 2013, close to 350 patients were involuntarily committed over 
thirty-six times or more.
221
  This problem worsened when each institution 
and the bodies of professionals who were required to act in involuntary civil 
commitments acted independently and disjointedly.
222
  The Times-Union 
Editorial Board opined and warned that these issues were a product of a 
broken system and an obvious result of legislators passing reforms without 
providing the necessary funding to enact the reforms.
223
  Florida ranks forty-
ninth out of fifty states regarding the amount of money it spends on mental 
health.
224
  Annette Christy, who was in charge of Florida’s Baker Act 
Reporting Center in 2015, stated that there was a need for funds and that, 
unfortunately, tragedy appears to be one of the few triggers that will 
stimulate the funds needed.
225
 
B. Competing Authorities and Interests:  Who Prevails?  How Can 
Information Be Communicated to Meet the Needs of the Patient and 
Competing Authorities? 
W.M. v. State
226
 established that multiple divisions and courts 
representing the State can have concurrent jurisdiction overseeing the 
involuntary inpatient placement hearings of patients involuntarily 
committed.
227
  This can result in what is seen in the W.M. case:  A patient 
can be committed for a short period of time and then be mandated by a 
facility administrator to stay a longer term than the circuit court’s initial 
determination.
228
  The facility administrator only needed to determine the 
patient was incompetent to act on his or her own behalf.
229
  Further, given the 
confidential nature of the patients and separate oaths of confidentiality 
between the patient, psychiatrists, lawyers, guardians, and mental health 
                                                 
219. Editorial, supra note 189. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. See id. 
223. Id. 
224. Editorial, supra note 189. 
225. Id. 
226. 992 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
227. Id. at 384, 388. 
228. Id. at 384–86. 
229. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); W.M., 992 So. 2d at 384; Miller, 
supra note 128. 
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advocates, necessary oversight over each patient, case, the facilities, and 
treatment becomes almost impossible without inherently violating a patient’s 
right to privacy.
230
 
Referring back to the case of the Cindy Mertz, a major cause of her 
alleged kidnapping resulted from competing authorities, interests, and an 
inability to communicate clearly.
231
  Communication between judges, mental 
health advocates, and the hospital was not handled in-person and primarily 
done through varying forms of technology—either email or the phone.232   
These technological communications prevented immediate actions from 
being taken, and allowed for delays, as the allegations of Mertz’s advocates 
and guardian—based primarily on their communications over phone and 
email with hospital staff and Mertz—were weighed against the alleged 
observations of hospital staff and administrators.
233
  The Miami Herald 
reported, “[l]ong email threads among Drake, [Mertz’s advocate], Mertz’s 
guardian, her behavior analyst, and hospital staffers beg[a]n on Aug[ust] 
[third], and bec[a]me increasingly frantic.”234  J. Rob Phillips, the Director of 
Clinical Services at North Tampa Behavioral Health, validated the hospital’s 
decision to keep the developmentally impaired woman in the hospital by 
stating in an email that Mertz had shown “suicidal ideation[s] and suicidal 
gestures” and that it would be sending Mertz to court to keep her in its 
facility.
235
  Meanwhile, Drake wrote back that the woman was not psychotic 
and, when he spoke to her over the phone, she sounded over-medicated 
causing her speech to be severely slurred.
236
  Access to the patient was 
regulated by the hospital, and the patient’s access to the court was dependent 
upon the facility or hospital where they are admitted.
237
  This holds true until 
the patient is deemed by a judge to have met the criteria for release, and he or 
she is released by the judge from the facility’s control.238 
                                                 
230. See Miller, supra note 128 (discussing how doctors referred to the 
patient’s confidentiality as a reason why they would not be able to provide more reasons as to 
why they were not releasing Mertz as requested). 
231. See id. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. 
234. Id. 
235. Miller, supra note 128. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(7)(d) (2016); Miller, supra note 128. 
180
Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1 1
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue Volume 42, Issue 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018
2017] THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS 165 
IV. DOE V. STATE:  DOES TELECONFERENCING BAKER ACT HEARINGS 
PROVIDE A NECESSARY REMEDY OR VIOLATE AN INDIVIDUAL’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? 
Video technology developed and advanced at the same time that 
Florida’s judiciary confronted many financial limitations.239  Budget cuts 
forced courts and the judiciary to create new and efficient ways to meet the 
rigorous demands of their judicial obligations, and ultimately led to an 
inquiry into how technology could be used for efficient and effective 
change.
240
  Statutory prohibitions and rule-based prohibitions do not exist 
regarding the use of videoconferencing during Baker Act proceedings.
241
  At 
the time that the Supreme Court of Florida considered this case, case law did 
not exist stating that Baker Act hearings by videoconferences were 
prohibited by the Constitution.
242
 
On March 30, 2016, two seemingly innocuous email lines began a 
firestorm of legal debate, questioning the procedural validity, 
constitutionality, decision-making, and duties of judges with regard to using 
videoconferencing during Baker Act Hearings.
243
  As part of her daily 
routine, Judicial Assistant for the Honorable Judge Swett, Kate Hroncich, 
sent an email to Public Defender Kathleen Smith with the subject of Baker 
Acts on Friday.
244
  The email stated:  “Per Judge Swett, he will be doing 
Baker Acts beginning this Friday via Polycom.  Thank you.”245 
These two lines began a legal battle between mental health officials, 
attorneys for the mentally ill, and trial judges who presided over Baker Act 
hearings.
246
  The debate would highlight the problematic procedural structure 
of the Baker Act, showcase how the mentally ills’ due process rights can be 
easily violated, re-emphasize the importance and need for reform, and 
underscore the continued lack of effective reform.
247
  Beyond whether the 
judge’s email violated an established legal procedure, petitioners questioned 
whether the patients’ constitutional and due process rights were violated as a 
result of this procedure.
248
 
                                                 
239. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 20. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 2. 
242. Id. 
243. See Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2017); Petitioners’ Initial 
Brief at 5–6, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC16-1852). 
244. Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5. 
245. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023; Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5. 
246. See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023. 
247. See id. at 1022; infra Part IV (A)–(C). 
248. Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 1–2, 15. 
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A. The Practical and Procedural Costs of the 2004 Baker Act Reforms:  
Insufficient Resources and the Advent of Teleconferencing for Baker Act 
Hearings 
In order to understand the significance of Doe, the historical and 
legal context of the judges’ plight must be understood and considered.249  
Despite the legislature passing Baker Act reforms in 2004, the Florida 
Legislature had not added circuit or county judgeships in ten years to support 
the enactment of those reforms.
250
  Only in 2016, were twelve new 
judgeships recommended and announced by the Supreme Court of Florida.
251
  
Yet, these recommendations came ten years behind schedule as reforms from 
2004 increased judges’ workloads regarding Baker Act hearings.252  From 
2010 until 2015 alone, some counties reported a 50% or more increase in 
Baker Act evidentiary hearings for minors alone.
253
  With no new judgeships 
added, judges were required to meet the needs of these patients and conduct 
the hearings at the courthouse or at patients’ facilities.254  When judges 
commuted to patient facilities, they would often have to wait as patients met 
with their attorneys.
255
  Wait time and time lost in travel backed up the 
hearing schedule in an already bogged down system.
256
  Costs accumulated 
as a result of the travel and wait time incurred by judges traveling from 
facility to facility.
257
  Yet, the travel and wait time was not limited to 
judges—all legal and medical authorities involved in the case were also 
required to attend the hearings, imparting more fees on the state through the 
presence and appearance of state, medical, and law enforcement officials.
258
  
                                                 
249. See Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207 
(discussing how Florida lawmakers have not added judgeships in a decade and how 
judgeships have been impacted by heavy burdens on the state’s fiscal health because of crises 
such as the mortgage crisis). 
250. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Fla. S. Comm. on Child., Fams. & Elder 
Aff., 2004 Regular Session: Summary of Legislation Passed 83 (2004), available at 
http://archive.flsenate.gov/publications/2004/senate/reports/summaries/pdf/sessum04.pdf; 
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207. 
251. Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207. 
252. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for 
More Judges, supra note 207; Morel, supra note 206. 
253. Morel, supra note 206. 
254. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13–15. 
255. Id. at 14 n.15. 
256. See id. at 14. 
257. Id. at 14–15. 
258. See id. 
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Meanwhile, judges would argue that the courthouse did not provide patients 
with a proper and safe setting to hold Baker Act evidentiary hearings.
259
  
Patients traveled to locations that were unfamiliar to them and followed strict 
protocols that were usually used to control “criminals or those accused of 
crime[s].”260  “The Baker Act [mandates] that the patients’ individual 
digniti[es] [be upheld and] respected at all times,” and these procedures were 
in direct opposition of that humane mandate.
261
  Holding cells were the only 
location where patients involuntarily committed could wait for their 
evidentiary hearings as no private or secure holding areas existed for 
patients.
262
  Meanwhile, placing patients in open and public areas caused a 
new host of problems as the patient presumably was involuntarily committed 
because he or she posed a danger either to himself or herself or the public.
263
  
By placing him or her in an open and public place, the respondent judges 
argued that this could cause the patient more harm and expose the public to 
unnecessary risks within the courthouse.
264
 
Further, medical facilities become responsible for relocating the 
patients to the courthouse, causing the state to incur more costs.
265
  
“[T]ransport service employees [would] not [necessarily] be law 
enforcement” officers properly trained to handle the risks of transporting 
such vulnerable patients.
266
  Escapes, medical emergencies, risk to the 
transport service employees, and increased costs to the state would all be the 
basis of the judge’s reasoning that teleconferences were appropriate and 
applicable to Baker Act hearings and could substitute the statutory in-person 
hearings held at the courthouse.
267
 
B. Doe v. State:  Petitioners Argue Baker Act Hearings Via 
Teleconferences Are a Violation of Patients’ Rights 
The issue at the heart of Doe was whether a judicial officer should be 
required to be physically present with the petitioners when Baker Act 
hearings were held—either by law or legal duty.268  The case was initiated 
                                                 
259. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15–16. 
260. Id. at 15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459(1) (2016)). 
261. Id. 
262. See id. at 15–16. 
263. Id. at 16. 
264. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 16. 
265. Id. at 14–15. 
266. Id. at 16. 
267. See id. at 14–17, 20. 
268. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1022–23 (Fla. 2017). 
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and filed with the Second District by fifteen petitioners, including John Doe, 
seeking relief from a seemingly off-the-cuff and without notice decision 
made by Judge Swett in Lee County that declared all involuntary 
commitment hearings would be held remotely.
269
  The Second District 
questioned the judgment of holding these hearings remotely, but held that 
conducting Baker Act hearings through teleconferences were “within the 
discretion of the court.”270  The Baker Act did not establish that judicial 
officers had a ministerial or indisputable legal duty to be physically present 
when they “presid[ed] over involuntary inpatient placement hearings.”271  
The majority of the district court panel reviewing the briefs submitted by 
both parties concluded that there was no “express legal right to have the 
judicial officer be physically present with the petitioners” during Baker Act 
hearings, and that no legal duty was outright expressed.
272
  However, they 
did determine the law clearly established that necessary mandamus relief 
“can derive from a variety of legal sources, including . . . rules of court.”273 
Judge Wallace wrote a concurring opinion with the majority where 
he expressed concerns about the law as it stood.
274
  The Second District did 
state that despite there being no express legal right to have a judge physically 
preside over Baker Act hearings, two problems did exist in the proceedings 
of the trial court:  (1) a court order supporting the judge’s arguments was not 
provided; and (2) the trial judge did not provide a reason for his decision to 
preside over involuntary placement hearings over teleconference.
275
  Even 
still, Wallace wrote in this opinion that while the majority held correctly, 
“the manner in which the trial judges . . . exercised [their] authority” over 
these hearings was unwarranted, inappropriate, and ill-advised.
276
  Despite 
his concurring opinion, Judge Wallace stated three reasons why conducting 
Baker Act hearings through teleconferencing equipment was questionable:  
(1) potential difficulties such as equipment malfunctioning and counsel not 
being able to approach the bench to speak in private; (2) the Supreme Court 
of Florida appointed a subcommittee on this topic in 1997, and the circuit 
court was disregarding the opinion of the subcommittee by continuing to 
                                                 
269. Id. at 1023. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217 
So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017). 
273. Id. (quoting Nader v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So. 
3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012)).  Established law does not have to only be defined by the legislature, 
but can also be derived from rules of court, statutes, constitutional law, and controlling case 
law.  Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723. 
274. Doe, 210 So. 3d at 159. 
275. Id. at 160–62. 
276. Id. at 159. 
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hold such hearings; and (3) similar procedures for juvenile hearings were 
used before and ultimately failed.
277
 
This begged the question of whether the silence by the legislature 
was an oversight or purposely excluded.
278
  The question became whether the 
silence on this procedure provided judges with a choice in how to handle 
such hearings, or if it was an oversight and the legislature assumed that 
longstanding traditions—always compelling the personal attendance of 
judicial officers at the evidentiary hearings and trials of which they preside—
would prevail.
279
 
Judge Lucas of the Second District Court of Appeal offered in his 
dissent that while no law required the physical presence of a judge in express 
terms,
280
 Bryant v. State
281
 established that the physical presence of a judge 
was constitutionally mandated in a criminal trial, unless waived.
282
  The case 
law held precedent that the physical presence of a judge was a bedrock 
principle and the reason it was not expressly stated in the law was because 
the physical presence of a judge or magistrate has always been a standard 
assumed as an elemental component to preside over trials and evidentiary 
hearings.
283
  The Baker Act hearings constitute evidentiary hearings; and as 
                                                 
277. Id. at 163–65 (discussing Florida’s videoconferencing experiment with 
juvenile detention hearings).  The Second District summarized the difficulties of 
videoconferencing in juvenile proceedings by referring to the Amendment to Florida Rule of 
Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), which states: 
Independent observations confirmed the fears expressed by all who have strongly 
and continuously opposed the adoption of the proposed robotic procedure.  
Specifically, many observed that there was no proper opportunity for meaningful, 
private communications between the child and the parents or guardians, between 
the parents or guardians and the public defender at the detention center, and 
between a public defender at the detention center and a public defender in the 
courtroom.  The mechanical process produced a proceeding where, on many 
occasions, multiple parties would speak at once, adding to the confusion.  At the 
conclusion of far too many hearings, the child had no comprehension as to what 
had occurred and was forced to ask the public defender whether he or she was 
being released or detained.  It was also problematic that the public defender at the 
detention center often had no access to the child’s court file, and there was 
absolutely no opportunity to approach the bench to discuss private matters or 
anything that should not have been openly broadcast.  Moreover, perhaps because it 
was difficult for the children to see, hear, and understand what was taking place, the 
youth did not behave as those participating in person in a courtroom; that is, the 
hearings totally lacked the dignity, decorum, and respect one would anticipate in a 
personal appearance before the court. 
Id. at 165; Amendment to Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), 796 So. 2d 
470, 473 (Fla. 2001). 
278. See Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168. 
279. See id. 
280. Id. at 166–68. 
281. 656 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam). 
282. Id. at 428–29. 
283. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1024; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168. 
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such, Judge Lucas argued that these court proceedings must be followed 
pursuant to the rules of evidence.
284
  Lucas argued that the advent and 
expansion of teleconferencing does not authorize judges to violate their 
duties as would otherwise be assigned.
285
  This was something implicitly 
assumed by the judges and magistrates who chose to use the technology as a 
substitute for their physical presence during evidentiary hearings.
286
 
C. Doe v. State:  Judges Argue that Technology Is a Necessary Remedy 
for Failed Baker Act Reforms and Increasingly Insurmountable Workloads 
The respondents in the Doe case argued in their Amicus Brief before 
the Supreme Court of Florida
287
 that the Supreme Court of Florida’s Task 
Force on the Management of Cases Involving Complex Litigation Report 
and Recommendations, published in 2008, stated that the Supreme Court of 
Florida should promote all courts throughout Florida to use 
videoconferencing when possible.
288
  The respondents pointed out in the 
same report that attorneys and judges were encouraged by the Supreme Court 
Task Force to use videoconferencing to resolve their cases more quickly.
289
 
The respondents argued, referring back to Judge Lucas’s dissent, that 
the Florida Rules of Evidence provided statutory authority that video 
recordings could be used to provide substantial testimonial evidence and 
witness statements.
290
  Important court appearances, such as criminal 
arraignments and first appearances, are often made by employing the use of 
technology.
291
  Medical experts testify using videoconferencing technologies 
during trial proceedings, and children testify during trial proceedings through 
videoconference calls in order to avoid trauma pursuant to Florida Statute 
section 92.55.
292
  Much in the same way that children need protecting, the 
judges argue in their Amicus Brief that the Baker Act provided several 
protections for the mentally ill and none were impeded upon by the use of 
                                                 
284. Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168. 
285. Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168–69. 
286. Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168; see also Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027. 
287. Answer Brief of Respondent at 10–11, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 
2017) (No. SC16-1852); see also Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2. 
288. See Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 10–11. 
289. See id. at 10. 
290. Id. at 12 (citing Kelley v. Webb, 676 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996)); see also Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Lucas 
J., dissenting), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017). 
291. Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 12. 
292. See FLA. STAT. § 92.55 (2016); Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 
287, at 12. 
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teleconferencing.
293
  While the petitioners argued that the use of 
videoconferencing technology during involuntary commitment procedures 
infringes upon the due process rights of the mentally ill, the respondents 
quoted the holding of M.W. v. Davis.
294
  M.W. held that while the purpose of 
due process in substantive due process claims was to protect the fair 
treatment of individuals by using proper administrative justice, the purpose 
and validity of due process claims in procedural due process depended on the 
nature of the court proceeding.
295
 
The Chief Judge Jeffrey Colbath of the Fifteenth District wrote an 
Amicus Brief citing that the Florida Legislature had not added or created 
new county or circuit judgeships in a decade but expected the reforms to be 
enacted.
296
  In his brief, he described the specific struggles of judges in Palm 
Beach County who comprised the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.
297
  The struggles 
derived from the expanse of the county and the lack of judges and time 
needed to cover the area; the county is sixty-miles-long and forty-miles-
wide, with seven mental health facilities all serviced by only four magistrates 
who would travel to attend the Baker Act hearings.
298
  The public defender, 
the state attorney, the sheriff deputy, and the judicial officer would all travel 
to each facility housing patients where they would preside over each of these 
hearings.
299
  The Chief Judge argued that time and resources lost were a 
waste as these hearings could be easily performed over teleconference.
300
 
The Chief Judge also referred to cost concerns related to Baker Act 
proceedings.
301
  Travel-related costs would no longer be incurred by the 
judicial officer or the sheriff deputy’s office.302  The state attorney and the 
public defender’s offices would also save these travel costs.303  Furthermore, 
the facilities would also avoid the travel costs of transporting the patient 
between the facility and courthouse.
304
 
                                                 
293. See FLA. STAT. § 92.55; Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial 
Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2–3, 20. 
294. 756 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 2000); see also Answer Brief of Respondent, 
supra note 287, at 14. 
295. M.W., 756 So. 2d at 97. 
296. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13. 
297. Id. at 14. 
298. Id. 
299. See id. 
300. Id. 
301. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 14. 
302. Id. 
303. See id. at 14–15. 
304. Id. 
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The security of the patient and the public is also cited in the Chief 
Justice’s Amicus Brief.305  Specifically, the judge wrote that the courthouses 
were not well equipped to hold Baker Act hearings because patients could 
only be held in criminal holding cells.
306
  He argued that the Baker Act states 
in plain language that holding cells should not be used and avoided for Baker 
Act hearings.
307
  Holding a Baker Act patient in an open waiting area, who 
has been involuntarily committed because he or she is deemed either a 
danger to themselves or others, is an equally disconcerting idea as it would 
expose the public to a known and unnecessary risk.
308
  Security protocols are 
not as easily controlled when a Baker Act hearing is held within the 
courthouse, given the environment cannot be completely controlled by the 
security provided by the facility.
309
 
D. The Supreme Court’s Final Decision on Doe v. State:  
Teleconferences are Unconstitutional 
The Supreme Court of Florida in the Doe case ultimately held that 
the lack of resources and the struggles that the judges described did not 
outweigh the individuals’ constitutional rights to due process and liberty.310  
The expediency and problems with workload did not provide sufficient 
reason to validate holding Baker Act hearings by teleconference.
311
  The 
Supreme Court of Florida stated that in Baker Act hearings, unlike in 
criminal proceedings, the use of teleconference technology is not expressly 
sanctioned against by the statute.
312
  However, the Court did take issue with 
the way the judge incorrectly used his authority to determine that he would 
only preside over Baker Act hearings through teleconference technology.
313
  
The Supreme Court of Florida described Judge Swett’s actions as misguided 
wisdom and an overreach of authority.
314
  His decision did not meet the 
standards intended by the legislature that allows judges to use their discretion 
as to where and how to hold Baker Act hearings.
315
  Longstanding traditions 
require that judicial officers be present at trials and the advent of technology 
                                                 
305. Id. at 15. 
306. Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15. 
307. Id. at 15. 
308. Id. at 16. 
309. See id. 
310. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017). 
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 1025, 1028. 
313. Id. at 1031. 
314. Id. at 1031–32. 
315. See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023–25. 
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does not change this tradition, nor is it a reason to change this tradition, nor 
should it be assumed to change this tradition.
316
  The Supreme Court of 
Florida wrote that the legislature’s intent regarding how and where to hold 
Baker Act hearings was to benefit the patient only, and ultimately depended 
upon what was least injurious to the patient’s condition.317  With the patient’s 
conditions in mind, judges could use their discretion as to whether Baker Act 
hearings should be held in the courthouse or at the mental health facility.
318
  
The final conclusion regarding the respondents’ practical and logistical 
concerns was that judicial expediency never justifies the exercise of a judge’s 
discretion regarding Baker Act hearings.
319
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The arguments made in the Amicus Brief of Chief Judge Jeff 
Colbath, while found to be insufficient to validate Baker Act hearings being 
teleconferenced, reflect a larger problem with the mental health system in 
Florida.
320
  Deinstitutionalization has created a mental health funding crisis 
with consistent decreases in funding provided to state-run treatment over the 
last three decades.
321
  In fact, after 2008, states were obligated to cut over $4 
billion in mental health spending, equating to the greatest decrease in 
spending and funding for mental health since deinstitutionalization began.
322
  
In 2004, seemingly needed calls for reform took place and many were 
applied, but without the proper funding to support those reforms.
323
  The lack 
of funding allotted to implement these reforms and the decrease in federal 
funding that justified the move towards deinstitutionalization left mental 
health facilities to find means—sometimes described as abuses—to pay for 
the treatments they were meant to provide.
324
  As recent as 2015, Governor 
Rick Scott proposed an increase of $19 million for mental health treatment, 
which ultimately was passed as a split between mental health and drug 
                                                 
316. Id. at 1027. 
317. Id. at 1025. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 1026. 
320. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 1–3, 20. 
321. See Deanna Pan, Timeline:  Deinstitutionalization and Its Consequences, 
MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/timeline-mental-health-america/. 
322. Id. 
323. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
324. See Editorial, supra note 189; Miller, supra note 128. 
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treatment to be released over two years.
325
  This amount, while seemingly 
large, is dwarfed by the $150 million used by the New York Legislature to 
implement Kendra’s Law for its first five years in the 1990s.326 
With the proper funding, more licensed professionals could provide 
care and services, and the services could be more effective.
327
  Without the 
proper funding, the mental health system in Florida, and those who must 
orchestrate and provide Baker Act services, will be consistently providing 
the same services to patients who consistently return to treatment, and will 
become overworked because they work in an inefficient and, possibly, 
dangerous system—due to patients not receiving treatment in time, or acting 
without medicine, or simply living in constant threats of lawsuits.
328
  
Meanwhile, patients will continue to be misdiagnosed, mistreated, held 
against their will without due process, negated liberty, and held without 
treatment until the system can provide them with their court appearance.
329
  
Patients may even be incarcerated—for acts they commit while being 
improperly treated or misdiagnosed—by an underfunded and ineffective 
system.
330
  In the past, reforms were consistently made without sufficient and 
proper funding provided, which has created our present mental health care 
crisis.
331
  When funds were allotted, they were minimal and token amounts, 
unable to achieve the lofty humanitarian notions the Baker Act and its 
reforms strived to achieve.
332
 
The Supreme Court of Florida questioned the wisdom of the judges’ 
use of technology and their justifications for its use in Baker Act hearings in 
Doe.
333
  Yet, the Amicus Brief was not an attempt to abscond from the 
official duties of Baker Act hearings, but rather a diligent attempt to deal 
                                                 
325. Margie Menzel, Mental Health, Substance Abuse Reforms Get Approval, 
HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/mental-health-
substance-abuse-reforms-get-approval/; Margie Menzel, State Leaders Look to Improve 
Mental-Health Funding, Policy, CBS MIAMI (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:41 PM), 
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/12/07/state-leaders-look-to-improve-mental-health-funding-
policy/. 
326. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119. 
327. See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119 
(explaining that as early as 2004, calls for reform were made to make the powers of the court 
more explicit).  Periods of patient observations needed to be extended beyond the standard 
fifteen minutes prescribed, and even with these two changes, major reductions in recidivism 
and mental illness turning into crime were expected.  Id. 
328. Editorial, supra note 189. 
329. See Gilliam, supra note 141; Killian, supra note 119; Torrey & 
Zdanowicz, supra note 179. 
330. Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179. 
331. Gilliam, supra note 141; Pudlow, supra note 151. 
332. See Pudlow, supra note 151. 
333. Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017). 
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with an overwhelming and ever-increasing problem given the documented 
surge in involuntary commitments and too few professionals and officials 
managing involuntary commitments under the Baker Act within Florida’s 
Mental Health System.
334
  Reforms should be conceived and approved within 
the limits of the funding provided—rather than minimal funding being 
promised by legislature to provide token gifts of support to reforms that are 
not achievable—otherwise, the increased pattern of incarcerating the 
mentally ill will continue to cost the state more than if patients were to 
receive proper treatment from the beginning.
335
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the most recent holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in the 
Doe case, the Florida Legislature should begin to rethink their reactive and 
token-funding approach to mental health.
336
  Proactive action needs to take 
place regarding mental health, where feasible reforms are enacted and a 
sufficient and healthy amount of funding is provided to ensure the success of 
the reforms.
337
  Baker Act reforms have consistently been underfunded and a 
response to crisis.
338
  The clear and convincing standard of dangerousness, 
either to one’s self or to others, is another pitfall that must be overcome 
because help is too often provided too little and too late.
339
  New legal 
definitions and grounds need to be created that better distinguish individuals 
who need involuntary commitments and those who solely just need mental 
health treatment and support.
340
  The definition of dangerousness needs to be 
expanded to include concerns about patients’ welfare, their ability to manage 
themselves healthily regarding self-care and neglect, as well as ensure that 
they are living in suitable living environments that promote mental health 
and self-care.
341
  A system responding to repeated crises without funding has 
created a system riddled with issues that make Florida’s Mental Health 
System a complex knot that must be untied; concurrent jurisdictions, 
disjointed action by competing authorities, a broken communication system, 
a concern for patient privacy, and a concern for funding underfunded 
hospitals all create a perfect storm where abuse threatens the patient’s liberty 
                                                 
334. See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
335. See Gilliam, supra note 141; Pudlow, supra note 151. 
336. See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1032. 
337. See Gilliam, supra note 141; Editorial, supra note 189. 
338. See Gilliam, supra note 141. 
339. See Editorial, supra note 189. 
340. Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill:  Is Their 
Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 157, 197 (2000). 
341. Id. 
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at every turn and the fight between all competing and interested parties 
ultimately affect the patient whose interest they all allegedly aim to 
protect.
342
  These abuses do not begin in hospitals or courtrooms, but rather 
have been created on Florida’s Senate floor.343  The State of Florida needs to 
stop reacting to crisis and, instead, act to prevent crisis by putting real money 
into these reforms.
344
 
                                                 
342. See W.M. v. State, 992 So. 2d 383, 386–87 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); 
Stavis, supra note 340, at 198; STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL 
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 3; Killian, supra note 119.  Miller illustrates how 
competing interests and an inability to communicate clearly and effectively between parties 
interested in the treatment and status of Mertz ultimately led to a chaotic scene that kept Mertz 
in treatment or kidnapp[ed] depending on which party was addressing the status and topic of 
Mertz’s inpatient commitment.  Miller, supra note 128. 
343. See Pudlow, supra note 151; Editorial, supra note 189. 
344. See Pudlow, supra note 151; Editorial, supra note 189. 
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